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PREFACE
The Secretariat of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s
International Hydrological Programme (UNESCO-IHP) is extremely pleased to present 
the publication, Urban Water Conflicts: An analysis of the Origins and Nature of Water-related
Unrest and Conflicts in the Urban Context. It is a product of the urban water management
projects being implemented under the Sixth Phase of IHP (2002-2007), and it represents
a joint effort with the IHP project, From Potential Conflict to Co-operation Potential 
(PCȺCP), which addresses water conflict prevention and resolution.
This collection of essays is a new and systematic effort to survey the controversial aspect 
of the management and, in many cases, mismanagement of freshwater resources in an 
urban setting. It addresses and characterizes the conflicts that arise within large human
settlements, due to the economic and social implications of access to and the use of basic 
water services. It also presents in-depth case studies from cities of various continents.
One prominent aspect of urban water issues is that, in contrast to agricultural, industrial, 
hydropower, ecosystem maintenance and recreational freshwater uses, water stress in the 
urban environment manifests itself directly at the household level, where the
consumption of domestic potable water takes place, and where the consumer is normally 
subject to charges for it. 
These essays are particularly relevant in a time when the world is becoming increasingly 
urbanized. Current projections predict that by 2007 half of humanity will live in cities, 
meaning the planet will have an urban majority for the first time in history. There are 
other political, social and economic processes at work, not the least of which has been 
the trend towards privatizing water services, which is of particular relevance to the
analysis of urban water conflicts.
This publication is the collective effort of numerous individuals. In particular, we would 
like to acknowledge Mr. Bernard Barraqué, Chairman of the French IHP National 
Committee, senior researcher at the National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS) in
Paris and chief coordinator of IHP’s Urban water conflicts Project, as well as Prof. Evan
Vlachos, Colorado State University, who initiated and followed up the project. 
iv
We would also like to acknowledge the members of the project’s working group, who 
have generously contributed to the collection: Bernard Barraqué, Petri S. Juuti, Tapio S. 
Katko, Christelle Pezon, Ana-Lucia de Paiva Britto, Ricardo Toledo Silva, Sarah Botton 
Gabriela Merlinsky, José Esteban Castro, S. Janakarajan, Marie Llorente, Marie-Hélène 
Zérah, Karen Bakker, Antonio Massaruto, Markus Wissen and Matthias Naumann. 
At the UNESCO Secretariat, the following people were involved in the project: Mr. José-
Alberto Tejada-Guibert, Deputy Secretary of IHP, officer in charge of the IHP Urban 
Water Management Programme, under whose responsibility this project was carried out,
with the support on Consultants Ms. Biljana Radojeviý and Mr. Wilfried H. Gilbrich. Mr.
Sean Lee did the final editing of the text. 
The community of nations has embraced the Millennium Development Goals, which call 
for halving the proportion of people without access to safe drinking water and basic 
sanitation by 2015. This collection’s ultimate aim is to be a useful tool in this global 
initiative. As such, we trust that this publication will prove useful to urban water policy-
makers, decision-makers, planners and managers throughout the world. As this is a
continuing effort, we would highly appreciate your comments and feedback, which may
be sent to the address on the cover. 
Andras Szöllösi-Nagy 
Secretary, International Hydrological Programme 
Director, Division of Water Sciences
Deputy Assistant Director-General for the Natural Sciences, UNESCO
v
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Introduction
Bernard Barraqué, DR CNRS, France 
Origin of the UWC task force 
In November 2002, the newly created UNESCO-IHE Institute for Water Education (formerly 
known as the International Institute for Infrastructural Hydraulic and Environmental
Engineering) centre in Delft, The Netherlands, hosted an international meeting entitled, ‘From 
Conflicts to Co-operation in International Water Resources Management: Challenges and
Opportunities’. This was the first and most important conference to date of the From Potential 
Conflict to Co-operation Potential (PCCP) task force on water conflicts, which is sponsored by 
UNESCO’s International Hydrological Programme (IHP) and the United Nations’ World Water
Assessment Programme (UN-WWAP).1
A wide array of themes and subjects were covered, but as could be expected the conference 
focussed chiefly on international water conflicts and transboundary rivers and aquifers. Specific 
attention was also given to the problems of access to and affordability of water services in cities 
(the right to water); the public/private issue; and the environmental footprint of urban water on 
large cities’ hinterlands, dealing with rainfall and runoff. Under the leadership of Evan Vlachos
(Professor of Sociology in Civil Engineering, Colorado State University) and Jan Lundqvist 
(Water and Environmental Studies Department, Linköping University), a task force was initiated
to prepare a separate report on these issues.2
Between the November 2002 conference and the following meeting, in July 2003, Evan Vlachos
put together a collection of press articles and research material on urban water conflict or unrest,
which he grouped into six different categories: population growth and hyper-urbanisation;
poverty and North-South disparities; globalization and privatization; scarcity and stress; 
1 Proceedings of this meeting were published under the IHP VI Technical Documents in Hydrology, PC-CP series, No.
31.
2 Lundqvist, J., Appasamy, P. and Nelliyat, P. 1996. ‘Dimensions and approaches for third world city water security’. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, Vol. 358, No. 1440, pp 1985–96. 
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competition between sectoral demands; and transboundary interdependencies. Evan has since 
expanded this documentation task. The resulting material is highly valuable and should be made
available to a large readership (at least in the form of a bibliography). The task force decided to
synthesize this material with the personal input of task force members into a single report.
In the meantime, two other groups of urban water experts have been created: the 100 European
Scientists in the European Network for a New Water Culture (EUWATER), which is an 
expansion of the Iberian group, the New Water Culture Foundation to include all of Europe, 
and the international Reflection Group on Changing Network Service Provision and Urban 
Dynamics, which studies the link between urban socio-economic fragmentation and established
and new forms of urban service provision. The combined breadth of experience these groups 
represent has provided a great range of case studies and invaluable knowledge of various 
approaches to these issues.
The enlargement of the first group combined the networks established by the initial Iberian
foundation with the Eurowater network and the environmental sections of Oxford University’s 
school of Geography and the centre for Science, Technology and Society at the University of 
Twente in the Netherlands. While this group deals primarily with sustainable water resources 
allocation, including social, political and ethical dimensions, its Declaration for a New Water Culture
also covers issues of service provision, even though consensus has not been reached on the 
possible role of the private sector. The second group was jointly developed by Laboratory of 
Technology, Territories and Societies (LATTS), a mixed entity that brings together researchers 
from France’s National School of Bridges and Roads (ENPC, Ecole Nationale des Ponts et
Chaussées), the National Centre of Scientific Research (CNRS, Centre National de la Recherche
Scientifique) and the University of Marne-la-Vallée, and the Wagner School of Public Services of 
New York University. It also includes people who deal closely with conflict issues related to 
globalization and commodification, both in developed and in developing countries, in the field 
of urban services in general.
Benefiting from these two networks of colleagues, along with the initial UNESCO drafting 
group, we were easily able to gather skilled and dedicated participants who could quickly write
case studies on particular urban water conflicts. This document is composed of case studies, on
cities or countries as a whole, that came of this collective effort. To prepare case studies of urban 
water conflict necessitated some agreement on what such conflict entails. In a meeting on 27-28 
June 2005, participants presented their visions of what urban water conflict is, which provided a 
rich common background for the task force. 
Definitions of urban water conflicts 
A list of the causes of conflicts or unrest should take the sometimes stark differences between
urban settings into consideration. Indeed, part of the difficulty of working on urban water issues 
comes from an inappropriate amalgamation of very different situations in developed and
developing countries: commodification, i.e. the commercial character of the service, is widely 
accepted in Europe, whereas it is hotly debated in countries where a significant portion of the 
population cannot afford to pay for services. Another situation involves cities in countries that 
were formerly part of the Soviet Union or under its influence. These cities are experiencing 
dramatic changes in funding capacities, which make it difficult to maintain and modernize their 
often oversized infrastructures. (This situation might also arise in cities in developed countries, as 
the main issue is long-term maintenance and ageing infrastructure.) While it might be possible to 
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reduce the associated costs using recent advances in the fields of environmental engineering and 
the social sciences, reaching a better state of equilibrium in the urban/nature relationship
through new technology and territorial management strategies will likely involve conflict. In 
developing-world cities, on the other hand, the major issue is the impossibility of readily 
expanding networked collective services to poorer neighbourhoods, for a lack of capacity and
solidarity, and analysis of what can best be done instead is vital. Mediterranean European cities 
fall somewhere in between these different categories, with unfinished sanitation connections and 
a strong tradition of State hydraulics that results in low prices. This has led to the development 
of irrigation, competing with urban water needs. In post-communist states, an important issue is 
the marked reduction in water needs, which often entails a strong decline in the quality of water
services or a dramatic price increase. 
It is difficult to make a precise list of the causes of urban water conflict, but they usually involve
the following: 
x quality/extension of drinking water services and their continuity
x quality/extension of waste-water collection and treatment
x urban hydrology problems (storm water control) 
x impact of large cities upon their environment, in particular water resources use and
misuse
x financing of investments issue
x tariff setting and cost recovery 
x degrees of freedom left to urban dwellers vis-à-vis the services provided. 
After developing a comparative and historical approach to water services provision, it is 
important to stress the changing nature of conflict over the decades, in line with a changing
technological, economic, political and social context. Several contributors also found it very 
important to explore changes over time. The European experience can be analysed as one where
private companies invented the piped water service, but the role of local authorities soon proved 
to be essential. As Tapio Katko and Petri Juuti from Finland were thinking on similar lines, they 
decided to write the first contribution to this report together. 
Conversely, Christelle Pezon focuses on those conflicts that had to be tackled by the courts,
reflecting primarily on the legal relationships among the actors concerned with the delegation of 
public water services to private operators, including municipalities, customers, operators,
eventual regulators in government, and third parties. Pezon illustrates the changing nature of 
conflicts in the century-long period of their development, primarily through a historical survey of 
administrative Supreme Court (Conseil d’Etat) cases in France: how the courts resolved these 
conflicts shows what the dominant solutions to such issues were and how governance translated
their viability. Pezon also assesses the possibility of generalizing this analysis to other legal 
contexts, particularly given that the French model of public service delegation has been debated
and experimented with in various other countries. 
Some participants in the June 2005 meeting, working on third-world cities, proposed a 
breakdown into three or four types of conflicts, a typology that can be systematized in
accordance with the United Nations’ typology of sustainable development: economic conflicts, 
environmental conflicts, social conflicts and political conflicts. In the case of Buenos Aires, the 
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first conflict results from people asking for connection to the water supply without the means to 
pay the full cost: cross-subsidies are needed. The second conflict deals with both increasing
water contamination and the rising level of the water table: as more people connect to water 
supply without having sewerage, the worse problems of contamination and excess groundwater
become. The third conflict concerns the relationships between the city, the national government, 
international financing institutions and multinational companies that provide services. 
For those who work primarily with large Indian cities, the issue is mostly one of scarcity. They 
proposed the following breakdown: lack of access to clean water sources for the poor, the 
quantity of water available for public services (reallocation issue of water rights), and quality 
issues that result from either overexploitation or industrial pollution (the decreasing quality of 
raw water implies growing treatment costs). They also viewed conflicts as ‘the activation of a 
credible threat’ at different levels, such as the media, public opinion, demonstrations, riots, etc. 
The case of Mexico illustrates this approach with a quantitative analysis of various forms of 
‘water unrest’. 
Colleagues working in a Mediterranean context are concerned, more than in the rest of Europe, 
by the environmental dimension of urban water issues. This is due to the ‘hydraulic mission’ 
tradition, which led governments to misallocate funds and to go on financing a large water-
transfer infrastructure instead of tackling urban and industrial pollution and water demands.
Luisa Schmidt envisions a more general conflict potentially involving the poorer fraction of the 
population in Portugal, which faces growing difficulties in accessing water, while wealthier 
people and tourists appropriate water resources and drinking water (e.g. with the increase in golf 
course development ). 
Karen Bakker, a specialist on the privatisation of the UK’s water services who now works on the
history of water services development in Jakarta, also proposes a typology, but one with two 
axes: one that considers governance of the services, the other the technologies employed to that 
end.3 The first axis proposes a continuum from individual to community solutions to water
provision, to corporate solutions involving public authorities and private capital. The second
contrasts artisanal and low-cost solutions with expensive industrial ones – that can, however, 
offer economies of scale. Conflicts would then occur in situations of change along these two 
axes.
This typology is not incompatible with others, such as ‘access-quantity-quality’, but it was felt 
that it could be completed by adding a third axis, representing the relationship between the city 
and its environment, both social and natural (there are natural shortages and socially constructed
ones). The larger the city in a given geographical context and the bigger the pressure on the 
environment, the farther away the city needs to go to obtain its water, or the more it needs to
treat water. Similarly, with larger cities, waste-water requires technology to reduce the time and 
space needed to stabilize urban waste.
3 Bakker, K. 2004: An Uncooperative Commodity: Privatizing Water in England and Wales. Oxford University Press.
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Now if we summarize Bakker’s presentation, we get the following grid: 
Artisanal










pressure, partly paid 








Obviously, only urban areas in developed countries are in the bottom part of the table, while 
cities in developing countries can face issues of all four types. But one has to imagine a third 
dimension, representing the degree of pressure that the city exerts on its environment, or 
receives from it, be it for water supply, waste-water collection or storm water issues. In the above 
table, we cross the level of sanitary technology with the level of capital invested. But we must 
also take into account the additional dimensions of conflicts and solutions offered by 
environmental engineering, such as replacing sophisticated technology with land-use control or 
the reallocation of water resources. 
By finding case studies that cover all four types of cities identified at the beginning of this paper,
we can clearly illustrate a wide rage of urban water conflicts. Although none of the following 
papers deal with situations in Africa or the United States, we believe we have gathered a relatively 
representative set of studies illustrating various sorts of water conflicts in various types of cities. 
We do not pretend to hope we can offer UNESCO an ideal tool with which to solve all of the 
conflicts surrounding urban water services. Indeed, members of the group will continue to 
disagree on certain issues (for example, the role of the private sector is a topic of debate among
the Scientific Committee for the European Declaration for a New Water Culture). But at least we 
can present the terms of these debates more clearly than has been done to date.
Above all, it is our hope that the inclusion of planners and social scientists working on urban 
water conflicts in the task force and in UNESCO-IHP networks will improve the focus of their
output and result in a more useful guidelines document. This report, published as part of
UNESCO-IHP’s Technical Documents in Hydrology series, is a landmark in that direction.
As noted above, this collection begins with a paper on the history of urban water services in 
Europe and related conflicts. This is followed by a paper by Christelle Pezon on the 
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development of the French water services delegation model, partly done through an analysis of 
supreme administrative court cases.
The next section is devoted to Latin America, a region well known for water conflicts. Ana
Britto and Ricardo Toledo Silva present a synthesis of urban water conflicts in Brazil, insisting 
on the intergovernmental nature of the major disputes. Sarah Botton and Gabriela Merlinsky go
into more detail through the complex case of Buenos Aires and, lastly, José Esteban Castro
covers unrest in Mexico City. 
Next are two papers on water conflicts in Asia, linked in part to the region’s very high
population densities and rural migration to cities: Janakarajan, Maire Llorente and Marie-Hélène 
Zérah cover two cases in large metropolises in India (Delhi and Chennai), where water scarcity 
and a lack of access reinforce the ongoing unsatisfactory situation. Karen Bakker presents the 
case of Jakarta, where privatisation under a weak governance system has resulted in a violent 
situation.
Lastly, two papers illustrate various situations in Europe: Antonio Massarutto looks at the Italian 
case and Matthias Naumann and Markus Wissen discuss the water services crisis in East 
Germany that followed from unification. 
As co-ordinator of the task force I wish to address many thanks to these partners, who agreed to 
prepare these reports for UNESCO under a limited time constraint, not forgetting Evan Vlachos 
for his initiative. I would also like to extend a warm welcome to potential contributors: we need
to, and certainly can, develop a series of Urban Water Conflicts reports.
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Urban water conflicts in recent European history: 
Changing interactions between technology, environment and society 
Bernard Barraqué, CNRS-LATTS, Petri S. Juuti, University of Tampere & Tapio S. 
Katko, Tampere University of Technology
barraque@latts.enpc.fr  tapio.katko@tut.fi
Introduction
Two hundred years ago, European city-dwellers obtained their water from public taps, 
public or private wells or water vendors. There were no public water-supply systems. The
first concession contract for a piped water system connecting private houses, granted in
1781 in Paris to the Perier brothers, went bankrupt in a few years.1 In the nineteenth 
century, however, the skill of British mechanics made it possible to offer pressured water
service in urban areas, and later to extend this to rural areas. Other European countries
soon followed Britain’s example, and engineers and sanitation companies also invented 
various sewer systems to handle both waste and rainwater. In the first half of the 
twentieth century, chemical engineers invented technologies for treating drinking water 
as well as waste-water, which increased the autonomy of cities vis-à-vis their environment. 
Today, Europe is the only continent where the great majority of the population is 
connected to a public water supply (PWS). Most of the population is connected to 
centralized public sewage collection and treatment (PSCT), and those who are not are 
able, at least in low density areas, to rely on efficient decentralized on-site sanitation
systems. In ecologically concerned countries, innovation in sewerage has enabled the
development of environment-friendly storm-water control. 
We argue in this paper that it is important to keep in mind these two centuries of 
experience, not only because of the period’s overall success, but also as a history of many
1 The Perier brothers attempted to use a steam engine to pump water from the river Seine into a reservoir
and distribute pressurized water to private subscribers.
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different conflicts. Generally speaking, this history remains at odds with the ongoing 
globalization debate over urban water management: the open conflict between the World 
Bank, economists and water companies, on the one hand, and the alter-globalization 
movement on the other is about the respective merits of public- and private-sector
intervention in water services. This debate is particularly important in Europe in light of
various proposals made by the European Commission (EC) to open up the provision of 
‘services of general economic interest’ to the private sector, and thus to competition.
Another issue is the potential impact on the budget of poorer households of ‘full cost
pricing’ of water services, as advocated by the European Union’s (EU) Water Framework 
Directive (WFD).
The history of how relatively sustainable water services have developed in Europe
suggests that the public vs. private debate is inseparable from the relative centralization 
or decentralization of the provision of water services. Although water supply services
initially developed via concessions to private companies, most urban municipalities in
Europe soon decided to take on the responsibility of extending the infrastructure to the
entire population, and to operate and maintain it over the long term. This was often 
possible only with the financial assistance of higher levels of government. While today 
some European countries are questioning the degree of municipal involvement in water
services and are reorganizing services at the supra-local level, the history of decentralized
water services should also be considered in the non-European context. This allows us to
better understand recent advances in environmental engineering that are challenging the 
long-standing autonomy of the water services sector. 
We explore three dimensions of sustainability (economic, environmental and ethical) and
the conflicts relating to them that have arisen over the years, as well as the power
conflicts that can arise between different levels of government. To do this, we follow the
historical development of water supply and wastewater control technologies as well as
changes that have taken place in technological paradigms and engineering disciplines,
because these changes have occurred in relation to various kinds of conflicts. 
If we go back to the beginning of public water services, we can broadly sketch their
development in terms of three stages. In the nineteenth century, before the discoveries of 
Florence Nightingale (1820-1910), Edwin Chadwick (1800-1890), Robert Koch (1843-
1910) and Louis Pasteur (1822-1895) were popularized, PWS were developed from a
belief that water should be drawn from natural environments far from urban
developments. Large cities in particular had to go further and further to obtain their
water supply. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, this initial strategy had
begun to meet with resistance, due to competition with other cities or local needs. But 
the discovery of bacteriology resulted in the invention of water treatment, which allowed 
local authorities to provide sanitary water by drawing from much closer sources, 
including the rivers on which the cities were located. Municipalities then took the lead,
and in many cases terminated contracts with private companies that had been unable to
supply water to the whole population. 
Once water services became a mature industry, municipalities also had to face issues of
long-term system maintenance and capital reproduction. Some were led to reintroduce or
to develop industrial and commercial services or to delegate services to private 
companies, sometimes companies they created and owned themselves. By the end of the 
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twentieth century the issue of cost recovery had led many to question the technological 
choices of the chemical engineering period, and to attempt to solve the sustainability
issue using new strategies inspired by environmental and ecological engineering. 
Governments intervene to provide long-distance clean water supply 
When industrialization began in Europe, prevailing legal systems were still largely 
inherited from the feudal period, which meant that water rights usually differed between
landlords and peasants. Communities had the right to use water for domestic and
husbandry purposes, and landlords had the right to use and misuse water, provided that 
they respected the inalienable rights of communities. In expanding cities, migrants from
the countryside imported their customs and requested free water of good quality from 
public taps. These growing needs could only be met through some sort of water transfer 
from a distant and ‘pure’ natural environment, which implied landlords’ consent. Later, 
with the formation of nation-states, national governmental intervention developed. 
Water services were initially supplied by private companies, which tried to recover initial 
investments from bills paid by their customers. On the one hand, these were often 
industrial and not financial companies: their aim was to install infrastructure and get
repaid for it, not to operate the services over the long term. Indeed, they were often
tempted to sell the initial network to local investors so as to recommence in another city.
But overall, few people in the nineteenth century were ready or able to pay water bills. 
This created growing conflicts between companies, users and municipalities: for lack of 
proper payment for their services, companies often postponed investments in extending 
or maintaining service, which in turn attracted critiques, and even legal prosecution, from 
municipalities. Increasingly, the latter were tempted to terminate concession contracts 
and recover the services and run them under direct labour. In some cases, national
governments sided with the private companies, and maintained their operations. This 
was the case in Lisbon, where the central government distrusted the municipality’s
capacity to operate the service. But in most cases, governments allowed municipalization
and even supported it financially. To understand this, one has to recall that most initial
private ventures throughout Europe were from English or French companies, and were
all the more criticized because they were foreign. A clear example of this is the Italian law
of 1903, which imposed municipal management for basic services such as water, gas and
public transportation. The same happened in Berlin. But even in Britain, takeovers by 
local authorities occurred, and it was both systematic and premature; it was eventually 
called ‘water and gas socialism’, which indicates a certain amount of conflict (Saunders,
1983). Indeed we should talk about ‘social municipalism’. Interestingly enough, in the 
Nordic countries, such discussion was hardly noticed. In any case, municipalities 
managed to develop the services and to make them, at least temporarily, trustworthy,
expanding and self-financing. 
This public funding was made possible by the use of finance sources such as early 
savings banks controlled by local governments. Their bonds were also found attractive 
by the public. In Finland and New England (Anderson, 1988), ﬁre insurance companies 
9
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also contributed signiﬁcantly to the development of water services, because the 
generalization of standpipes were effective for fighting ﬁres.2
Consumption-based bills by private companies were partly or totally replaced by the 
payment of rates based on property values or by local taxes paid by all citizens, which 
would provide revenues independent of actual water consumption. Today, the payment
of water supply through rates is still largely dominant in Britain, and in many countries, 
sewerage has long been paid through local taxes, particularly since the systems have been
combined.3 In addition to this, governments often subsidized projects for national health
policy reasons. Public procurement was then bound to succeed more than private, as in 
the example of Glasgow:
direct municipal provision seemed to offer several advantages to the city. The existing
private company had … outdated infrastructure [and] consequently was unable to cope
with the demands of the rapidly growing population… Moreover, the company was not
in a position to raise the necessary capital for improvements, unlike the Town Council,
whose extensive community assets made it eminently creditworthy. Public accountability 
meant that unpredictable market forces could be over-ridden, and a stable service
provided… Loch Katrine was located in the Perthshire highlands, some 55 km from
Glasgow, and thus well away from the polluted city… The official opening by Queen
Victoria on an appropriately wet autumn day in 1859 was an event of enormous 
significance for Glasgow… Loch Katrine was unquestionably the prime municipal
showpiece for the city, combining the wonders of Victorian technology with the
nurturing quality of pure Highland water (Maver, 2000). 
Joel Tarr (1996) has illustrated this broad approach in the United States (US): getting 
cleaner water from farther away, on the one hand, and using the rivers as sewers on the
other – the latter decision relying on the assumption of natural dilution and riverine self-
purification.
To ensure the whole population was connected to the PWS, many cities not only had to
take over the utilities created by private companies, but also to force the population to 
connect. In Paris for instance, part of the population preferred the taste of river water 
sold by vendors, and other people trusted only their own wells, even though urban 
densification increased the risks of surface and groundwater contamination. Private 
companies also sold water that was partly pumped from the river. It was Baron Georges-
Eugène Haussmann and his engineer Eugène Belgrand who decided to make water
2 This issue became increasingly topical immediately after the Great Fire of Turku in 1827. The General
Fire Assistance Company of the Grand Duchy of Finland was established in 1832, and funded cities
establishing water works. The advantageous loans offered by this insurance company played a large role in 
the expansion of city water works. But there were other important forms of funding too, especially the
taxes paid by distilleries. In each locality, one company was given the exclusive right to distil spirits against 
the payment of a liquor tax. From this tax, little-by-little, capital was raised for the establishment of a water
works: about 10 per cent of the total required – most came through taxes and substantial donations. Loans
were also given by local banks where necessary. A loan from the ﬁre insurance company was nevertheless
generally the largest single source of funding, and the interest charged was clearly lower than that offered
by other creditors (Juuti and Katko, 2005). 
3 Today, of course, a growing number of countries, such as Finland, France, Germany and Sweden, have
legalized the inclusion of waste water charges in water bills, or have created direct charges.
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supply a municipal monopoly, with water coming from distant sources. But he allowed 
the water company, Compagnie Générale des Eaux, to manage the billing for in-house 
connections. Most of the population still rejected billing, especially as the same systems
provided clean water for free at public taps. Connecting every family to the PWS could 
be hastened only if one changed the financing system completely. Indeed, creating a local
tax or rates based on property values provided the money as well as cross subsidies from
the richer to the poorer. The Montreal case (Fougères, 2002) illustrates this trend: a PWS 
had been started by a private company as early as 1798, but it did not work well. It was
transformed into a public direct labour service in two steps: first, as soon as it was
incorporated, the municipality obtained authorization from the British Crown to 
purchase the private company, which was losing money and was willing to sell, but the 
city soon realized that it had similar difficulties in raising the funds necessary for
connecting the periphery. In 1853, it obtained a new authorization from the Crown to 
compel all the inhabitants of Montreal to connect to the PWS and finance the service 
through local taxes. After fifteen years, the entire city was connected to the system.
The practice of delivering untreated water from distant sources remained dominant in
the Americas and was later extended to the rest of the world after the Second World 
War, due to the combination of international financing institutions offering cheap money
and various (Keynesian or socialist) forms of support for government intervention in
infrastructure provision. In the 1950s and 1960s, large water projects were increasingly 
devoted, not only to cities, but increasingly to irrigated agriculture for the export market.
Today still, many states in developing countries base their water policy on large water 
transfers, so as to indirectly subsidize the production of irrigated cash crops for the world 
market. In some cases, the maximum extractable water resources have been reached, and
sometimes irrigation is de facto privileged at the expense of public water supply.
In short, government intervention initially allowed the transfer of enough water from 
distant sources through largely subsidized aqueducts. Local authorities soon started
taking over the infrastructure, which had been initially created by private companies. The 
frequent financing of connections by local taxes or rates reduced the tension between 
urban populations and water suppliers, making public services acceptable. Consequently,
municipalities were dependent on higher levels of government and distant water sources,
the latter of which would eventually become unsustainable. The innovation of water
treatment helped alleviate this situation. 
From quantity at a distance to quality close at hand 
In the heart of industrial Europe in the early twentieth century, growing population 
densities and reduced natural resources increased competition for pure water resources, 
while the development of bio-chemical analyses showed the growing extent of 
contamination. The issue was less quantity than quality. At the end of the nineteenth 
century it had been decided that, whatever source it came from, surface water should be 
filtered, and later, around the First World War, that it should be chlorinated, ozonized or
disinfected through granulated activated carbon (GAC) beds. Groundwater, which




Once water began to be treated on a regular basis, the question arose of why it was 
necessary to collect it from so far away. Taking it from rivers just upstream of cities 
would no longer make a difference in terms of public health, but would be more cost-
effective. In that still early period, large European cities changed their strategy from 
investments aimed at increasing available quantities of water to those aimed at improving
its quality. This, of course, resulted in a significant increase in operational costs. At the 
same time, the rise of the middle class meant that the domestic delivery of pressurized 
water went from being a luxury to being a normal commodity, and made it possible for 
customers to pay water bills to cover the costs. 
This is exactly what happened in Paris a century ago. The idea that Paris should get its 
water from distant sources had prevailed since the third Empire (1850-1870). Indeed, the 
above-mentioned work by Belgrand was aimed at utilizing sources of water that were
further from the city (about 100 km from Paris). It was even expected that Paris would
eventually have to obtain water from the Loire, which would require central government 
licensing. However, the Loire has very low flows in summer, when the demand for water 
is at its highest, and the potential donor region around Orleans was strongly opposed to 
the idea. 
In 1890, an engineer named Duvillard presented a project to draw water from Lake 
Geneva, situated 440 km away from Paris. Despite the project’s impressive scale and
scope, it was technically quite simple, even at that time. Proponents of the project soon 
came up with all sorts of arguments to convince the Paris city council and the French
government that a ‘capital of the world’ would need at least 1,000 litres of water per
capita per day – i.e. five times more than the highest standards of the time. This would 
allow Paris to have more luxurious fountains, improved street cleaning, greater domestic
comfort and improved sanitation.4 It was also argued that such a quantity of water would
extend navigation possibilities in drought periods, help flush waste-water from the new 
sewer system through the Seine and then to the sea, and leave other water resources for 
local economic development. In the end, they argued, a huge transfer would make Paris’
PWS reliable forever, and the bigger its scale, the cheaper each cubic meter of water
would be!5
But while proponents were finalizing studies for the project, an epidemic disease broke 
out and it was found that one of the distant natural intake points (the Loing springs) was 
4 Paris is one of the few cities in the world whose streets are washed clean daily: for political and business
reasons linked with Haussmann’s decision to merge suburban communes and extend Paris from 12 to 20 
arrondissements (boroughs), it was decided that water for public purposes would be produced by the city
and delivered to the people for free through a public network, while a second network would serve
domestic and other private needs to be paid for by water bills. Paris still has two PWS systems, one potable
and the other non-potable by today’s standards. The non-potable network uses hardly filtered Seine water 
to flush the sewers, supply the lakes in the Boulogne and Vincennes parks, and clean the streets. Other
public uses such as fire hydrants have been discontinued, due to unreliability, low pressure, sprinkler
clogging, etc.
5 It is interesting that a similar argument has recently been raised by the French-Spanish partnership to
transfer water from the Rhone to Barcelona – a distance of 350 km. This example also shows the indirect
impact of irrigation: Mediterranean cities have to get water from ever farther away, because the local
surface and groundwater is provided to farmers almost free of charge through government projects.
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to blame: this showed that even distant, ‘pure’ water could be contaminated and should
be filtered and treated. In 1902, Paul Brousse, one of the founding fathers of French
‘municipal socialism’ (equivalent to what was derided in England as ‘water-and-gas 
socialism’), inaugurated the new water filtration plant in Ivry, just upstream from Paris. 
(It was recently redesigned to serve as a showcase for French water technology know-
how.) A choice was made in favour of water treatment that would have a lasting impact,
with chlorination later chosen after the First World War. Water demands were growing 
incrementally at the time, and the big jump then seemed too risky. Lastly, the Lake
Geneva aqueduct project was discarded by Paris City Council for national defence 
reasons: what would happen if the Germans decided to attack the aqueduct and cut it 
off? In the end, investments that focused on water quality replaced those that focused
merely on its quantity, just as chemical engineering supplemented civil engineering.
After the Second World War, the Prefect of the Seine Département (county) took 
advantage of a severe flood to obtain permission to construct three large upstream
reservoirs on the Seine, Marne and Aube rivers, which were used to increase summer
flows and meet Paris’s water demands even in serious droughts, as in 1976. Interestingly 
enough, a fourth upstream reservoir was planned by Mayor Jacques Chirac’s councillors 
in the 1990s, but it was abandoned for the same reasons that the Lake Geneva project 
was rejected (the water must and can be purified anyway, argued the water supply
companies), and also because water demand in Paris dropped by 13 per cent between 
1990 and 1996 (Cambon-Grau, 2000). In the end, Paris’s PWS used civil and sanitary 
(chemical) engineering technologies together to reduce their risks. 
As in Paris, the invention of water treatment (chlorination developed during the First 
World War) allowed many cities to turn to nearby surface water and thus complete their 
water networks and serve the population through a primarily local solution. This is one
common rationale for the generalization of municipal control of utilities, at least in 
temperate climates. The next-best solution would be to establish an inter-municipal joint 
board. Treating the water also meant increased operational costs, supporting the notion 
of water as a commodity to be paid by water bills, which would enhance the financial 
autonomy of the utilities. This commodification was better accepted in the twentieth 
century, when urbanites became accustomed to having tap water. After the Second
World War, the rise of pollution in rivers was increasingly unacceptable, and cities were 
constrained to build sewage treatment plants in order to reduce discharge. In many 
European countries – but not all – this had to be done with reduced government 
subsidies, and authorities again found the solution was to finance operational costs
through water bills. For example, the costs of wastewater treatment in Finland were 
covered essentially by greatly increased prices. In France, the development of sewage 
works was made possible through taxes on drinking water, which went into a sort of 
mutual banking system, the Agences de l’eau. 
In a way, the two types of plants created the frontiers of the ‘networked city’ (Tarr and
Dupuy, 1988) and allowed for the development of an institutional, legal and economic 
system quite separate from the issue of water resources allocation, and one that would 
eventually be extended to rural areas. This was the domain of local public services. 
Conversely, central governments in the Mediterranean region of Europe remained 
actively involved in water services, sponsoring the development of regional bulk water 
transfer institutions. Local authorities were provided with very cheap water to distribute 
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to their population, which in turn helped maintain the tradition of inexpensive but 
relatively unreliable and incomplete services. Today, paradoxically, there is less open 
criticism of service quality in these countries than elsewhere in Europe (for example, in
the UK and France), but water users express a sort of ‘silent distrust’. Raising water 
prices or rates in these areas is very difficult, because authorities first need to earn the 
confidence of their citizens by improving the service. 
Despite these differences, water and waste-water services eventually became a mature
industry in Europe. However, the initial infrastructure, which had frequently been
subsidized, eventually needed replacement, and environmental performance had to
improve. This created a new set of conflicts.
The crisis of municipal water supply services 
France, Germany, the Netherlands and Nordic countries all made efforts in the field of 
city sewage collection from the 1950s, and in sewage treatment from the 1970s. To make 
funding easier, it was decided to change the status of the PSCT from an imposed
administrative service, for public health reasons, to a commercial service similar to the
PWS, and then to have it financed by water bills. This caused a steady increase or even a
drastic jump in consumer bills, depending on the degree of government subsidy the 
PSCT still received.
But in the same period, the PWS itself became a fully-fledged business, which meant that 
it had to face the issue of renewing an aging infrastructure without the financial help of 
government subsidies. This is the fundamental reason that municipalism had to evolve in 
various ways towards a legal private status: under traditional public accounting, it was 
neither allowed to depreciate its assets nor to make provisions for renewal, while private 
accounting could. The PWS, and later the PSCT, slowly turned towards commercial
status, i.e. depreciation and provision practices, and this, of course, meant another rise in 
water bills. Governments today are influenced by economists who support full, or at least
fair, cost pricing, phasing subsidies out.6 In turn, water bills have risen dramatically: in 
France, bills nearly doubled on average between 1990 and 2000. This has brought
unexpected consequences: an increasing number of large-volume users (such as the
manufacturing and service industries) have either changed their processes or invested in
leakage control. This explains to a great extent the recent plateau in the volume of water 
sold. In some countries, even domestic users have reduced their demand for PWS,
through changes in fixtures and domestic equipment, different garden designs, and using
rainfall storage or other alternative sources of water for non-drinking uses. Such cases
have been identified in several places in France, Belgium and Germany (Montginoul,
2005; Cornut, 2000). More recently, this has happened in Central and Eastern Europe 
(Juuti and Katko, 2005). Eventually, these new attitudes will threaten the financial 
balance of public services. 
At the same time, water suppliers have realized that it is going to be ever more difficult 
to comply with drinking water standards at reasonable costs. The control extended to 
6 Fair cost pricing means that the principle of cost recovery is accepted but only partly implemented, i.e.
bills include part of the capital depreciation cost.
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eco-toxicologists over standard production has tended to privilege a traditional ‘no-risk’ 
strategy (Lave, 1981) without taking the increased costs into account. For example, in 
Europe, the lowering of the lead content from 50 to 10 micrograms per litre (Pg/l)
implies replacing all lead pipes, which will cost up to US $35 billion, while there is no 
evidence that the former standard resulted in lead poisoning from water.7
The multiplication of strict criteria for drinking water is progressively making the 
situation over-complex. Chlorination by-products incur a very small probability of 
cancer, and there are many other examples of similar substances that are nonetheless
strictly controlled through modern drinking water standards.8 Year after year, the media
report a growing proportion of people receiving water that does not comply with current 
standards, even though water treatment processes are continually improving (Okun, 
1996). This is creating growing distrust on the part of water users, and in some cases has 
led to open conflict.
To lower the risk of being unable to meet current standards, water suppliers, along with
local, national and European authorities, have turned to a new strategy: land-use control 
in areas or catchments where groundwater is used by the PWS. This often requires 
changing to organic, or at least nitrate- and pesticide-free, agricultural practices, along
with compensation programmes for farmers (Brouwer et al., 2003). This policy turns out 
to be cheaper than water treatment, while also being advantageous for farmers. Yet we 
seem to be a long way from a new and more sustainable equilibrium. In the meantime,
drinking water criteria are regularly reinforced, as new risks are discovered, while 
treatment costs and their negative effects continue.
In any case, in contrast with what some water engineers in Spain seem to think (Llamas, 
2001), large-scale, long-distance water transfers are not appropriate for today’s water
needs (Barraqué, 2000). The situation that began in California in the 1970s has now 
spread to Europe: it is becoming ever more difficult to build dams because
environmental movements that oppose their ecological impacts have been joined by 
economists and neoliberals who advocate full-cost payment for water infrastructures by 
their beneficiaries. The new rationale seems to be, ‘save first and manage the demand,
there is no cheap money in sight for water transfers’. Copenhagen is not going to buy 
water from Sweden, Bari isn’t going to have Albanian water, London will have to reduce 
leakage drastically before it can obtain water from Scotland. In 1980, a water-transfer
scheme to transport water from Umeå, Sweden to Vaasa, Finland through a submerged
pipeline on the sea bottom was proposed, but finally rejected. Many other fancy projects 
on other continents are dying like so many ‘hydro-dinosaurs’.
However, water transfers or treatment technologies are still needed, depending on the 
economic situation. For instance, long-distance rock tunnels for raw water transfer were
completed in 1982 for the Helsinki metropolitan area in Finland (Katko 1997), and for 
the southern region of Sweden in 1985 (Isgård, 1998). In Mediterranean countries, there 
7 This measure concerns only certain European countries: France, Italy, Spain and the UK. Other
countries, Nordic ones in particular, had few lead pipes to begin with and have already phased them out.
8 Bacteriological criteria are now just a small part of drinking water standards; heavy metals and micro-
organic compounds bring the total to 63 criteria in Europe and 84 in the United States. 
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is now a rise in desalination processes to produce additional water for tourists in the 
summer.
New York City, like many US and Canadian cities, could follow a different path than
European cities have, because of its abundance of clean water. Using a lot of water and 
taking it from farther and farther away, while protecting the water intake points through 
extensive land-use control, has become more widespread. However, New York might 
still have to take European history into consideration, because clean natural resources are
not immune from cryptosporidium, a type of protozoa, and other new (and lethal)
substances. An Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) panel of experts concluded that 
New York should not be given any further derogation on the need to filter and treat 
water extensively, while city engineers argued that increased land-use control would
suffice (Okun et al., 1997; Ashendorff et al., 1997). The controversy is serious, as the 
requested new treatments are likely to substantially increase water prices, which might
lead to serious social impacts and a possible water demand collapse.9 And in that case,
one might ask, why not just pump the water in the Hudson River rather than get it from
Canada? It seems, however, that this issue could be so controversial that such a big
change will be suspended.
To summarize this section, we could say that in Europe, due to population density and 
environmental issues, the water industry has had to progressively supplement the 
quantity approach (hydraulics and civil engineering) with a quality approach (water
treatment and sanitary engineering), and more recently with resources protection and 
demand management (environmental engineering). But this in turn questions the viability 
of pure municipal procurement and calls for various types of cost averaging. 
European water services and the three Es of sustainability 
Can Europeans afford their water policies? This has been a growing issue since the 
1990s, with the first estimations of the cumulated investments required by the anti-
eutrophication directives adopted in 1991 (targeting urban waste-water and nitrates from
agriculture) in addition to previous directives. Water policy has been increasingly 
criticized by the public, the press and politicians. Paradoxically, criticism has been much 
stronger in northern Europe, where the infrastructure is completed, than in Southern 
Europe, where infrastructure construction is still under way and water prices are still far 
from matching costs, leading to government subsidies or infrastructure degradation. This 
shows that rationalization (both economic and environmental) cannot really start until 
rationing is over. 
The issue has developed between the European Commission and some of its Member
States. It was felt that supplementing traditional standards based on emissions control 
(e.g. pollution discharges and drinking-water criteria) with another type of regulation, 
based on the desired ecological quality of the aquatic environment, would be too costly, 
and that, furthermore, it would be impossible to meet all of these regulations at the same
time, – which meant that governments could be sued any time by their own citizens for 
9 In particular, if metering is introduced to replace the outdated frontage rates system, negative
redistributive effects could be serious, as pointed out by Netzer et al., 2001. 
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non-compliance with the legislation. This resulted in halting the issuance of a projected 
directive on ecological river quality until a framework directive was set up and discussed,
to introduce coherence and financial savings. The European Framework Directive was
issued in October 2000. Some have questioned whether the target fixed by the European 
Commission, Parliament and Council of ‘cleaning all water in fifteen years’ is realistic. 
Moreover, the European Commission and Council both officially support full-cost 
pricing, without having carried out any feasibility studies. 
However, the issue of cost may have been biased: the costs of implementing regulations 
have generally been calculated on the basis of technologies that are well mastered, but
which were developed by sanitary engineers before the rise of environmental issues, and
under a different rationale vis-à-vis risks and costs. The high costs incurred today might, 
then, be due to an incapacity to develop environmentally innovative technologies and, 
above all, strategies other than supply-side or ‘end-of-pipe’ solutions, such as demand-
side management, land-use control and integrated planning (Moss, 2000). Moreover, 
Southern European countries, with a different climate and different population patterns, 
may need to develop specific technologies, rather than copying northern states, even 
though they receive support from the latter via European structural funds. However, it 
will obviously be difficult to convince some Southern European countries to pass this 
new technological reverse salient before a severe crisis occurs. These issues were 
addressed in a comparative study of the forecast costs of complying with the most costly 
directive, on urban wastewater collection and treatment (UWWD), issued in 1991.10 The 
Eurowater partnership of European water policy analysts has addressed the issue of
future water services (i.e. PWS and PSCT) in light of the UN’s definition of sustainability: 
how does one reconcile economic, environmental and ethical/equity sustainability 
criteria? This is what we call the ‘three Es approach’:
x Economically: how is the enormous capital accumulated in water services
technologies to be maintained and reproduced in the long term? If we do invest 
enough, what impact will this have on water bills? 
x Environmentally: what extra investments are needed for the sake of public health 
and the environment, and when cumulated costs are too high, are there 
alternatives to the common systems? 
x Ethics and equity: if all sustainability costs (long-term reproduction of the 
infrastructure, environmental protection and user costs) are to be passed on to 
users, can they afford it, and is it politically acceptable?
The two first issues are interrelated, through the limited capacity of governments and 
cities to face unsubsidized investment. Investments in new environmental measures and
the replacement of ageing infrastructure do overlap, but both have to be made without 
10 Eurowater is a partnership study funded by DG XII, LAWA in Germany, the NRA in Britain and the
Gulbenkian foundation in Lisbon. The research partners were Tom Zabel and Yvonne Rees of the WRc in 
England, Jan Wessel and Erik Mostert from the River Basin Administration centre in Delft T.U.
(Netherlands), R. Andreas Kraemer and his colleagues at Ecologic, an environmental policy consultancy in
Berlin, and Bernard Barraqué’s team at LATTS, a social sciences laboratory within the Ecole Nationale des
Ponts et Chaussées – under the leadership of Francisco Nunes Correia, a hydrology and environmental
policy professor at Lisbon's civil engineering faculty.
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subsidies. If England and Wales were to rebuild their water services infrastructure
completely, they would have to spend £189 billion! Some of these assets depreciate after
a hundred years, but others depreciate after only thirty or even ten years. With the
present centralized regulation system, OFWAT, the UK water regulator, can calculate
what investments should be made and when, and which price should result. Other 
countries are trying to do this as well, despite the decentralized organization and small
size of the structures. But many experts believe that we are quietly exhausting initial 
capital, particularly for sewers. In any case, water prices are reasonable in the UK when
compared to other European countries.
In 1989, to make privatization more attractive, the British government cancelled the 
previous regional water authorities’ debt, and on top of that offered a ‘green dowry’ to
help new companies face the ‘nasty European Directives’. Altogether, what anybody
other than Thatcherites would call subsidies amounted to £6.4 billion, i.e. more than the 
French or German governments have given to their water services in the last twenty
years! In her thesis, Bakker (2003) shows that British privatization put the water industry 
into a fundamentally unsustainable situation, which was to become increasingly obvious 
more than twenty years later. This is why the issue of cost recovery, which was raised by
the Water Framework Directive, is so unclear: if one wants to take economic
sustainability seriously, it is necessary to look back thirty or fifty years to see how 
subsidies made then have influenced today’s prices. If subsidies are removed now, effects
on water prices will not be felt for at least another twenty years.
We also found that water suppliers or authorities, under various modes depending on
their political and historical culture, have organized cost averaging or cross-subsidy
mechanisms to limit the impact of heavy but long-lasting investments on water prices.
Some do it through spatial integration, with a concentration process occurring across 
Europe that tends to expropriate local authorities of their former responsibilities over 
water services: Italy now bans direct local labour procurement and is moving towards the
integration of servizio idrico integrato at the province level, although this has met some 
resistance from local authorities.11 Conversely, in the Netherlands a significant and 
voluntary concentration of water services has taken place since among local authorities 
the Second World War, and commercial forms of water services provision have been 
adopted: today there remain only fourteen mixed economy PWS companies and around 
twice that number of water boards in charge of PSCT. 
Another strategy is cost averaging across time (earmarked funds, water banks such as the 
French Agences de l’Eau, modernization of public accounting to allow for depreciation,
etc.). The Germans do this through an original institution, the Stadtwerk, a technically 
private but publicly owned company that runs several technical networks in a given city: 
this model was criticized by the World Bank, but on the basis of incorrect data (Barraqué,
1998). The Stadtwerk often supplies electricity, transportation, water and gas services,
while sewerage is taken care of by another municipal organisation (Juuti and Katko, 
2005).
11 This is what happened in Britain: before centralization created ten regional authorities in 1974, which
were privatised in 1989, a sustained concentration process had been underway since the Second World War 
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Lastly, social forms of averaging are well known, even if they are not always presented as
such: for instance, paying for waste-water via local taxes makes this service more 
expensive for those who have a large house, and who are usually wealthier. Under 
municipalism, water suppliers did not pay much attention to the detailed breakdown of 
potable water uses and distributive effects of tariffs because they wanted the best quality 
in unlimited quantities to serve all purposes (in a commonwealth vision). Modern water
suppliers are still reluctant to really study distributive effects: they want water services to 
be commodified (through billing instead of taxing) for financial reasons, so they assert 
that it is more equitable that way. However, the English and French examples show that 
commodification is dangerous, even for water companies themselves, because users will 
not readily accept that a good service is costly; and they will likely have a hard time 
accepting the fact that if they save water, their unit price (per cubic meter) will probably 
go up! So the opening of the traditionally closed PWS policy community to a whole 
range of newcomers, in particular the public, makes water engineers feel awkward and
insecure. But is there any alternative to this opening if what is at stake is the public’s 
general confidence in the service and those who provide it? 
The new social issue of sustainability
It is therefore the third issue, the third E of Eurowater’s sustainability, the ethics/equity 
dimension, that is the most crucial today: Are social and political acceptability still 
possible in the long term, or are we moving towards a collapse of the networked model 
for water? There was general satisfaction with water services until they had to deal with 
demand management and pricing closer to real costs. But this was based on what Martin
Melosi calls ‘out of sight, out of mind’. Today, the limitations of the supply-side model 
are forcing managers to study user demand as any business does: through marketing. The 
breakdown of drinking-water demand and the evolution of sector-differentiated uses
have to be studied. But this may not be sufficient, and utilities may well have to involve 
the public in their studies. For instance, claiming that metering is more equitable and
efficient (because water conservation is rewarded) may become problematic for residents
of central cities who live in condominiums, because water use is largely determined by 
the use of appliances, and there is little elasticity in (existing) prices (Chesnutt and
Mitchell, 2000). 
Yet even though local econometric studies show little elasticity in domestic prices, per 
capita use is slowly reducing in the developed world. In the US, this may be attributed to
information policies and subsidies for individual conservation measures (Dickinson, 
2000). The point is for changes to occur slowly, so as to let people adapt to higher water
prices over sufficient time. In northern Europe, less consumption and higher prices limit 
the potential scope of change when compared to North America. However, there has 
been such a reduction in water consumption (mostly from large-quantity users and
outdoor uses) that the only way to maintain the cost recovery principle is to raise unit
prices. The limited amount of information given to users, in particular on the difference 
between short-term and long-term sustainability, and on the real reasons for (formal) 
privatization, has contributed to a growing distrust of systems that had reached their
equilibrium under a municipalist type of welfare system. In some cities in France, this
distrust is growing to the level of court action. 
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Southern Europe illustrates this point differently, as the incomplete infrastructure has 
prevented utilities from increasing prices to cost-recovery levels, which has led to 
irrational allocation. Almeria, for example, was supposed to obtain its water from the 
Pyrenees or the Rhone, at a cost ten times as much as the city would pay to buy water
from farmers. Through a model initially developed under the Franco dictatorship, but 
now involving European subsidies, Spanish farmers overexploit the aquifers and request 
increasing volumes of surface water transfers to grow tomatoes and strawberries, part of
which are bought as surplus by the EU. Farms are commonly owned by large northern 
agribusiness. If they were not constrained by this uneconomical set up, farmers would
make more money without working, just reselling ‘their’ water. This happened in 
California, and the only problem there was that, to be accepted, evidence had to be
shown that there was a ‘water market’.
In fact, what we have to face is that the growing commodification of water services is
very dangerous if it is not done within a collective re-learning process, as opposed to an
‘out of sight, out of mind’ mentality. For instance, there is a trend in Europe towards
individual water metering and billing for the sake of better equity, even in apartments in 
small buildings, so that people are better able to trade off between saving and paying. Yet 
in most experiments, individual metering does not induce a significant change in
consumption patterns, in particular after a few months, and in many cases the savings of 
the most thrifty are offset by the yearly cost of the meter itself (depreciation, reading and
billing separately). Consumers are often angry to see their water bills increase after they 
had been told that they would save money. And this distrust, too, is growing. According
to Rajala and Katko (2004), installing meters in individual apartments might be feasible in 
new houses, but it is too expensive in older buildings.
One of the most interesting recent cases is the decision by the Government of Flanders, 
Belgium to strictly implement Agenda 21, and to provide users with an initial volume of 
water for free. For practical reasons, the free volume was set at 15 cubic meters per
capita per year, with extra water charged at rates that ensured water supplies would make 
the same income as they did previously. The consequences have been studied by the 
social and economic council of the Region of Flanders (Van Humbeeck, 1998). First, 
water suppliers have seen their total volumes shrink, because increasing block tariffs have
increased prices. It appears that people have invested in cisterns and in private wells to 
water their gardens, etc., and suppliers have been obliged to raise unit prices. Second, it 
turns out that wealthier families are paying a little less than before, while poorer ones are 
paying a little more. This is due to specific socio-demographic conditions: wealthier 
families are larger than poorer ones, yet extra children do not use enough water to result 
in higher bills (the free initial volume being per person). This complex case illustrates 
how little we know about domestic water use. If we are going to successfully tackle the
present water services crisis, we will need more than just the economist’s toolbox and 
good intentions. We need anthropologists, sociologists, historians and geographers, etc., 
all working together towards developing an interdisciplinary approach. Attitudes are so 
variable and culture-specific that it might be very difficult to show any rationality behind
apparent price elasticity. 
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Conclusion
With increasing discussion on how to reach a better compromise between the economic,
environmental and ethical dimensions of water services sustainability in the EU and in
the US, the development of new tools and indicators can give us some confidence for the 
future. But what is missing is an indicator translating the general public’s overall degree 
of confidence in water systems and in the water services policy community.
The real threat to water services is illustrated by the situation in Eastern Europe and in 
large cities in developing countries: when utilities are not fully reliable, in terms of 
quantity, continuity and quality (particularly sanitary quality), the compensation strategies 
adopted by various groups of users tend to increase uncertainty and the unreliability of the 
services. In this case, trying to apply new economic approaches that are suited to the
mature systems of developed countries might be unwise, if not catastrophic. Indeed,
privatization and even public-private partnerships at state or regional levels show their 
limitations when it comes to universalizing water services. Maybe, in fact, it is impossible 
to improve deficient utilities in developing countries – maybe these deficiencies will 
persist, together with increased use of bottled water. Zérah (1997) presents a striking case 
in New Delhi, for example. When we look closely at the situation, we find no significant 
differences between this and the kind of poor services and private alternatives seen on 
Greek islands.12 If confidence in the PWS in developed countries continues to shrink, 
and water volumes sold decrease significantly, they may see a growing irregularity of 
service, so much perhaps that the systems found in large third-world cities would finally 
prevail in the long term (Barraqué, 2001). 
In Durban, South Africa, the French water supplier, Lyonnaise des Eaux, has been quite 
successful in introducing special chip cards that are used to buy potable water from 
public taps: the company makes some money and users have no more gastro-enteritis 
and escape the traditional tribal control of the wells. In Buenos Aires, the same company
proposed providing cheap bulk water at the entrance of barrios, instead of desperately
trying to meter each user and fight for bill recovery. But both examples raise contentious 
issues: are poorer populations in developing countries bound to stay on these alternative 
partial services for ever? We could argue that the reason they have these alternative types
of PWS is that there is no municipality with sufficient legitimacy and capacity to build
reciprocal confidence between the company and water users.
So why not we take a second look at the future of municipalism? In our view, the only 
way to escape the dilemma faced by companies such as Lyonnaise des Eaux is municipal 
implication, as was common before local welfare and public economy were thrown into 
the dustbin of liberal economics. What municipalism achieved was to channel the savings 
of the upper and middle classes into the financing of a long-term solidarity-based system 
for all through a public economy of urban services, sometimes with the participation of 
the private sector, but without privatizing the actual infrastructure. Moreover,
municipality-owned water undertakings can be made autonomous, thus covering their
12 In some Greek islands, people rely first on their wells and cisterns, turning to PWS only for additional
uses. This makes the demand for public water highly variable, which has a negative impact on the reliability 
of the service. 
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costs. In many countries, such undertakings buy goods, services and works from the 
private sector based on continuous competition – without becoming locked into long-
term operational contracts (Hukka and Katko, 2004). In most countries, such 
arrangements have been carried out since the beginning of the modern systems in the
late 1800s (Juuti and Katko, 2005). 
Indeed, the territorial dimension of the issue is more important than the simple public vs. 
private debate. To maintain hope for cities in developing countries, we will have to 
invent similar mechanisms at appropriate territorial levels, depending on the
national/local citizenship traditions and community cultures. Such a subsidiary system 
would certainly offer better guarantees for national and international public investors,
which in turn would result in access to cheaper sources of funds for water systems. This 
seems to be the lesson that the historical development of European water services has to 
teach us. 
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The French PPP model for water services management: 




The Public Private Partnership (PPP) is a consensual concept that emerged during the 
1980s in relation to the evolution of the role of public institutions in economics. 
However, PPPs are not clearly defined by law. To some extent, they include any type of
informal partnership between private and public institutions. In a more narrow sense, 
they imply a formalization of relationships through a contract, or the creation of a public-
private company. This is why PPPs can only be defined in terms of practical experiences.
In this paper, we focus on the PPP model for water services management, which was 
developed in France in the middle of the nineteenth century and was strongly promoted
at an international level during the 1990s, especially in developing countries. the same 
type of contract, the concession, was used in both cases, but in two very different 
contexts. In the nineteenth century, local French authorities built partnerships with
private companies in order to develop collective and residential water distribution 
systems. In the 1990s, a number of large cities in Argentina, Bolivia and Brazil signed 
contracts with international companies to extend residential water systems into poor 
neighbourhoods. However, in spite of improvements in connection rates, concession 
contracts have failed to generalize access to drinking water. Those PPPs are being 
strongly challenged today, if not contested or even terminated. This raises questions
regarding the underestimation of the specific risks associated with developing countries 
or the capacity of foreign models to be implemented in different contexts (Breuil, 2005).
1 Christelle Pezon is Assistant Professor at the French National School for Water and Forestry
Management, head of the Laboratory Water and Sanitation services.
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We demonstrate that there was no reason to expect that the concession contract would 
succeed in generalizing access to water, given that it has to date failed to do so anywhere,
anytime, even in France (Pezon, 2000). We also characterize the conditions that led the
French PPP model for water services management to become the main way of providing 
drinking water in France (Pezon, 2005). One has to be very careful and particularly 
precise about which model is referred to: success credited to a particular model could, in
fact, be misplaced. 
PPPs and the public management of water services: co-existence and competition 
In France, PPPs for water services are a long-standing practice. They developed very 
slowly from 1850 to 1950, then became far more common, especially after the 1970s. 
Since 1990, four inhabitants out of five in France rely on drinking water supplied by 
private companies. This description of PPPs must be put into perspective by considering 
the evolution of people's connection to water networks, in order to compare PPP to
public management (see figure below). 
PPP and public management for the provision of drinking
water in France since 1900 
In the nineteenth century, only the largest cities were equipped with water distribution 
systems. At the beginning of the twentieth century, however, smaller cities began to be 
similarly equipped, followed by rural areas in the 1930s (Goubert, 1987). Half a century 
later, all of the 32,000 French rural local authorities were equipped with water networks.
French local authorities have always been in charge of supplying water to their
populations. They own the local water supply facilities and choose the regime under 
which the water supply is organised. Three distinctive regimes have successively 
dominated the French water supply industry since 1850: 
x The concession, in which investment and operation are realized by a private
operator, the concessionaire
x The régie (direct labour procurement), in which investment and operation are 
realized by a public body, the local authority 
26
An analysis of the origins and nature of water-related
unrest and conflicts in the urban context
x The affermage (lease contract), in which investment costs are borne by the local
authority, operation being taken over by a private company, the operator. 
Three periods can be distinguished since the middle of the nineteenth century, according
to the dominant legal structure: 
1850-1900: The concession 
The concession was almost the exclusive legal structure in this period, even though some 
water services were publicly managed (Copper-Royer, 1896). In Lyon, the Compagnie 
Générale des Eaux had 16,000 users after 30 years of concession, (Villard, 1885). At the
national level, the connection rate (the percentage of the total population supplied with 
drinking water) remained very low, from about 0 per cent in 1850 to 2 per cent in 1900. 
The concession disappeared at the beginning of the twentieth century, and never enabled 
universalization of access to drinking water. 
1900-1970: The régie
In this period, the régie was the dominant regime, experiencing a high growth rate up to 
1950. The lease contract was the second most popular regime, and the concession 
contract disappeared. In 1908, less than half of France’s 500 urban water services fell 
under a lease contract (Burel, 1912). Ten years later, only one-third of cities with more 
than 5,000 inhabitants were using PPPs for their water services (Monsarrat, 1920), and by 
1938, fewer than 1,000 local authorities were engaged in a PPP, as opposed to 6,000 that 
managed their water services on their own (Guillaume, 1987, Loosdregt, 1990). In 1954, 
in-house water services supplied 18 million people with drinking water, while water 
services under PPPs supplied only 7 million people (Loosdregt, 1990, Ministère de 
l'Agriculture, 1959). The connection rate had grown from 2 per cent in 1900 to 65 per 
cent, but there were still 21,700 local authorities in need of water networks. They ranged 
from very isolated municipalities to rapidly growing communities located near cities,
which were transforming rural areas into city suburbs. In this context, public and private 
management continue to co-exist, with PPPs increasing faster than in-house water 
services – as local authorities that gathered into larger inter-communal organizations
preferred this type of regime. The régie continued to supply drinking water to a majority
of the population, and by 1970, 90 per cent of the French population was supplied with 
drinking water. 
1970-2005: The affermage 
In 1973, privately and publicly operated services supplied an equal number of
inhabitants; 2 million people were still to be connected to water networks (Ministère de 
l'Agriculture, 1976). This population was finally connected to water distribution systems 
under lease contracts. The affermage became the dominant regime and it also started to 
increase at the expense of public management. This meant that it was not only chosen
for new water services, but that water services that had been publicly managed since their
creation changed to PPPs. As the univeralization of water connections was completed in
the late 1980s, the alternatives of PPPs or in-house management could no longer
peacefully co-exist, and they entered into competition. This competition began to favour 
PPPs when many of the major cities chose a PPP style of management (Avignon in 1985, 
Lyon and Paris in 1986, Montpellier in 1989, Toulouse in 1990 and Saint-Etienne in
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1992). In the past 30 years, about 10,000 local authorities (8 million inhabitants) have
signed PPP contracts to develop their water services. However, 10,000 in-house water 
services still supply drinking water to 20 per cent of the French population, located in 
15,000 municipalities.
PPPs and the economic regulation of drinking water services
Since 1850, PPPs have been regulated in different ways, according to the institution 
responsible for their regulation, the economic principle enforced to regulate the PPP, and
the contract that formalizes it.
From an institutional point of view, water services regulation was, for a century, 
exclusively conducted by the Conseil d'Etat. This acts as the Supreme Court for the legal
affairs of the state, settling conflicts involving a public body. As a water service cannot be 
privately owned, it is a public body regardless of the way it is managed. Cases involving
an in-house managed water service are either brought by or against subcontractors (civil 
engineering firms, project managers), third parties, or, to some extent, users. Cases 
involving a PPP-managed water service are initiated either by or against the private 
partner, the local authority, third parties and, to some extent, users. The Conseil d’Etat’s
settlements rely on the laws that regulate local authorities (their economic competencies 
in the broad sense) and the drinking water providers, and also on its jurisprudence, which 
established the guiding principles of France’s public services in the early 1920s.
At the beginning of the 1950s, the state became the main regulator of drinking water
services in France. It promoted an administrative regulation until the decentralization
laws of 1982, which distributed powers of the centralized state were to local authorities. 
This administrative regulation translated into PPP contracts and regulated prices. It 
proceeded through the exclusive capacity of the state to allocate water network funding, 
without which no rural local authority would have been able to create a water service. 
Since 1982, the PPP has been deregulated: contracts and rates are no longer under state 
control. Water services management has now become a market in which local authorities 
are supposed to act as the major regulators (Pezon, 2003). 
The regulation of water services is carried out by institutions that submit the PPP to one
of the two well-known regulatory principles in economics, price-cap and cost-of-service 
(Milgrom, Roberts, 1992). Each of these principles evaluates the risks endorsed by 
partners and their level of responsibility in the management of the service differently.
Under the price cap principle, a fixed rate is supposed to remain unchanged, regardless of 
contingencies, until the end of the contract. The private partner is the residual claimant: it 
is entitled to keep the remaining benefit (or loss) of the activity after the deduction of all 
expenses. Under the cost-of-service principle, the water rate is adjusted in line with the 
expenses of the private partner. The local authority is the residual claimant and is given 
residual rights of control: it is responsible for making decisions regarding the water 
service facility when neither the contract nor the law has expressly designated a decision-
maker.
Until the 1920s, the regulation of PPPs for water services management complied with the 
price-cap principle. Since then, cost-of-service regulation has been the rule. This change 
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originated in a consolidation of the principles of public service implemented by the 
Conseil d’Etat (Pezon, 2003). 
Lastly, the PPPs are formalized by a contract whose nature and duration has greatly
evolved since 1850. From 1850 to the beginning of the twentieth century, PPPs took the 
shape of a concession contract. The private partner financed the infrastructure of the 
service and sought the return of its investment through the operation (water bills). The 
concession contracts lasted about a century. 
Since then, PPPs have been formalized by a lease contract. The owner, the local
authority, is responsible for investments, whereas operating costs are taken over by the 
operator. The public financing of infrastructure invalidates very long-term contracts. 
From 1951 to 1982, the duration of the lease contract was formally limited to twelve
years. But during the 1980s this increased to up to twenty or even thirty years. Since the 
middle of the 1990s, lease contracts have been negotiated on a shorter basis, of about ten 
years.
Table 1 presents the historical evolution of these three regulation dimensions. It 
underlines the gap between changing the regulator and changes in the regulation
principle, as well as the symbioses between the regulatory principle and the dominant 
contract.
Table 1 : Institutions, contracts and principles of the regulation
of water services in France
1850 1920 1950 1982 2005
Institution C o n s e i l  d ' E t a t State Local  author i t ies
Principle P r i c e  c a p C o s t  o f  s e r v i c e  
Contract C o n c e s s i o n A f f e r m a g e
This table is also helpful in identifying the institutional and contractual contexts under
which PPPs have successively declined and been successful. It suggests that the 
successful PPP is neither regulated according to the price-cap principle, nor is it a
concession contract. Surprisingly, though, it is under these conditions that it was
promoted in developing countries during the 1990s, especially in Latin America. In
France, this original model was a complete failure. We are now going to analyse the cause
of this failure, before identifying the key factors behind the success of the model that has
succeeded in France. 
The failure of the original PPP model: An analysis through conflicts 
The concession contract represented the French original model of PPPs for water-
services management. This contract is primarily a way of financing the ‘public service’. In 
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the nineteenth century, ‘public service’ was limited to the collective water supply to 
public taps: it was the service that local authorities sought to finance through the 
concession contract. The concessionaire obtained, as a counterpart to its investment, the 
exclusive right to offer a ‘private service’ in the form of providing private, piped tap
water to the population of the municipality (Duroy, 1996). From a technical point of 
view, the private service was expected to either extend the primary network of the ‘public 
service’ or to simply connect a water supply to it. 
The monopoly of the ‘private service’ depended in a sense on satisfying all primary water 
needs. The public partner represented these. It had to pay the concessionaire (with a bill) for
the supply of water once or twice a year. For users, the ‘public service’ was free. It would 
also become free for taxpayers after 20 or 25 years, when the bills collected by the 
concessionaire from the local authority equalled the forecasted investments of setting up the 
public service. 
The concession contract gave local authorities the chance to have a water network
without getting into debt and at a secure price. The concessionaire made no profit on the 
‘public service’; its profit was rooted in the ‘private service’. The ‘public service’ was
justification for the concessionaire to turn water into money. In a certain way, the
concession contract created solidarity between those who could afford a private service 
(previously satisfied by water carriers) and those who were supplied collectively.
This smart contractual arrangement collapsed at the beginning of the twentieth century,
when local authorities tried to remove the ‘private service’ and make it the new core of 
the public water service. The legal cases settled by the Conseil d’Etat show how hard the 
local authorities tried to make the concessionaires universalize access to tap water, and why
the concession contract was so ill-equipped to reach this goal. 
With seventy-eight court cases, the second half of the nineteenth century saw the most
conflict between public and private partnerships. Among those judgements, twenty-nine
originated from municipalities wanting to extend their concessionaires’ contractual
obligations (network extension, water quality improvement, water quantity increase),
twenty-one originated from municipalities wanting to lower the rate applied to users, and
eighteen originated from municipalities wanting to terminate the Concession contract 
before its term. 
The Conseil d’Etat systematically considered that there were no limits to the parties’ 
rationality during the negotiation stage.2 It considered concession contracts to be 
complete contracts: no unforeseen contingencies could be invoked to justify
renegotiations ex post relating to the allocation of residual rights of control. In particular: 
x The rate, the quantity, and the quality of the water supplied were set once for all. 
x None of the parties could invoke unforeseen contingencies to curb the 
contractual clauses. 
2 See Annex A 
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x There was to be no revision and no hardship clause. 
x The price cap could not be increased or decreased.
x The concessionaire could pay damages should it not comply with its contractual
obligations.
The Conseil d’Etat systematically invited both parties to negotiate any amendment to the
contracts.3 It never allocated any residual rights of control to any party to extend the 
scope of the initial contract. This applied in particular to local authorities, which 
frequently asked the Conseil d’Etat to enforce extra-contractual obligations (network 
extension, water quality improvement, lowering rates for ‘private’ water). 
None of the parties could be forced to accept an extension of the contract, which would 
decrease the initial contract’s profitability.4 In that respect, municipalities claiming 
extension of the concessionaires’ duties (network extension, water quality improvement)
were invited by the Conseil d’Etat to provide the concessionaires with a compensation
scheme in line with the initial one, implicitly denying any economies of scale or scope. 
The Conseil d’Etat set restrictions on contract transfer and termination.5 It always denied 
the concessionaire the right to sell its contractual rights and obligations to a third party 
without the municipality approving the deal. This was a consequence of the intuitu
personae characteristic of the concession contract, whereby the concessionaire was selected by
the municipality by mutual agreement. Only a judge could formally decide to terminate a
concession contract, based on consideration and evidence that the concessionaire had
stopped fulfilling its contractual duties (i.e had stopped operating). It should be noted
that the municipality was not entitled to terminate the concession contract on its own,
even if it had become obvious that the concessionaire had lost the ability to fulfil its part of 
the contract. Once the termination was decided on, the concessionaire was not guaranteed
even partial recovery of the amount invested in the concession.
Lastly, the Conseil d’Etat gave concessionaires the right to charge users for extra contractual
services.6 Users often asked to be supplied with a greater volume of water, or to meter
their consumption, when the concession contract had foreseen only the provision of a 
fixed quantity of water at a fixed rate, whatever their effective consumption. The 
following should be noted: 
x The Conseil d’Etat granted concessionaires the capacity to sell additional services 
(metered consumption, variable quantity) at higher rates than contractual rates.
x Most Concession contracts involved a profit-sharing scheme by which the 
concessionaire shared with the municipality profits made beyond a certain level of 
sales.
3 See Annex B 
4 See Annex C 
5 See Annex D. 
6 See Annex E. 
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x The Conseil d’Etat prevented municipalities from undertaking legal action on 
behalf of ‘private’ water users.
x Commercial conflicts between the concessionaire and ‘private’ water users were 
considered by the Conseil d’Etat as being outside its jurisdiction. 
The reaction of the municipalities to Conseil d’Etat settlements that found concessionaires
were not obliged to finance water service extension beyond what was stated in the 
original agreement was threefold:
x A few local authorities committed to concession contracts bought their
concessionaires’ operating rights back through very lengthy and conflictual processes
(11 judgements, 13 to 25 years of procedure).7 The position of the Conseil d’Etat 
concerning the financial settlement and conditions of buying back operating 
rights, clearly in favour of concessionaires, prevented most municipalities from 
buying their rights back (Pezon, 2000). 
x Other local authorities committed in PPPs started financing the extension of 
water supply facilities themselves, progressively turning their concession contract 
into an affermage contract, in which the operator was mainly concerned with 
providing operating service.
x Local authorities engaged in the process of creating a new water service opted for 
the régie, under which the local authority retains responsibility for investment and 
operation.
After half a century, the system based upon the triptych of the Conseil d'Etat, price-cap
regulations and concession contracts resulted in very poor results in terms of connection 
rates.
This historical perspective shows that the tandem of concession contracts and price-cap 
regulations applied to water service is incompatible with the univeralization of drinking 
water access. The risks the concessionaire took on with a fixed-price contract drove the
partners to describe precisely the actions that the concessionaire would have to undertake to
reach pre-determined objectives. Concessionaires managed their risks through a supposedly 
complete contract. But this interpretation was incompatible with the public water service 
once tap water supplanted collective supply as the objective of local authorities. By 
definition, a public service evolves permanently. Who could foresee all the decisions that 
would have to be taken to comply with principles such as continuity of service or the
need to adapt the service to new technical innovations ten years down the road? The 
actions of the concessionaire cannot be dictated in full through a single contract unless its
duration is reduced, which contravenes laws regarding the private financing of long-term
infrastructure. The uncertainty of costs leads us to reconsider the way risks are shared 
between partners, as they can be assumed by the public partner, by the local authority or 
by the water users, depending on whether the tax or the rate adjusts the revenue to the
costs of the water service.
7 See Annex F. 
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The key factors of success of the French model of PPP for water management 
The successful French PPP model relies on the affermage, or lease contract. This contract
became slowly more popular until the 1950s, then increased rapidly in popularity to 
become the dominant regime by the early 1970s. Surprisingly, the Conseil d’Etat has not 
been called upon to settle any conflict opposing a municipality and an operator
committed in an affermage contract. We might expect the affermage regime, which splits 
responsibilities and allocates investment decisions to one party (the local authority) and
operating decisions to the other (the operator), to be a fairly conflictual arrangement:
when decisions regarding investment and operations are being split, there is evidence that
optimality will not be reached. The investing party tries to minimize its investment, with 
the risk of inflating operating costs, and, conversely, the operating party tries to obtain 
equipment redundancy in order to minimize its effort and costs. Therefore we might
expect to see many conflicts and subsequent Conseil d’Etat decisions. However, this is
not the case. The success of PPPs in providing water services management in France has
relied on very specific conditions that have pre-empted such conflicts.
The first key factor of success lies in the public financing of investments. In other words,
the PPP has worked in France because the main financial risks have been taken on by 
local authorities. Consequently, the private partner has had no grounds to claim a profit 
based on capital it has not financed, as was the case under the concession regime. As no
return is expected from public financing, prices have been kept to a minimum.
The second key success factor lies in cost-of-service regulation. The private partner takes 
on only the operational risks. The cost-of-service principle applies to the operation of the 
water service, not the investment. The adjustment of price rates to costs is determined 
through a multi-criteria formula indexed to the main components of the operating costs:
energy, wages and chemical products. As users’ bills are proportionate to the volume of
water distributed, the increasing of revenue results from an extension of the water service 
in size (inter-municipal services), number of connections and water consumption. The 
distribution of tap water becomes a mass-activity: the more the private partners distribute 
water, the more profit they make. Their interest is therefore to increase the number of
users and the number of services they operate, instead of seeking to increase the profit 
rate of a smaller number of users. This is not difficult, because they do not have to 
finance these investments.
A third key factor of success lies in the way regulations are implemented. In 1951, a 
standard affermage contract was defined at the national level. This standardization
favoured the expansion of PPPs in two ways. First, it came in a context in which few 
water companies had survived the municipal socialism movement and the Second World
War. With a standardized PPP agreement they were in a better position to capitalize on 
their experience in negotiation and to rationalize their internal organization than they 
would be if faced with varying kinds of PPPs. Second, the standard affermage contract 
gives the operator a substantial role in the design and construction of the facility it is
committed to operating. This pre-empts the potential conflicts that might have arisen 
from the lease contract and the division of responsibilities it embodied. 
A fourth key factor of success lies in the administrative regulation of water rates at the
national level, implemented at the local level by the prefect (representing the State in each
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county). The standard affermage contract relies on a rate formula that automatically adjusts
prices to costs. Moreover, it translates into a rate level that must be approved by the 
prefect. If the rate formula results into an overly high rate increase, prefects are entitled 
to fix a lower rate than the contractual price. In such a system, local authorities hardly
take on the responsibility that usually falls to the public partner engaged in cost-of-
service regulation. In reality, regulation is controlled by the state and its local 
representatives. This gives local authorities interested in PPPs a guarantee that their water
rates will remain reasonable.
A fifth key factor of success lies in the fact that this model has been strongly promoted
by those in charge of allocating water funding. Rural local authorities clearly depend on 
public funding to set up water networks. Only those that intended to create a service in
compliance with the service planned by the Genie Rural Corps of Engineers would have
the opportunity of being funded. These engineers define, in particular, the water service 
territory and its management (in-house or PPP). They encourage the latter. For them – at 
the state and local levels – it is the best way to overcome the rural local authorities’ lack 
of technical and management skills. To some extent, a PPP model built with only a few
water companies is very helpful in pursuing a rationalized national development of water
infrastructures, in spite of 36,000 local authorities (Pezon, 2004).
The last key factor of success lies in the capacity of PPPs to appeal to the different 
priorities of local authorities, water companies and the state. The state finds in the PPP a
way to reach its two objectives: the rationalized, national development of water
infrastructures and the recovery of at least some of the costs of water services. The 
existence of water companies that operate services across the national territory 
overcomes vain attempts at reform at the local administrative level. In fact, through 
PPPs, water services can be managed on a larger scale than that of the municipal
territory, even when local authorities have not grouped into an inter-municipal 
organization. Cost-of-service regulation guarantees recovery of the operating costs taken
on by private partners. On the other hand, local authorities can benefit from the large 
scale of the operation of their services without decreasing their power as they would by
grouping into inter-municipal organizations. Moreover, for the national regulator, PPPs
provide a stronger guarantee that their operating costs will be recovered than would
public management, and gives local authorities the political advantage that a well-
managed and low-rate water service offers.
These six key factors of success allowed the deployment of a rent-sharing scheme
favourable to all parties: operators were in a position to sell construction and operation 
services at relatively attractive rates; municipalities were able to fulfil their role of 
developing local infrastructures, and were in a position charge end-users reasonably; 
users got drinking water at very low rates (enough to cover the operating costs of water 
services).
Conclusion
The difficulties recent met by efforts to export the concession contract for water services 
management could have in part have been foreseen, as they are very similar to those that
led to the failure of the concession in France a century ago. French municipalities gave 
up on this contract, which supposed enforcement of the full-cost-recovery principle, and 
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accepted that public financing was necessary for the creation or the development of their 
water services. The PPP has become the predominant way of operating water services in 
France, dependant on six very specific key factors for its success. With the deregulation
of the water sector in the mid-1980s, local authorities were, however, on their own to 
frame new relationships with three water companies. The legitimacy of the PPP is still 
contested, especially by users, due to its lack of regulation. The Local Authorities Law of 
1999 and the forthcoming European Framework, which aims to increase PPP 
transparency, might pave the way for a new regulatory framework for water services
management in France. 
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Annexes: Court cases examined
A: Conseil d’Etat decisions on completeness of Concession contracts
Year Date Opposing Parties
1875 29 Jan. Ville du Havre v. Compagnie des Eaux du Havre
1876 11 Feb City of Marquise v. Sieur Kent
1877 09 Feb Sieurs Fortin-Hermann et Cie v. City of Laon
1878 27 Dec. Compagnie Générale des Eaux v. City of Nantes 
1879 28 Feb. City of Melun v. Compagnie des Eaux
1879 13 Jun City of Cannes v. Crédit Compagnie
1879 12 Aug. Sieur Branellec v. City of Brest 
1882 24 Mar Sieurs Dalifol, Huet et autres v. City of Montlhéry 
1883 11 May Compagnie Générale des Eaux v. City of Nantes 
1883 07 Aug City of Meaux v. Société des Eaux de Meaux
1889 10 May Compagnie Générale des Eaux v. Ville d'Ancenis 
1890 02 May Compagnie Générale des Eaux v. Commune du Petit-Quevilly
1891 13 Feb. Sieurs Goffinon, Rozier v. City of Beaumont-sur-Oise
1891 15 May Sieur Joncla v. Commune de Grenade
1893 03 Mar. Commune de Clichy v. Compagnie Générale des Eaux
1893 19 May Ville d'Aix-les-bains v. Compagnie des Travaux Hydrauliques 
1895 15 Nov. Compagnie Générale des Eaux v. City of Toulon
1896 12 Jun. City of Bastia v. Société d'Entreprise Générale des Distributions et
  Concessions d'Eau et de Gaz 
1898 18 Feb. City of Douai v. Société des Eaux Saphore
1912 22 Nov. City of Rouen v. Compagnie Générale des Eaux 
B: Conseil d’Etat decisions inviting the Parties to negotiate amendments
Year  Date Opposing Parties
1875 29 Jan. Ville du Havre v. Compagnie des Eaux du Havre
1877 09 Feb. Sieurs Fortin-Hermann et Cie v. City of Laon
1882 24 Mar. Sieurs Dalifol, Huet et autres v. City of Montlhéry 
1893 19 May Ville d'Aix-les-bains v. Compagnie des Travaux Hydrauliques 
1894 11 Jul. City of Courtenay v. Société des Eaux et du Gaz
1910 28 Jan. Commune de Sainte Maxime sur Mer v. Sieur Jeffery
1923 26 Jan. Compagnie Générale des Eaux v. City of Lyon
C: Conseil D’etat decisions outlining that the initial terms of the
 contract serve as a status quo 
Year Date Opposing Parties
1877 9 Feb. Sieurs Fortin-Hermann et Cie v. City of Laon
1890 2 May Compagnie Générale des Eaux v. Commune du Petit-Quevilly
1891 13 Feb. Sieurs Goffinon, Rozier v. City of Beaumont-sur-Oise
1896 21 Feb. Compagnie des Eaux de la Banlieue de Paris v. Commune d'Asnières 
1898 18 Feb. City of Douai v. Société des Eaux Saphore
1911 27 Jan. Compagnie Générale des Eaux v. City of Rouen 
1912 22 Nov. City of Rouen v. Compagnie Générale des Eaux 
1924 28 May City of Rouen v. Compagnie Générale des Eaux 
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D: Coneil d’Etat decisions restricting contracts transfer and termination 
Year Date Opposing Parties
1876 11 Feb. City of Marquise v. Sieur Kent
1878 08 Feb. Sieur Pasquet v. City of Bourges
1882 24 Mar Sieurs Dalifol, Huet et autres v. City of Montlhéry 
1884 11 Jul. Compagnie des Eaux d'Oran v. Ville d'Oran
1894 11 Jul. City of Courtenay v. Société des Eaux et du Gaz
1895 06 Apr. Sieur Deshayes v. City of Lorient
1898 01 Jul. Ville d'Aix-les-Bains v. Compagnie des Travaux Hydrauliques
1902 22 Mar Société Départementale des Eaux de Source v. City
  of Brie-Comte-Robert
1905 20 Jan. Compagnie Départementale des Eaux et Services Municipaux v. City of 
Langres
1912 22 Nov. City of Rouen v. Compagnie Générale des Eaux 
1919 26 Dec. Compagnie des Eaux de Bayonne v. City of Bayonne
1923 02 Nov. Compagnie des eaux de Bayonne v. City of Bayonne
1924 28 May City of Rouen v. Compagnie Générale des Eaux 
E: Conseil d’etat decisions on Concessionaire's role in price setting
 and the profit sharing scheme
Year Date Opposing Parties
1868 30 Jan. Sieur Pradier v. Compagnie Générale des Eaux
1877 09 Feb. Sieurs Fortin-Hermann et Cie v. City of Laon
1878 08 Feb. Sieur Pasquet v. City of Bourges
1879 28 Feb. City of Melun v. Compagnie des Eaux
1879 12 Aug Sieur Branellec v. City of Brest 
1883 20 Jul. Ville d'Issoudun v. Sieurs Badois et Berthier 
1884 25 Jul. Compagnie des Eaux du Havre v. Ville du Havre 
1885 04 Dec. Commune de Saint-mandé v. Compagnie Générale des Eaux
1888 08 Aug Commune de Neuilly-sur-Seine v. Compagnie Générale des Eaux
1893 03 Mar Commune de Clichy v. Compagnie Générale des Eaux
1895 06 Apr. Sieur Deshayes v. City of Lorient
1902 13 Jun Sieur Sinet et commune de Sceaux v. Compagnie Générale des Eaux 
1903 20 Nov. Compagnie des eaux de Creil v. City of Creil 
1908 14 Feb. Commune de Nanterre v. Compagnie des Eaux de la Banlieue de Paris
1911 27 Jan. Compagnie Générale des Eaux v. City of Rouen 
F: Conseil d’Etat conditions upon premature contract termination 
Year Date Opposing Parties
1900 6-avr. City of Nantes v. Compagnie Générale des Eaux 
1906 23 Feb. Compagnie Générale des Eaux/City of Lyon v.
  City of Lyon/Compagnie Générale des Eaux
1908 20 Mar Compagnie Générale des Eaux v. City of Nantes 
1911 10 Mar Compagnie Générale des Eaux v. City of Lyon
1921 4 Mar Compagnie Générale des Eaux v. City of Toulon
1923 26 Jan. Compagnie Générale des Eaux v. City of Lyon
1924 28 May City of Rouen v. Compagnie Générale des Eaux 
1925 6 Nov. Compagnie Générale des Eaux v. City of Rouen 
1926 13 Jan. Compagnie des Eaux de la City of Creil v. City of Creil 
1928 09 Nov. Compagnie Générale des Eaux v. Villes de Toulon et de La Seyne
1934 08 Jun City of Toulon v. Compagnie Générale des Eaux et City of La Seyne
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Water management in the cities of Brazil:
Conflicts and new opportunities in regulation 




Access to water and sanitation services is one of the most pressing concerns in Brazil
today. Significant social inequalities remain even in Brazil’s large cities, where a total
absence of access to system services still exists in some areas. According to the data for
2000 from the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE, Brazilian Institute of
Geography and Statistics), the absence of water system services affects about ten million 
households, most of which are located in cities. Indeed, nearly 80 per cent of the
Brazilian population now live in cities.
The country has had to deal with complex circumstances and now faces an accumulation
of deficiencies. This explains the difficulty of those responsible for water and sanitation 
to move from words to deeds, and to carry out policies capable of universalising services 
and improving effectively the living conditions of the population. Public officials
continuously extend the deadlines set for meeting social objectives, such as universal 
access to drinking water and sanitation. The economic crisis and the need to decrease 
public spending to lower the fiscal deficit – a necessity imposed on Brazil by international
finance organizations – are invariably offered as arguments for reducing investment in
public policies of a social nature. The situation tends to worsen as the population and the 
number of poor people increase. Several of the country’s cities are consequently seeing 
new slums appear, poor neighbourhoods that lack access to water and sanitation and
whose infant mortality rate is exceptionally high. 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the federal government has tried to make access to
services more dependable by introducing new management models. During the two 
terms of President Cardoso (1994–1997 and 1998–2001), certain officials in the 
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government called for the delegation of services to private firms, although no new 
national policy for water and sanitation was put forward. The last nationwide policy dates 
from the 1970s: the Plano Nacional de Saneamento (PLANASA, National Sanitation
Plan), which represented the military government’s policy covering water and sanitation. 
Innovations in public policy on water and sanitation have had to be introduced at the 
municipal management level.
Since passage of the law of 1995, municipalities have made the first steps towards the 
delegation of services to the private sector. However, the number of concessions remains
quite limited. According to recent data (2003), only thirty-one municipalities have
delegated their water and sanitary services to private operators. This represents barely 5
per cent of the total population connected to water and sanitation networks. As for the 
public Companhias Estaduais de Saneamento Básico (CESBs, State Basic Sanitation
Companies) created by PLANASA at the state level, only two have been partially
privatized: Paraná’s state water company (SANEPAR), managed by a firm called Domino
(a joint venture of Vivendi and the Brazilian groups Andrade Gutierrez, Opportunity and
Copel), which holds 39.7 per cent of the company’s shares; and Tocantins’s state water 
company (SANEANTINS), of which 76.5 per cent of the shares belong to the private 
group, EMSA.8
However, the essential problem is that Brazil’s large cities extend into several 
municipalities, a situation that leads to institutional conflicts. 
Institutional Conflicts 
A first point worth more detailed analysis concerns jurisdictional conflicts between
municipalities, which according to Brazilian law are responsible for the delivery of
services, and the CESBs.
In the 1970s, within the framework of PLANASA, municipalities were required to 
delegate services operation to the CESBs in order to obtain federal government funding. 
In the second half of the 1980s, this model encountered major difficulties in financing
and in the expansion of services. By the 1990s, coinciding with the growth of the 
democratic process in Brazil, heavy criticism was being levelled at the centralized model
of services management. Indeed, the democratization of public policies was understood
to mean their decentralization. According to the consensus view, decentralized delivery
of public services would be more democratic, more efficient, and would raise the well-
being of Brazilian society. 
Criticism came from the municipalities as well as from the Programa de Modernização
do Setor Saneamento (PMSS, Water Sector Modernization Programme), which was
8 Among the private groups operating in Brazil there are three types of capital investor: large international 
water companies (the French companies Veolia and Suez-Ondeo, the Spanish company Aguas de
Barcelona, the English company Water International, the Portuguese company Aguas de Portugal and the
North American company Enron); private national or international banks (BNP Paribas, Banco Fator, 
Wald e Associados, Banco Patrimônio, Salomon Smith Barney Holding, Capitaltec, Banco Essi and
Deutsche Bank); and Brazilian public works companies that already worked for CESBs at the time of 
PLANASA (CBPO, Odebrecht, etc.). 
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started in 1994. The PMSS aimed at greater flexibility in the existing management 
structures. Created at the prompting of the World Bank, the programme meant to 
redress the rigidity of the military government’s management model, which was still in 
place. Recognizing, moreover, the enormous differences between different regions of the 
country, the PMSS advocated the possible coexistence of several management models: it
was up to the municipalities and the states to choose their management model from a 
range of possibilities made available to them, including the concession of services to 
private operators. The PMSS did not, therefore, represent an interventionist policy. In
fact, as of the latter half of the 1980s there was no longer any national plan to determine 
the priority of investments. Action was taken without coordination between the different 
governmental agencies involved. There were no tools to evaluate the use of financial 
resources or the social effectiveness of the investments made.9
Nevertheless, the concession of services to CESBs remains the dominant model: 71 per 
cent of the drinking water systems of Brazil’s municipalities are managed by state 
companies, with or without concession contracts. For sanitation, the percentage drops to
14.5 per cent; 84.5 per cent of Brazil’s municipalities are without concession contracts for
sanitation services, which means that the services, when they exist, are managed directly 
by the municipalities, and are much less developed. 
Territorial conflicts linked with the state-centralized management model involve the 
state’s relationship with the planning and regulation of urban land use, which falls under 
municipal authority. However, it can be seen that the institutional and technical
organization of water and sanitation systems do not respond to the directives of urban
policy, whether these directives are made at the municipal or city level. The supply-side 
logic of water and sanitation services is sector-based and is not necessarily related to local
or urban territorial development planning. The urban process and, therefore, urban
planning and management cannot be dissociated from the territory, even when the most
elementary ideas of functionality are at issue. On the other hand, most often measures 
concerning the increase of supply to a water system are determined without taking into 
account the objective characteristics of the territory (Silva, 2004). This sector-based logic 
is maintained by the institutional framework of concession contracts, a framework that
does not allow municipalities any real possibility of setting the priorities for service and 
system expansion within their jurisdiction. A striking asymmetry of power exists,
reinforced by these contracts, which leads in most cases to a situation in which large
companies with service concessions pursue a sector-based strategy without yielding to 
the directives established by the master planning of the municipalities. Large companies 
determine their investment plans autonomously, without consultation with the 
municipalities. Only in certain cases do these plans coincide with the urban development
directives drawn up at the municipal level.
9 Since 1995 the objective of the PMSS has been to establish universal access and to improve the quality of 
services through research and efficient management. It maintains two lines of independent but
complementary action. The first aims at the institutional restructuration of the sector through the
development of regulatory measures, new financing mechanisms and possible institutional models for the
management of services. The second line of action aims at the financial, technical and organizational
modernization of certain CESBs, with the goal of setting examples for other CESBs. To this end,
investments in CESBs have been made with the assistance of the World Bank and local financing.
41
Urban Water Conflicts
Despite the decentralizing tendency of public policy that has defined Brazil since the 
Constitution of 1988, and despite the opportunity to break with or, simply, not to renew 
concession contracts with the CESBs, no sizeable move towards the municipalization of 
services has yet been seen. Even the signing of new concession contracts under new 
terms with the CESBs, terms which would give the municipalities means to participate 
more directly in services management, does not seem to be a widespread tendency. For
small municipalities, whose services are in most cases insufficient and whose effective 
management depends on cross-subsidization, the municipalization of management is not 
a viable choice. For large municipalities where services are profitable, the
municipalization process almost always gives rise to conflict with the CESBs. The 
authoritarian nature of the concession contracts protects the interests of public 
companies to the detriment of the municipalities’. Legal action is complicated and the
CESBs demand various kinds of compensation for investments made and infrastructures
installed, which makes it difficult for municipalities to break with a contract and resume 
services management.10 A considerable number of municipalities therefore prefer to 
maintain their concessions to CESBs on the same contractual terms, so limiting their 
responsibilities towards the users of water and for sanitation services management.
The conflicts arising from the municipal recovery of concessions entail not only 
potentially lengthy legal disputes, but also genuine political disputes between city and
state governments. This latter conflict typically arises when the mayors of capital cities
are not members of the same party as the state governors. State companies earn the
greatest share of their profits in capital cities. CESBs obviously do not want to lose 
capital-city concessions, but these cities demand more investment and sometimes 
challenge the policy of cross-subsidization practised by the companies, whose earnings 
from services operation in the capitals end up financing investments in other 
municipalities of the urban area, or even of the state, at the expense of service quality in
the cities. In the state of Rio de Janeiro, for example, the municipality’s Office of Public 
Works each year issues a large number of fines (around 1,660 in 2001) to the state-run 
company CEDAE for leaks and for the poor quality of the water and sewage systems, 
problems that lead to flooding and road damage.
The move to protect municipal autonomy and municipal involvement in services
management is lead by the Associação Nacional dos Serviços Municipais de Saneamento 
(ASSEMAE, National Association of Municipal Sanitation), an association founded in 
1984, which brings together 1,800 municipalities that directly manage their water and
sanitation services. ASSEMAE calls for the municipalization of management (although 
not in every case) by emphasizing the need to recognize the variety of technical and
financial resources that define Brazilian communities. In 1997 the association joined with 
other social organizations to create the Frente Nacional de Saneamento Ambiental
(FNSA, National Front for Environmental Sanitation). The Front brings together 
different political forces in civil society, among which include the sector’s trade unions, 
10 However, the city council of Diadema, citing article 293 of the São Paulo State Constitution, has been
able to avoid immediate payment of compensation for investments made by the state company SABESP.
Article 293 provides a period of twenty-five years for payment of the compensation, following an audit
completed by the City Secretariat and the Secretariat of the National Treasury (see Vargas, 1996).
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ASSEMAE, nongovernmental organizations, consumer advocacy groups and an 
organization mobilizing for the right to fair housing. The Front has lead the movement 
against the privatization of services and for public municipal management.
With the election of Lula da Silva, the Front has made its voice heard within the national 
government. The National Secretariat of Environmental Sanitation of the Ministry of 
Cities has included Front members. The Lula government also created the National 
Cities Conference, a large gathering held in October 2003 in which the public 
participated in formulating urban policies. It was preceded by a widespread participatory
process, involving first the municipalities then the states, through which the 2,510 
members of the National Conference were elected. The principal goals of the 
Conference were to discuss water and sanitation policies and to elect the National Cities
Council. The Council of seventy-one members elected during the Conference (forty-one 
representatives from diverse segments of civil society and thirty from governmental 
authorities), together with a team of technical experts from the Ministry, then formulated 
the National Urban Development Policy, as well as policies for the water and sanitation,
housing, and transport sectors. 
Based on the Conference debates and on a new round of public consultations involving
public meetings in each state, the National Secretariat of Environmental Sanitation
drafted a bill for the sector (Bill no. 5296/05). The bill, currently being debated in the 
National Congress, reinforces the responsibility of local or municipal authorities for 
water and sanitation services. But clearly identifying the municipality as the authority
responsible for services management does not eliminate possible conflicts with CESBs.
In most Brazilian urban areas, state companies remain responsible for drinking-water
production and sewage treatment, and they manage large, currently-existing 
infrastructures. Municipalities wanting to manage their services themselves will be forced
to buy water in bulk from state companies. In most cases, the price per cubic metre of
water remains a source of conflict between CESBs and the municipalities. Such is true of 
the municipalities of Niteroi in Rio de Janeiro state as well as of various municipalities of 
São Paulo. 
Conflicts involving modes of financing water and sanitation services 
A second source of conflict involves the financing of universal access after the failure of 
the cross-subsidization model set up by the CESBs, to which reference has already been
made. This system of cross-subsidization was based on the idea that, in a large country 
with significant social inequalities, as is the case in Brazil, the various costs associated
with the operation of services is enormous. Accordingly, the larger the size of the 
territory administered by a company, the more evenly distributed the system of operation 
would be. In each state, areas in which costs could not be recovered through tariffs 
would be subsidized by profits from areas producing surplus revenue. This was not
viewed as a direct transfer from rich to poor areas, even if in most cases such was the
case. In certain areas, economies of scale sufficiently lowered marginal costs, generating
revenue that was transferred to areas where technical difficulties increased operating
expenses.
The current major problem is the saturation of the benefits of cross-subsidization. 
Indeed, in this kind of system it is not possible to fully identify the different areas of 
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demand, as the structure of the services-supply system is integrated. The difficulty has in 
the past been dealt with through an increasing block rate tariff structure: the essential
quantities (for drinking water and sanitation) for each household were subsidized for all 
users, and the volume corresponding to non-essential uses was billed at a rate equal or
superior to the marginal costs of production. However, the potential of the cross-
subsidization system remains limited with regard to the extension of water and sanitation
networks to poorer urban areas. In nearly all of Brazil’s cities, access to services is 
universal in middle-class and well-to-do areas, whereas poorer neighbourhoods remain 
without service. Consequently, it is difficult to generate new cross-subsidies for the
extension of services because the most profitable supply remains stagnant. On the other
hand, the demands of the poorest areas continue to increase.
But the limits of cross-subsidization cannot justify abandoning it, because doing so 
would only exacerbate the disparity of services available in different areas. Such a 
problem arises especially with regard to the municipalization of services: in certain of the
poorer states, services in the capital equal those of almost all the other municipalities 
served. One solution involves the federal government, which could finance the extension
of water and sanitation networks and services to poorer areas. But, again, conflicts arise, 
and the municipalities are not particularly optimistic. The last ten years have, in fact, seen
successive financing restrictions on state companies and on municipal services. Access to
the Fundo de Garantia de Tempo de Serviço (FGTS, Severance Pay Fund), the principal 
form of financial assistance for investments in water and sanitation, has been blocked
several times due to austerity measures that have prohibited public agencies from 
borrowing from the fund. The federal government justified this policy by asserting that 
public companies, municipalities and states did not have the means to reimburse the 
loans. But according to Marcos Montenegro’s analysis, the government instead reserved 
access to the fund for itself in order to pay interest on the public debt. The prospect of 
increasing investment in the sector under Lula’s government is all the less encouraging 
given that the Fiscal Responsibility Law has resulted in the economic policy adopted by 
the Ministry of Finance setting major restrictions on public spending.
In any case, the actual investment capacity of CESBs is limited because they are closed-
end companies, indebted and subject to elevated interest rates on their loans. Marcos 
Thadeu Abicalil (2004) has shown that on average 19.8 per cent of CESB income 
currently goes to investment and 23.6 per cent to loan reimbursement. With regard to the 
application of tariffs and water consumption, the situation is equally problematic: in the 
last decade water consumption in the top consumption bracket has dropped by 18 per
cent, whereas the number of users in the lowest bracket, which yields the least profit, 
rose by 30 per cent. Revenue per customer has consequently fallen by 28.3 per cent. 
With the loss in income on the one hand, and on the other hand a rise in expenditure
due to changes in the tax system, changes that have resulted in both higher taxes and
increased labour costs, CESBs have found it more and more difficult to recover costs. 
According to data concerning 2003, provided by the Sistema Nacional de Informações 
sobre Saneamento (SNIS, National Information System of Water and Sanitation), out of 
twenty-five CESBs four companies from northern and northeastern Brazil, as well as the
state company of Rio de Janeiro, CEDAE, were not able to produce revenue sufficient 
to cover total expenditure. According to the data of the National Secretariat of 
Environmental Sanitation of the Ministry of Cities, only six companies found themselves 
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in a situation financially sound enough to repay their loans (São Paulo, Paraná, Brasília,
Minas Gerais, Espirito Santo and Ceará). It should also be pointed out that in certain
states, such as Rio de Janeiro, the revenue of CESBs (in this case CEDAE) is diverted to
other sectors of the public administration. These CESBs have been unable to develop a 
public, corporate structure independent of the political concerns of the state 
administration.
User conflicts: Exclusion from services 
A third source of conflicts concerns users. City residents who would like to connect to a
water and sanitation system but who without a system of subsidies or social assistance 
are often unable to pay the real price of services. In Brazil, deficiencies in saneamento are
predominantly found in rural areas, often on the periphery of existing systems. A portion 
of these deficiencies can be also found in municipalities of less than 20,000 residents and 
on the outskirts of medium and large cities. The following analysis will look in particular 
at these latter situations. 
According to the IBGE, in 2000, 10.9 per cent of Brazil’s urban population and 82.2 per
cent of the rural population did not have access to a public drinking-water distribution
system. Moreover, in nearly all regions of the country (with the exception of the 
southeast), more than 60 per cent of the urban population and 90 per cent of the rural 
population were not connected to a sewage system. Based on the IBGE data, and 
comparing developments in services access between 1991 and 2000, chapter five of the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report, Relatório de Desenvolvimento 
Humano 2003, shows that there were improvements in access both in absolute terms and
in terms of the percentages: the percentage of the population without access to drinking 
water decreased from 32 per cent in 1991 to 24.2 per cent in 2000. Only in the northern
region of the country was there no decrease. In the rural areas of all the regions of the 
country, the percentage of the population without access declined. As for sanitation, the 
same UNDP report shows improved access for the urban population, the percentage
without access to a sewage system dropping from 55.6 per cent in 1991 to 46.2 per cent 
in 2000. On the other hand, in rural areas the situation worsened, with a rise of 0.5 per
cent in the population without access to a sewage system.
More recent data shows that even in urban areas, access to sewage systems has declined. 
According to the SNIS, the percentage of residents with service decreased by 0.6 per cent 
in urban areas between 2001 and 2003. The urban deficit of services access is found on
the outskirts of medium-sized and large cities and in neighbourhoods where illegal 
housing predominates. The shortage is concentrated among the poorest residents, who 
cannot afford to pay for system expansion, let alone for a connection.
Moreover, when a policy of recovering costs through tariffs is pursued, the wealthier
classes and the industrial sector, which are the largest consumers of piped water, have a
great influence over the choice of new investments. They also attract the greatest portion 
of subsidies, because tariffs do not reflect the growing costs of expanding water 
production systems. The majority of Brazilian cities offer examples of this situation, with 
the water service available to the city’s various social groups differing both in terms of 
the quality and quantity of supply. 
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With the growing number of urban poor, a symptom of the increasingly uncertain entry 
of a large part of the urban population onto the job market, rising water and sanitation 
costs have lead to the exclusion of a large number of users from the public system and to
an increase in alternative modes of supply, such as water-well drilling. In these areas there
has also been a rise in illegal water connections and other methods of illicit access to 
services. It is difficult for the companies responsible for services to identify and thereby 
to combat these kinds of illegal connections.
Illegal connections and water-well drilling represent not only a loss in revenue to the 
companies involved, but also a health risk to the population at large. According to 
information provided by SABESP, in the state of São Paulo there are illegal connections 
in most of the municipalities for whose services SABESP is responsible. The precarious
connections damage the quality of the water that is distributed: water parasites can enter
the mains and water quality can no longer be guaranteed at the end of the line. Moreover, 
a significant portion of these connections are made in areas liable to flooding, which 
causes a reflux of contaminated water flowing into the distribution system. In the favelas
and other neighbourhoods of the Rio area, where illegal housing structures are common,
a maze of ground-laid plastic pipes forms a veritable network of illicit connections. The 
network is subject to frequent contamination problems.
Illegal connections also cause leaks, which lower the water pressure in the system. Leaks
lead to water damage that in turn weaken building structures. As for wells, there is almost 
never any way to verify their water quality. The groundwater may be polluted and the 
danger of well contamination is high. Furthermore, this practice raises the price of 
electricity for low-income populations, as electric pumps must be used daily to fill water 
storage tanks. 
In most large cities, the number of users excluded from services continues to grow. This 
provokes two different reactions: on the one hand, there are those who seek alternative 
and/or illegal solutions in order to have access to water, and who, being unable to pay 
for access, come to accept this situation; on the other hand, there are those who demand
access to public services and are willing to pay tariffs set proportionate to their income. 
In both cases conflicts arise between users and those responsible for public services, 
conflicts in which relations between the two groups tend to deteriorate. 
Environmental conflicts 
A fourth source of conflicts involves environmental issues. Recent decades have seen a 
sharp increase in water pollution, as sanitation services have fallen behind drinking-water
services. CESBs initially adopted a technical model based on water-supply expansion in 
the absence of integrated resource planning. Beyond the contamination of water systems
from wastewater, the model has resulted in various problems: the pollution of waterways
due to the discharge of wastewater into rainwater sewers; the pollution of groundwater 
due to illegal utilization; the pollution of rivers, which are a source of supply, due to 
uncontrolled urban sprawl into catchment areas.
A first task is to improve water collection and wastewater treatment systems. What are 
the technical and financial stakes involved? Resource contamination raises the issue of 
having to choose technologies and systems management. Most projects aim at the 
46
An analysis of the origins and nature of water-related
unrest and conflicts in the urban context
construction of large-scale treatment plants. However, even if the plants function well, 
the preservation of water quality cannot be guaranteed, because there is no real control
of non-point source pollution (polluted runoff), which results from uncompleted, poorly-
maintained and antiquated systems of collecting wastewater, and from collected rainwater
bring contaminated by untreated wastewater (from household and industrial sources). 
Another important issue involves the sustainable management of resources. Although 
relatively abundant in Brazil, resources are not evenly distributed; certain areas experience 
recurrent shortages of water, as is the case in the semi-arid region in the northeast of the
country. However, aside from the natural availability of water, many of the country’s
urban areas encounter water shortages due to the misuse of the resource. The principal
problems are as follows: 
x the priority given to water used in the production of electricity, a priority which 
in the case of the São Paulo urban area has determined the choice of the 
infrastructures constructed and the operating model of the system; 
x the use of water by large industrial consumers, because of the volume of water 
collected and the resulting pollution; 
x losses in water supply systems, from water catchment to distribution.
Water waste in the existing systems is very high. One way to gauge water losses is to 
examine the difference between the volume of water distributed and the volume of water
for which users are actually charged. According to the SNIS, in 2003 39.4 per cent of the 
water billed was lost, although in the case of certain CESBs the figure neared 50 per cent.
This is all the more serious because certain cities, such as Recife and São Paulo, are faced 
with water shortages. In the city of Recife, losses for the Pernambuco state-company,
COMPESA, reached 55.7 per cent. In São Paulo, the loss rate for SABESP was 34.5 per
cent.
New opportunities in water management: Regulation and conflict-solution
Management of Brazil’s water and sanitation services has been undergoing a crisis in its
regulatory system for ten years. Under the previous system, conditional allocations of 
funding were made to CESBs by the Banco Nacional da Habitação (BNH, National
Housing Bank), the centralizing agency that established standards and distributed
financial resources. With the closing of the BNH, the regulatory system collapsed. There 
are as yet no regulatory practices that do not rely on funding allocation as a means of 
persuasion or dissuasion.
The financial resources at the disposal of the Ministry of Cities are currently distributed
to CESBs and to municipal services according to the following criteria: the debt capacity
of the those responsible for services (CESBs or municipalities); the need to resume
stalled works; the (mandatory) existence of a formalized management structure, in 
particular a valid service concession or management-delegation contract; a payment
policy (through tariffs or taxes); open lines of communication between the CESB and the 
municipality; citizen oversight of management services; and a guarantee on the part of 
the borrower to improve performance. However, certain companies do not respect these 
criteria and nonetheless receive funding from the Ministry. 
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Indeed, passage of the new water and sanitation bill is needed in order for new regulatory 
structures to be put in place. The bill recommends the creation of a national sanitation
system (Sistema Nacional de Saneamento Ambiental, SISNASA) that states and 
municipalities would be members of on a voluntary basis. Those that joined would be
required to comply with fixed standards. Membership would be a prerequisite for access
to federal government funding. Membership would further require the states and 
municipalities to embrace measures included in the national system, such as the creation
of a water and sanitation plan; the development of strategies to increase community 
involvement and to establish user oversight of management; the adoption of the 
standards put in place for the review of tariffs, and the adoption of the criteria
recommended for the water-management delegation.
Certain conflicts might be resolved through these new structures. First of all, various
institutional conflicts might be settled because the proposed bill more specifically defines 
the roles of the public and private sectors in the management of services. This is very 
important, as the relationship between CESBs and municipalities will be subjected to a 
new normative framework that gives much greater power to the municipalities. 
Following passage of the bill, a system of management sharing would become 
conceivable, made possible by the clear definition of the functions of the different
institutions involved in services management: the national government, the states and
their CESBs, and the municipalities. The bill first of all recognizes municipal authority 
over services. With regard to urban areas, it states that municipal services must follow the 
norms and legislation established by the states, although this would not affect municipal
jurisdiction over services management. The law recognizes that the states, in the interest
of harmonizing services, may enact laws governing the form of service delivery taken by
municipalities. However, the states would not be able to supersede municipal authority
over water and sanitation services, especially as regards the setting of tariffs and the 
oversight of contract compliance.
A new structure of services management thereby becomes possible, one in which states
would retain an essential role in the production of drinking water (catchment and
treatment) and in regulating the use of the water supply in the catchment areas of their 
territories. The states would also play a supplementary role if municipalities proved
incapable of managing their water and sanitation distribution systems. Municipalities that 
choose to do so would take control of their water and sanitation services, with two new 
options available to them: they could install decentralized water treatment systems and
they could develop intermunicipal cooperation, in accordance with the new law on 
intermunicipal associations (consorcios). The municipalities would therefore be able to
choose between managing services through either a direct or an autonomous 
management structure (managing through a public department or municipal
corporation), managing services in association with other municipalities, or delegating
management either to public companies such as the CESBs or to private companies.
According to the bill, municipal delegation to the CESBs would not require a call for
tenders when the delegation is part of a programme contract. 
To overcome conflicts surrounding modes of financing, cross-subsidization should be 
understood to include the different uses of water and not only those uses limited to the
supply of urban areas. The Brazilian model of water resources management is based on 
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an integrated vision of the different uses of water at the watershed level, which makes it 
possible to imagine cross-subsidization among different uses. Until now this kind of 
cross-subsidization has only been applied in the metropolitan area of São Paulo: in the 
development of the Alto Tietê Basin Plan several measures have been combined to 
control urban river flooding and to restore the water quality of catchment areas.11 These 
projects, which already have financing, could be linked to specific projects designed to 
connect areas not being served by a water and sanitation system. Made worse by urban 
flooding, the effects of non-point source pollution on the quality of water used for urban 
provision have really only recently been taken into account. However, in cases where 
water catchments are shallow, such as in the São Paulo metropolitan area, the combined
effects of flooding and pollution warrant attention. The potential for corrective measures
opens an opportunity for creating new forms of cross-subsidization between different 
sectors.
What makes the implementation of these measures difficult is the excessive division of
responsibility for water and sanitation services, as well as the absence of institutional 
integration of services management and water resources management. At least 
conceptually, thanks to several general directives, Brazil has moved from the notion of 
saneamento basico (water, wastewater sanitation, solid waste) to that of saneamento ambiental
(water, wastewater and rainwater sanitation, solid waste). Still, the management structures
of these services are not integrated at the operational level. The supply-side logic of 
rainwater sanitation services is not compatible with that of water provision and 
wastewater sanitation services, whose tariffs are determined case by case. Nor is the logic 
governing water provision and wastewater sanitation services compatible with the 
operational logic of waste services. A solution may perhaps be found that could
somehow integrate the daily management of these services, but they are guided by very 
different investment and amortization strategies. However, a further weakness of
integrated water resources management derives from the fact that the policies and 
programmes of saneamento ambiental are not based on objectives common to the policies
and the plans put in place at the watershed level. This is true both of large national
projects and the policies put in place at the state and municipal level. As a consequence, 
an enlarged planning strategy conducted with multi-level coordination becomes
necessary.
The law proposed by the Ministry of Cities represents a first step towards the 
construction of integrated project management. The law defines four levels of planning 
(the national, state and municipal levels as well as, possibly, an intermediate level of
conurbations). At each level a plan must be developed identifying the services included in 
saneamento ambiental (water, wastewater and rainwater sanitation). The plans must be 
compatible with the basin plans and, in the case of a municipal-level plan, with the 
master urban development planning of the municipality. This new opportunity for 
integration will necessarily call into question state and municipal jurisdiction while 
benefiting new territorial authorities, such as city administrations and basin committees. 
11 For example, by controlling rainwater discharge at points far upstream from the hydrologic network of 
the city of São Paulo.
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However, even with the new, multi-level, territorial approaches to planning and cross-
subsidization, the framework of public funds dedicated to water and sanitation must also
be re-examined. An increase in investments in the sector should be foreseen, with the
understanding that public funds fall within the framework of public health investments
and, for this reason, ought to be exempt from the austerity measures linked to the 
reduction of public debt. 
In the final analysis, direct disputes with users are not seen in great number in Brazil.
Dispute resolution generally depends on settling institutional conflicts and on the
implementation of public financing mechanisms capable of guaranteeing lasting and 
equitable services. These policies will not, however, protect users from conflicts, for 
despite some advances in certain municipalities, the management of public services 
remains firmly closed to consumers. A bill introduced by the Ministry of Cities proposes 
a new structure of public participation and oversight of services: the City Council,
through which participation in and oversight of water and sanitation services
management will be possible. Among their functions, City Councils will develop, then 
advise on, the strategies and priorities of the Municipal Water and Sanitation Policy. They 
will also follow and evaluate the Municipal Water and Sanitation Plan, indicate priority
investments, define cross-subsidization and social aid, and advise on other matters such
as tariffs or services delegation. In addition, they will have to coordinate with other City 
Councils according to their sector, and in close relationship with water and sanitation
management bodies such as the Health Council and the Environmental Council. The 
City Councils will participate in the State Cities Council and in the National Cities 
Council. The Council will also have to evaluate and approve the annual report on the 
quality of services. 
Conclusion
The Ministry of Cities bill on water and sanitation may be considered a step forward for 
the institutional organization of the sector and for public participation in services 
management. It puts in place a general political directive promoting public involvement. 
Combined with other, existing social-oversight mechanisms, such as the Participatory 
Budget, the City Councils may be new places in which to construct more equitable
management of water and sanitation. According to the law, the Councils will not only be
advisory authorities, but decision-making authorities with regard to municipal policies. 
But are these advances in social oversight desired by the Workers’ Party, and – as they lie 
at the core of the Ministry’s bill – are the advances compatible with the liberalization of 
Brazil’s economy? The Lula government has signed off on another law which regulates 
public-private partnerships (PPPs) and includes water-sanitation services among the 
sectors concerned. According to certain officials associated with the federal government,
the Water and Sanitation bill is solid enough to guarantee that the poor will have access
to services even in the case of privatization. Indeed, the bill contains several innovative
features along these lines. First, it ensures that all users connected to a system will have
access to a minimum volume of water, including those users with outstanding charges. 
Second, the bill provides certain guarantees to users: the right to a handbook containing 
information about services provision and the quality of the water distributed, and 
mandatory notice of any service interruption resulting from technical problems with the 
system. Finally, it must be emphasized that this bill establishes a policy of financial 
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assistance for users who cannot pay the total cost of services, a policy that is essential to 
guaranteeing the inclusion of the poor in the benefits offered to the rest of society. A 
single law does not, however, suffice to ensure access to services. The application of the 
law will have to be watched closely; its success will depend both on the political will of 
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Urban Water Conflicts in Buenos Aires, Argentina: 
Voices questioning the economic, social and environmental 
sustainability of the water and sewerage concession




In a city that lies along the banks of the Río de la Plata, an inexhaustible source of
freshwater, and also sits on the largest reserve of groundwater in the world, large 
numbers of the inhabitants of the Buenos Aires metropolitan region do not have access 
to a supply of quality water. Some of the city’s inhabitants, mainly in the southern part of 
the concession, are suffering serious environmental externalities. This observation merits 
research into the conditions under which the resource is managed and distributed.
Under pressure from international organizations, Carlos Menem’s ‘justicialist’ government 
launched a series of wide-ranging reforms at the beginning of the 1990s3, enabling the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) to carry out and assess
the results of ‘on-site’ tests of the neo-liberal policies that they had advocated.4 An 
1Laboratoire Techniques, Territoires et Sociétés (LATTS), Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées , 6-8 
Avenue Blaise Pascal, 77455 Marne la Vallée Cedex France, tel: +33(0)1 64 15 38 27, fax: +33(0)1 64 15 36
00.
2 Instituto de Investigaciones ‘Gino Germani’, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de Buenos Aires,
Pte JE Uriburu 950, 6º, 114 Capital Federal, Buenos Aires, Argentina, Tel: 00 54 11 4508-3815, Fax: 00 54
11 4508-3822
3 These include the introduction of Argentine peso/US dollar parity and privatization of all key sectors of 
the economy, which led Argentina to permanently break with an approach to industrial development based
on a centralized state in favor of a complete opening up of the Argentine economy to foreign investment.
4 This, without regard for the constant and significant deterioration in the principal social welfare indicators
(unemployment, poverty, healthcare, education, etc.) and the increasing burden of external debt (which had
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analysis of the various developments in the Aguas Argentinas S.A. (AASA) concession
agreement makes it possible to retrace the gradual whittling away of the neo-liberal 
economic model that had been based on the idea that private operators, under public 
authority control, would be able to inject large financial investments into the water 
sector, enabling the public operator to make up for lost time by maintaining and
expanding the water network. Such investment was to be recuperated via a suitably 
adapted pricing mechanism, accompanied by effective commercial management. The
ultimate objective of the agreement was a full quality service (serving 100 per cent of all
users) in the largest concession area in the world. The AASA’s concession agreement and
regulatory framework stipulated a certain number of action principles as the basis for 
organizing the concession. In this study, we will seek to analyse how these action 
principles may be perceived as incorporating the seeds of urban water conflicts and how 
they gradually changed with the development of the conflicts, in order to draw 
conclusions with respect to the dynamics at work in this concession area.5
The social urban context 
The city of Buenos Aires, capital of Argentina, is both a modern Latin American city that
has benefited from particularly strong industrial development during the second half of 
the twentieth century and a highly fragmented territory, in social and economic terms. As 
a result, the city and its peri-urban ring are marked by strong contrasts: from the 
shantytown area of Villa de Emergencia 31, behind the train station (itself peopled by 
executives travelling to and from their businesses) to the extreme precariousness and 
almost unimaginably (for the porteño6) deteriorated and unsanitary conditions of those 
neighbourhoods on the outskirts of the city. Poverty in Buenos Aires has another face to
show. After the crisis undergone by the country over the past few years, pauperization of 
the middle classes has been added to the existing structural poverty (NBI, Necesidades
Básicas Insatisfechas, unsatisfied basic demands) of the outskirts and the ring
neighbourhoods of the federal district (Prévot-Schapira, 2002). According to data 
collected by AASA, there are 593 poor neighbourhoods (home to 2.5 million inhabitants)
in the concession area, of which 445 (1.1 million inhabitants) are within the area served 
by the system. For the sake of clarity, let us recall that of the 12 million inhabitants living 
in the city of Buenos Aires in October 2002, 54.3 per cent were living below the poverty 
line – that is, on less than 700 pesos (US $240) per person per month.7 This is 21.2 per 
rapidly become the major item of public expenditure). The image of Argentina as one of the international
financial organizations’ ‘star pupils’ resulted in even more surprise on the part of the international
community when faced with the extent of the social catastrophe triggered by the crisis of December 2001.
5 For the purposes of theis paper, we define urban conflict by considering the city, or ‘the urban’, as an
ensemble of products (material products and services) dedicated to the satisfaction of collective or
individual needs. In that sense, the city is a public object which is a concern of private interests and, as
such, constitutes an object of social dispute. This social dispute materializes particularly in a process of 
social integration/exclusion that produces territorial segregation through the configuration of socially
homogeneous spaces within heterogeneous cities (Pirez, 1994).
The urban conflicts we study in this paper are ‘open’ conflicts. According to Albert Hirschman’s grid, they
would be analyzed as ‘voices’ (neither ‘exit’ nor ‘loyalty’). For further details, see Hirschman, 1970. 
6 A Porteño is an inhabitant of Buenos Aires.
7 Data provided by INDEC (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos), 27 December, 2002. 
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cent of the population of the federal district and 64 per cent of the population of the
outskirts.
Water services before privatization 
In Argentina, the state-owned water and sewerage company, Obras Sanitarias de la
Nación (OSN), aimed from its inception in 1912 to present itself as a ‘model’ public 
utility, by virtue of its triple ambition: public hygiene, income redistribution and land 
organization (De Gouvello, 2001). Its water tariffs were highly representative of this 
ambition: the Río de la Plata allowed the provision of water to the entire city of Buenos
Aires in large quantities (the aim of OSN was to provide 700 litres per day per inhabitant, 
the highest volume in the world). The issues of supply and rational utilization of the 
resource were therefore not of primary concern, nor was the issue of cost recovery,
because the infrastructure rationale predominated over that of efficient service provision. 
The tariff was defined not as a function of the quantity of water consumed – as the
system provided for canilla libre (all you can use) – but as a function of a calculation of
indexes. This was a platform similar to that of a tax system based on the rental value of a
dwelling (surface area of the land, constructed area, type of and age of construction, zone 
coefficient, etc.) so as to allow for more ‘equitable’ income distribution. However, this
universal-access project encountered a major hurdle. On the one hand, the lowest-
income groups were scattered in an eccentric manner, which meant the expansion was
integrating a greater and greater population that was contributing less and less to paying 
for the service. On the other hand, the public utility, because of the heavy structural 
financial losses of the system, very quickly stopped investing in infrastructure, leaving the 
peripheral areas of the federal district waiting for connection to the network (see Table 1
below). The ‘OSN model’ was not in a position to finalize the project because of its 
unbounded ambition. This ultimately led to the opposite result: a good service in the 
federal district and the fringe peripheral areas, with others waiting for connections that
the state-owned company was not in a position to provide. Moreover, even in the areas
not covered by the network, water was considered an ‘OSN question’: users, political 
actors, mayors and local administrators were simply excluded from having any voice in 
the system (Schneier, 2005).
Table 1: Water and sewerage coverage before privatization 
Water Sewerage
Federal district (city of Buenos Aires) 99% 99%
Outskirts 55% 36%
Concession total 70% 58%
Number of connections (millions) 1.2 0.7
Source: AASA concession contract, 1993.
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The private sector operating the largest water concession in the world 
In 1993, after the Dublin conference stated that water was an ‘economic and social 
good’, a number of privatizations of state-owned water and sewerage companies took
place throughout the world. In this context, the Argentine government launched a call
for tenders for the Buenos Aires concession in order to continue and improve the 
activities of OSN, which was losing money and was in need of hefty investment for its
seriously deteriorated infrastructure. The Suez group was awarded the contract. The
concession contract, based upon the ‘universal service’ notion (Arza, 2002), stipulated a 
period of 30 years by which almost all of the population of the concession (comprising
the federal district and the greater Buenos Aires area) had to be connected to both water 
and sewerage services, whenever the urban configuration so allowed.
Every five years, the company provides the regulatory agency (ETOSS, Ente Tripartito
de Obras y Servicios Sanitarios) with a plan encompassing all of the expansion works to 
be carried out over the next five years, as well as the corresponding tariff adjustments.
The five-year plan must be accepted by ETOSS, and represents a firm commitment from 
the company, which will be fined by the regulatory agency in case of non-compliance.
The technical and commercial elements at stake for AASA are to be found in the 
expansion goals, most of which target the poorest neighbourhoods and those located
farthest from the concession (mainly precarious neighbourhoods). The expansion goal at 
the time of the takeover (1993) was to integrate 3.5 million customers, of whom 65 per 
cent lived in poor neighbourhoods.8 The challenge was, and still is, enormous (see Table 
2 below). 
Table 2: Population connected and to be connected to water and
sanitation






Water Sewerage Water Sewerage
Total
Standard
neighbourhoods 5.6 4.7 1.4 2.3 7
Poor neighbourhoods 0.4 0.2 2.1 2.3 2.5
Total 6 4.9 3.5 4.6 9.5
Source: AASA data, 1998. 
8 AASA data
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Technical access to the network: The technical approach outlined in the contract was simple: a 
surface system with water coming from the Río de la Plata. Despite the existence of
good-quality water tables in most areas, programme organizers did not originally foresee 
that poor neighbourhoods might drill wells to gain access to water. However, the idea of
a single supply technique has been reviewed in certain recent projects.9 The contract 
specifies that all households are be connected to the system once the expansion works 
are finished. The sole type of connection foreseen is for individual households; there is 
no mention of public taps. Except for the possibility of obtaining water from a well 
(permitted until the company’s works reach an area), AASA did not envision alternative 
linkages to the public water system. 
Economic access to the service: The cross-subsidy tariff system that existed when the company 
was state-owned was still valid at the time of writing. It is used on the one hand to 
finance the operation (as a redistribution tariff) and on the other hand (since 1997) for 
financing network expansion.
Development of the paper
We analyse water conflicts in terms of ‘urban sustainability’, using an heuristic grid
composed of three main axes: economic, social and environmental issues that lead or 
have led to urban water conflicts in metropolitan Buenos Aires.
Economic sustainability issues leading to user and political conflicts 
We will study the conflicts linked to the economic sustainability of the concession on the 
basis of two emblematic examples: firstly, user conflicts that result from the financing 
scheme for the expansion of the network and, thus, are related to territorial solidarity 
issues at stake within the concession; and secondly, conflicts due to the devaluation of 
the Argentinean peso (in January 2002), which could be called ‘political conflicts’, dealing 
with financial balances and monetary risks in the concession contract.
Financing the expansion of the network: The SUMA conflict
According to the ‘consumer-payer’ approach adopted in the concession agreement, the
initial extensions to the network mainly concerned profitable economic areas (particularly 
in the north of the concession area) that were in a position to pay for the major costs 
involved in developing the infrastructures. This triggered several splintering phenomena,
mainly between the inhabitants of the capital, who were already being served and who 
benefited from a higher quality service (through the repair and maintenance of the water 
9 See the Agua + Trabajo (Water + Work) programme in the municipality of La Matanza in 2004. It 
includes the construction of local systems that use water from the water tables (via wells), which
themselves should be connected to the primary network within a few years (once the expansion work is
complete). This programme, which was begun at the direct request of the Argentine president in 2003, 
aims to connect 178 poorer neighbourhoods in the La Matanza municipality to a water supply (on the
second outlying ring of Buenos Aires). It envisions the participation of neighbourhood co-operatives, and
benefits from a fund of more than 35 million pesos (around $US 13 million). It is an ambitious project that
should eventually connect more than 400,000 people.
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system and treatment plants) at no extra cost, and the residents of peripheral zones who
had to bear the enormous cost of expanding the network (to secondary and domestic
networks).
This situation led to two kinds of user conflict:
x The first one was concerted demonstrations by non-connected people who
were not able to pay the fee for the new connection. This led to the reform of the 
expansion financing scheme
x The second one was organized protests by already-connected people not 
wanting to have their bill raised as a consequence of the new financing system. 
The AASA concession agreement initially stated that the network expansion would be 
financed only by newly connected users (via an ‘Infrastructure and Connection’ charge).
The charge ranged from 400 to 600 pesos for water and 1,000 pesos for sanitation (at the 
time, the peso was equal to the US dollar). Most low-income customers could not afford 
this charge and, therefore, were not able to pay their bill. Moreover, some of them began 
what they called a ‘bill strike’ (with 80,000 bills unpaid in 1996).
The first neighbourhood protests began in 1995 in the western part of the concession 
(La Matanza, Lomas de Zamora) when local residents realized that the connection fee 
(CIC) was more expensive than the OPCT rates (contract work by third parties). 
Neighbourhood associations began to organize actions so as to prevent AASA from
working on the network expansion in their area: a human barrier of 300 people stopped
engineering work on a project, negotiation processes began with lawyers to challenge a 
specific project and its financing, formal complaints were made to the regulatory agency,
street demonstrations and sits-in in front of the AASA local headquarters were 
organized, denunciations were made on television, etc. (Schneier, 2005). 
Following blatant economic distortions and concerted action by those excluded from the 
network and unable to pay, the methods of financing the concession were renegotiated in
1997 at the company’s request. Since then, network expansion has been financed via the 
participation of all network users, based on two new concepts: a service incorporation 
charge (CIS), which replaced the CIC, and a new ‘universal service and environment tax’
(SUMA).10 The result was a slight rate increase for users who were already connected and 
a significant fall in the cost of connection for new users (see Table 3).11
10 The SUMA comprised two aspects: SU for universal service and MA (medio ambiente) for environment.
11 Calculations by pro- and anti-privatization analysts highlight the same trends. 
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Regulatory charges 0.80 0.80








Regulatory charges 0.16 0.16
SUMA tax - 3.00
CIS charge - 4.00






Source: Alcaza, et al, 2002, data from La Nación, 24/02/98.
In spite of a strategy focused on renewed solidarity at the territorial level, the creation of
the SUMA was the cause of numerous highly publicized debates among local political 
representatives, as well as numerous legal actions. Actually, the concept of SUMA altered 
the splintering capital/periphery effect for many users, as it challenged the ‘new 
consumer as payer principle’, which was one of the basic precepts of the international
financial institutions (full cost recovery). The introduction of the concept of SUMA was,
however, denounced by the Counsel for the Argentine people (el Ombudsman), due to its 
SU – universal service – component. This declaration halted all expansion work in 
progress for over a year pending resolution of the problem. The municipalities concerned 
by the stoppage considered that this declaration was made to defend the special interests
of the City of Buenos Aires itself (due to the considerable increase in water charges 
involved for users already receiving the service), and they banded together to take legal 
action against this intervention. This concerted action also provided the opportunity to 
set up a forum composed of all of the municipalities of Greater Buenos Aires to initiate a
debate in respect of all themes related to water and sanitation services. Thus, setting up 
an institutionalized forum consisting of the municipalities of Greater Buenos Aires, via
the intermediation of the Ministry of Public Works for the Province of Buenos Aires, 
constituted an essential step in the shift of power from the national sphere to a local
level. As such, we should bear in mind that the concession agreement had been signed 
between the Argentine State (grantor of concession) and AASA (concession holder). 
Although the local public authorities were directly concerned by decisions relating to the
management of water services, they were not involved in such decisions due to the 
decision-making structure on which the concession agreement was based. 
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Devaluation of the Argentinean peso: The beginning of the concession contract renegotiation
The neo-liberal model rested on the convertibility between the Argentinean peso and the 
US dollar. The crisis of December 2001 and numerous social movements led to the fall 
of the government and a global dynamic of total rejection of the on-going economic 
model. The peso-dollar parity, which could not be supported any further by the national 
economy, was rapidly abandoned. In January 2002, the temporary government 
announced the devaluation of the national currency, and instituted the pesification
(conversion to peso) of public services’ tariffs (the tariffs stipulated in the concession
contracts had been defined in US dollars) and, thus, put an end to the concession
contract terms. The end of the monetary model based on convertibility had a huge 
impact on the operators’ economic and financial balances. Since then, a renegotiation of
the concession contract for all public utilities has been underway. 
According to the new law, the renegotiation of the contracts had to take into account 
‘the impact of the tariffs on the competitiveness of the national economy, on income 
distribution, on the level of service quality, on investment plans – as soon as they were 
contractually defined – on users’ interests, on the accessibility to services, on the 
technical systems security, and on the operators’ profitability’.
The purpose of the law was to confirm the clear will of the public authorities to secure 
global contract revisions that would reconsider ‘not only the interests of the private 
companies but also the level of completion of the contracts and, above all, the 
population’s capacity to pay for the services, because the majority had experienced a 
marked fall in their income level’ (Twhaites and Lopez, 2003). Article 10 prevents 
companies from ‘stopping or altering the completion of their obligations’, while Article 
13 authorizes the government to ‘regulate in a temporary way the incomes and prices of 
the goods and services considered as ‘critical’ so as to protect the users’ and consumers’ 
rights from any hypothetical distortion of the markets or actions of a monopolistic or 
oligopolistic nature’.
In many aspects, this law constitutes a complete reversal in service management policy, 
due to a new economic context, that is much less favourable to the companies.12 Beyond
the water sector, the context that led to these renegotiations also had serious
repercussions on the Argentinean political and economic scene. It opened the way to 
urban water conflicts of a new kind: to confrontation between the government and water 
companies (and companies in other sectors). This included pressure for and against the 
increase of public service tariffs, companies resorting to the international courts to 
denounce the ‘pesification’ of the contracts, ‘crisis’ events in the services (electrical cut-
offs, etc.), and to certain international companies deciding to leave the country.13 The 
12 The majority of the services contracts were based on the US dollar reference. These contractual
definitions were very profitable to the operators and had led to sizeable external debts for the expansion
investments (in US dollars). In a context where the peso was worth a dollar, the exterior debts were largely
covered by local incomes but once ‘pesification’ was instituted, external debts began to be a real burden for
the companies that could not compensate them with incomes converted to peso (divided by three on
average) and in a recessive global context.
13 Legal cases were made to the ICSID (the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes) in the framework of the bilateral treaties for the promotion and the protection of
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first analyses of this total reversal of the situation were very critical of the private 
companies (Aspiazu, 2003) and explicitly denounced the unfair balance of forces acting
in the negotiation (in favour of the companies); nevertheless, they admitted the 
importance of the economic and social elements at stake in the negotiation.
In actual fact, the Argentine economic crisis of December 2001, which had been in the 
making since the mid-1990s, clearly highlighted the limits of this doctrine; however, the
impacts within the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Region (BAMR) were of a contrasting
nature. The crisis demonstrated that the southern areas are subject to global economic 
and financial circumstances that are largely beyond their control. The Enron crisis, which 
triggered the hasty departure of Azurix, plunged an entire zone within the southern
agglomeration into uncertainty regarding the future of its water service. On the other
hand, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, the Suez Group appears to have stood
by its ‘showcase’ concession in spite of the economic crisis, at least until September 2005.
Social sustainability issues: Bringing water service to the poor 
We will now look at the question of the social sustainability of the concession through
the examples of two measures that were adopted and applied to face the collective claims
of poor people in Buenos Aires’ suburban zones: firstly, the ‘participative management 
models’ as an answer to the claims of poor neighbourhoods’ inhabitants to connect to 
the drinking water network (technical access); secondly, the ‘social tariff’ as an answer to 
poor users who were no longer able to pay their water bills in the new recessive context
(economic access).
Bringing water and sewerage networks to poor neighbourhoods 
In her work, Cristina Cravino analyzes in detail the different modes of mobilization of 
poor people in the Buenos Aires peri-urban neighbourhoods (especially in the 
asentamientos at the beginning of the 1980s) wanting to obtain land property titles. Cravino 
insists on the importance of the claim to public services (water, electricity, telephone) to
this dynamic (Cravino, 2001). The recognition of property and the access to public 
services are presented as two processes that echo one another. At the beginning of the 
1990s, the privatization of public services profoundly transformed the nature of the
water operator’s answer to these sorts of claims. Since then, the population no longer 
addresses its claim for connection to water services to the public authorities directly, but 
to a private company operating through a concession contract whose terms are not clear
regarding this specific question.
The contract actually excludes the slum areas (as it only prescribes that networks are to
be expanded to urbanized areas), as well as the internal networks of the barrios armados,
which are large groups of dwellings under the responsibility of the municipalities. This 
foreign investments signed with Argentina. This ‘offensive’ on the part of the companies was rapidly
answered by the Argentine public authorities: the ministry of economy emitted a decree (No. 308/02) to 
exclude the companies that had been to court from the renegotiation framework. France Telecom sold its
participation in Telecom Argentina in September 2003; EDF reduced its participation in Edenor to 25 per 




means there is no contractual obligation whatsoever to provide services to these two
types of neighbourhoods – which, in terms of population, represent more than 25 per 
cent of the poor neighbourhoods inside AASA’s concession area.14
In response to the conflict: the establishment of an access to services programme carried out by the
Community Development Unit15
To face the challenge of providing water services to poorer neighbourhoods in the 
concession area, the concession company moved quickly to approach the problem of 
urban poverty. However, the group that won the concession contract (Suez-Lyonnaise
des Eaux, later Suez-Environnement), which initially favoured sustainable development 
programmes, became less enthusiastic later on as it became more aware of the 
investment dynamics in developing nations such as Argentina.
Table 4: Population connected and to be connected to water and






Water Sewerage Water Sewerage
Total
Standard neighbourhoods 6.8 5.5 0.2 1.5 7
Poor neighbourhoods 0.8 0.3 1.7 2.2 2.5
Total 7.6 5.8 1.9 3.7 9.5
Source: AASA data, 1998.
Responding to the regulator’s demand, the Community Development Unit (CDU) was
created in 1999 within AASA. The original goal was to define and implement a social
back-up methodology for network expansion in poorer parts of the concession.16 Little 
by little, the scope of these activities and responsibilities was enlarged until it 
encompassed, among other things, the regularization of services in the poor
neighbourhoods and the professional training of company staff on issues linked to 
company activities, such as sustainable development, direct communication, management 
14 Of the total population of the concession area’s poor neighbourhoods (more than 2 million people), 
around 15 per cent live in slums, 10 per cent in barrios armados and 75 per cent in precarious
neighbourhoods (data from the IIED-LA-UADE report: Participation of the private sector in drinking 
water and sewerage in Buenos Aires, balancing the economic, environmental and social goals, July 1999). 
15 Now called the Sustainable Development Unit. 
16 The vast majority of the poorer areas that the operator was concerned about in terms of service
expansion were the precarious neighbourhoods, as the slums and the peripheral cities are not included in
the operator’s contractual obligations. 
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of community meetings, management of conflicts, participatory management of the 
projects, etc.17 Since the beginning of 2002, the goal of the CDU has been to define the 
concessionaire’s policy for low-income neighbourhoods by having the communities
understand the value of the public/private participation model. With this in mind, it
defined a series of almost forty projects called Participatory Management Models (MPG), 
the purpose of which was to achieve full-scale expansion or regularization of services in a
particular neighbourhood. MPGs are built on a three-party agreement, institutionalized
by a contract between the company, the ‘neighbourhood community’ in question and the 
municipality.18 This must then be agreed upon by the regulatory agency, whose role is to 
supervise the process and authorize the consolidation of the partnership among all of its 
stakeholders.
Box 1: Participatory management models (CDU-AASA)
The criteria to be fulfilled by MPGs are valid for all participants:
The neighbourhood community must request the service (following the concept of ‘informed
request’ established by the company). The project will be carried out only if 80 per cent or more 
of the neighbourhood agrees. The community must be able to organize itself and choose its
representatives, and must also provide the manpower for the infrastructure work.
The municipality commits itself contractually to fulfilling its responsibilities as regards the
infrastructure work (digging ditches in the streets, etc.), distributing the necessary tools (gloves
and shovels) and organizing the distribution of funds – the planes jefes y jefas de hogar (heads of
household programmes). These are subsidies of 150 pesos per month, allocated by the
government to the heads of households participating in a community labour programme.19
The company is in charge of the technical feasibility of the project. It must provide the
necessary materials (pipes, wrenches, and so on) and technical training (workshops for people to
become familiar with techniques and safety issues) as well as being responsible for
communication with the community (workshops introducing commercial aspects and providing
answers to questions or doubts from inhabitants).
Main results of the programme 
The installation of participative management models (MPGs) in 2002 marked the
beginning of the company’s operational stage. This was together with a continuous
growth in the number and dimensions of operational projects. Twelve MPG projects 
were carried out in 2003, allowing 8,000 people to be connected. In 2004, there were 21 
17 In the water sector, the term regularization concerns the establishment of a standard technical and
commercial relationship with certain neighbourhoods. It can take very different foms. For example, 
regularization can mean organizing the expansion of water services to a neighbourhood that is not
connected but is located inside an area served by the concession, or it may mean taking a closer look at the 
unpaid bills of certain customers in order to organize workshops focusing on commercial issues. The scope
of CDU was enlarged to include all of the poor neighbourhoods in the operational projects and not just 
the precarious neighbourhoods, as was initially the case
18 The neighbourhood community, according to the term used by AASA, comprises all of the inhabitants 
of the neighbourhood. This community appoints its representatives, elected or not, to sign the contract.
19 In 2002, 150 pesos was the equivalent of $US 50. In addition to these payments, inhabitants who
participate in the works benefit from a reduction in their water bill for a number of years.
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projects involving the connection of 30,000 people, and projections for 2005 foresee the 
connection of more than 400,000 people, thanks in particular to the implementation of
the Water+Work programme. Moreover, in January 2004 a specific resolution was 
passed by the regulatory agency regarding a reduced water service tariff for poorer
neighbourhoods: it stipulates a bimonthly (reduced) invoice of between 4 and 6.5 pesos 
(i.e. between $US 1.5 and $US 2.4) per service. 
The profitability evaluation of the service extension projects to the poor neighbourhoods 
is still incomplete. However, a degree of improvement has been seen in the bill collection 
rate after commercial efforts such as workshops. Likewise, payment ratios are very good 
(much better than those in traditional neighbourhoods) when the community participates
directly in management tasks, such as handing out invoices and getting together with
neighbours to pay bills. It is worth noting that water supply costs to poor 
neighbourhoods before connection to the urban network were much higher. The
benefits gained by Argentine society from the programmes, in both sanitary and social 
terms, have been encouraging, with much better health indicators in connected 
neighbourhoods due to better access to drinking water. The programme has also meant 
an improvement in the dialogue between the neighbourhood communities, the 
municipality, the regulatory agency and the operator, and improved community 
organization.
Box 2: The paradoxical impact of the argentine crisis on the programme 
Paradoxically, the December 2001 crisis did not slow the development of neighbourhood
projects in poorer areas. On the contrary, 2001 became an actual springboard for the operational
stage of the participative management models. Moreover, these projects were the only
opportunity for AASA to proceed with the extension of the networks, as all the remaining
projects negotiated for the five-year plan were stopped temporarily. This strange situation was
the result of a number of effects combined: the maturity effect (the crisis arrived right when the
company was ready to establish projects for the poor neighbourhoods); the cost impact
(expansion in poor neighbourhoods is generally less expensive than in traditional ones) and,
finally, the image effect (during the contract renegotiation period, the poorer neighbourhoods’
projects represented the cara humana (human face) of AASA’s activities).
The social tariff: The response of the Argentine middle class
After the crisis in December 2001, the majority of the middle class fell into poverty. 
Many people who had been connected to the water and sewerage networks suddenly 
faced a situation where they were no longer able to pay their water bill. In a highly 
ideologized context, many users organized direct demonstrations (escraches) in front of the 
private companies’ offices to denounce potential price increases (after the peso
devaluation).
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Unlike what might be expected, the social tariff programme was not aimed at the poorest 
population in the concession. Because it proposed a reduction of the water bill 
(according to economic and social criteria), it necessarily was addressed to those already
connected to services, mainly the impoverished middle class. This measure appears to be 
emblematic of the ‘new poverty’ phenomenon that appeared in the 1990s after the 
structural adjustment policy of the Menem government. To face new social tensions
resulting from a degradation of purchasing power, the company and the public regulator 
decided to institute a social tariff programme for water and sewerage services (see Box 3).
Box 3: The social tariff programme (STP) 
The social tariff programme (STP) emerging from the company’s demand. It was formalized by
the public regulator (ETOSS) in collaboration with the user commission it integrates, the Water
Company and NGOs working in the field. Since its first application, the regulatory technical team
has managed the programme. The STP was introduced as part of the tariff revision act
(authorized by the ETOSS resolution 2/02, January 2002). It includes a system of economic
assistance to law-income users, to be ‘efficient, transparent, explicit and focalized’. It is not a 
cross subsidy. The economic assistance is organized through ‘reduction modules’ on the bill (4 
pesos by service and by bill). According to their situation, households can benefit from one or
two reduction modules.
The criteria to be eligible for the programme are as follows: to live beneath the poverty line, to be
registered as a regular client, and to have bills that are less than 30 pesos (since 2002). The user 
must initiate the request. The municipality selects the STP beneficiaries from the applicants and
then sends a list to the company, which applies the reduction modules directly to the bills. The 
company has to reserve a 4 million pesos of its annual budget for the STP.
The evolution of the environmental question in the context of the water sector
privatization and concession process 
The first agreement for the concession of drinking water services, signed in 1993, did not 
include any clause for environmental protection by virtue of its preponderantly economic
approach and the absence of unified legislation on water resource management. 
With the 1994 constitutional reform, a new range of opportunities opened up for the 
unification of environmental protection criteria.20 This situation – in which provincial
legislation appears to be underdeveloped and out of date as it goes through a process of 
structural reforms aiming at privatization and market liberalization – has an impact at the
federal level, as provincial jurisdictions have to process strong conflicts of interest among
sectors requesting resource management without being accountable for providing 
adequate protection.
20 The 1994 Constitution produced a series of innovations regarding environmental protection. One of the




In the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area, one of the main conflicts of interest results from 
the rise of water table levels. This process emerged at the end of the 1990s, though a
considerable part of the related definitions for its service management and supply had 
already been defined in the concession contract. 
Two decisions contributed to the conditions for the conflict’s emergence: firstly, the 
closure of the wells that extracted water from the underground aquifer and the switch to
using surface water extracted from the Río de la Plata and, secondly, the definition of an 
investment plan for expansion of the system that assigned too much weight to the
drinking water system, at the expense of the sanitation system. 
Water table rise, flooding and environmental conflict
The rising of groundwater is a natural response that the hydrological system adopts in 
order to preserve equilibrium among its different variables. In the case of the Buenos
Aires Metropolitan Area, many factors contributed to this process in the 1990s.21
According to the 1991 census, the supply deficit of the domestic water system was 55 per 
cent, whereas the sewerage deficit had reached 80 per cent. In the course of the past 
decade, the domestic water system had been rapidly extended in different municipalities
within the suburban zone. Conversely, the sewerage network did not grow in proportion.
This means that, in net terms, a greater volume of water was entering the region that, 
because of the low coverage of the sanitation systems, was dumped again in the same 
territory.
The balance between the different phenomena of natural and man-made origins varies in 
each of the sub-regions that were taken into consideration inside the Metropolitan Area.
Researchers (Santa Cruz and Buzzo, 1999; INA, 2002, 2003) agree that the human
factors – among them, the reduction in potable water extraction from aquifers –
outweigh natural ones. 
In any case, these factors together caused the groundwater to rise in seventeen districts
of the suburban zone. In the following section we will concentrate on the Lomas de 
Zamora case, one of the districts with a higher level of demand from neighbourhoods
and social organizations. 
Urban water conflict and environmental conflict: The Lomas de Zamora Water Forum 
The level of knowledge of and interest in water service externalities and their
consequences on health, environment and the local economy play a central role in the 
environmental conflicts that have taken place in the area (Sabattini, 1997). The case 
21 Five such factors are as follows: (1) an increase in the precipitation level; (2) watercourse tubing (this
solution, which was adopted to avoid overflows produced by rain, prevents the watercourse from being the
natural drainage source when there is an excess of water due to an increase in precipitation); (3) the
increase in impervious surfaces caused by acceleration of the urbanization process; (4) the closing of
groundwater extraction wells used for industry (due to the industrial shut down that took place during the
recessive period from 1994 to 2001); (5) a change in the source of supply for human consumption (from 
underground to surface water).
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under analysis refers to a neighbourhood organization that changed its agenda over the 
years. It had begun as an organization of people who were victims of flooding. From the 
mid-1980s to the early 1990s it achieved the construction of different sanitation works in
the watercourse (where overflows had the greatest impact in times of flooding). Towards 
the mid-1990s, now operating under the title of ‘Water for Everyone’, the group joined in
demands for the construction of a drinking water supply works and the improvement of 
service quality. In 1992, the federal government began work on the ‘third reinforcement’
– an underground river for the Lomas de Zamora potable water supply. Construction 
began under the management of the public company OSN and was eventually completed
under the management of the privatized company, AASA, in 1997. 
The first cases of home flooding caused by elevation of the groundwater table were 
recorded in early 2000. In that same year, another rain-caused flooding took place,
affecting the lower zone of the district, in which water drainage was much less efficient 
than in previous episodes. In this context, a new organization emerged, the Hydric 
Forum, which began to petition the provincial and federal authorities and AASA,
blaming them for elevating the water table by closing down the underground water 
extraction wells and replacing them with a superficial water supply. The conflict became 
acute between 2001 and 2003, when the organization gained public visibility through
organizing protests, writing petitions to the authorities, taking the company to court and 
holding demonstrations in Plaza de Mayo. During that same period the organization 
articulated demands from other groups of victims living in other parts of the suburbs. 
At present, the conflict is going through a process of mediation and, with the 
intervention of the federal government, a new funds contribution has been set up for the
cleaning and sanitation of the watercourses, which continue to overflow due to a lack of 
maintenance. AASA, through an agreement with the Province of Buenos Aires 
Government, has purchased drainage pumps, to be allocated to the municipalities, to
extract water from the water table and lower its piezometric level. An ongoing problem is 
that not all of the municipalities are able to maintain the pumps; in many localities, the 
pumps worked for a few months and then broke down.22
The community association continues to demand sanitation works, because systems of 
domestic off-loading have overflowed in their neighbourhoods (settled on lowlands),
creating serious risks for the health of the population.
‘Environmental problem construction’ and the need for a responsive institution 
In this case, the environmental problem has been constructed through the aggregation of 
demands and changes in the groups’ profile. Although the original demand was for 
drinking water, the water supply generated to meet this demand had unexpected
consequences that harmed the environment. 
22 This is an agreement that was signed between the Province of Buenos Aires and the company in January
2003 for the installation of 1,500 pumps in 17 municipalities of the greater Buenos Aires region. The
agreement establishes that the concessionaire is responsible for the machinery and for two-thirds of the
installation costs, with the government responsible for the remaining amount.
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Scientific and technical knowledge play a significant role in defining the environmental
problem, for when the group began complaining to AASA, they received answers that 
tended to limit the company’s responsibility, putting the causality down to other 
problems not linked to the ‘third reinforcing’ project. It became very important for the
organization to collect proof that, beyond their legitimate claims, would allow them to
show clear attribution of causality and responsibility. The publishing of a report by the 
Instituto Nacional del Agua (INA, National Water Institute) gave the organization’s 
claims a greater level of legitimacy. 
The other important element in defining the environmental problem is the transition to a
stage of greater mobilization (this has occurred since the federal government change at
the end of 2003). Demands started to be redirected at the federal government when the
group decided that the emerging political situation would facilitate obtaining answers at
the federal level, thus generating pressure on the provincial government (which has legal 
authority over water management). An important factor in this decision was the impact
that the massive demonstrations had on public opinion and media coverage. 
The relationship between community organizations, the provincial government, the
federal government, the regulatory agency (ETOSS) and the concessionaire company
(AASA) has gone through a series of different phases. At the beginning there was a 
process of ‘relative acceptance’ of the AASA’s role, due to its part in the expansion of the 
drinking water service. As the home flooding problem became more prominent, the
organizations started to openly confront first ETOSS, then AASA, through legal actions
and, finally, by appealing to the federal government. The most important element of the 
social apprenticeship that the organizations went through could possibly be learning to 
understand the water problem as a phenomenon that resulted from a multitude of
causes, and assigning shared responsibilities for resource management to the company 
and the government. 
Conclusion
The urban water conflicts in Buenos Aires, which deal with economic, social and
environmental sustainability issues, reveal the extreme limitations of the concession 
contract and the complexity of the interactions between all of the actors concerned by 
urban water management: including connected users, people not yet connected, public 
authorities, regulatory bodies and private companies.
If the cases presented in this paper (which we refers to as ‘open conflicts’ because of
their public nature: demonstrations, mobilizations, denunciations, court cases, media 
declarations, etc.) provide an interesting panorama – they nevertheless do not constitute
the totality of existing conflicts, much less those to come. Solutions to these conflicts are 
not always sustainable or even identifiable.
The conflict cycles identified in the Buenos Aires cases – such as the user conflicts
initiated by people not yet connected to the urban water supply (and wanting the firm to 
lower the connection fee), which were resolved through the creation of the SUMA fee, 
leading to a new conflict (initiated by people already connected to the water system) –
illustrate the highly revealing nature of analysis that is based on concrete urban water 
management. Studying urban water conflicts is a very pertinent method of analysing large 
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water systems and their social implications. It can help us to understand the complexity
of the social and political dynamics at stake, together with the issues involved in 
governing concessions that can arise through a lack of social solidarity – in this case 
within the specific territory of the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Region. From this 
perspective, the purpose of our paper was to identify potential fields for further analysis in
relation to urban water management.
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Introduction1
The research on which this paper is based was triggered by our interest in understanding the 
meaning and causes of the large number of social confrontations over water recorded in the 
Basin of Mexico during the 1980s and 1990s. These are conflicts over water resources and 
services ranging from bureaucratic complaints to mass parades, acts of civil disobedience and
even direct violence resulting in the destruction of infrastructure and the loss of human lives. 
The Mexican authorities recognized that by the early 1980s ‘the protests of the majority 
around water problems were amazing, owing both to their depth and breadth’ and that ‘water
had become a strong political concern for society’ (SARH, 1988). It seems that water problems
attracted even more attention after the urban catastrophes of the mid 1980s, in particular the
1985 earthquakes that seriously damaged the urban infrastructure and further worsened the 
living conditions in Mexico City. 
Despite the political saliency of water conflicts in the Basin of Mexico, and in the country at 
large, the interrelation between these incidents and broader social and political processes like
the struggles for the democratization of the political system or the enhancement and 
expansion of citizenship rights have received comparatively little attention. This work 
contributes to filling this gap by exploring the interconnections between the evolution of the 
processes and institutions involved in the governance and management of water resources and
services and the development of citizenship in Mexico. The confrontations over water, we 
argue, are part and parcel of a wider social struggle over the conditions that make human life 
possible and meaningful and as such, are an expression of the social character of water, as 
1 A previous version of most of the material included in this paper has been published in Castro, 2006. 
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distinct from the biophysical and techno-scientific dimensions. In short, our work investigates 
the ways in which water, the most essential life-sustaining element, has become interwoven
with the socio-economic and political processes structuring Mexican society, such as the
struggle over what can be termed the territory of citizenship. The following pages contain a
summary of our project findings extracted from Castro (1992; 1995; 1998; 2006). 
Water conflicts in the Mexico City Metropolitan Area 
The Mexico City Metropolitan Area (MCMA) (see Figure 1) enjoys one of the highest 
coverage levels of water supply and sewerage in the country. The officially reported average 
daily distribution of water of about 300 liters per capita is well above the internationally 
accepted standard of 100 liters to cover essential household needs. However, since the 1980s 
the MCMA has also been the scene of recurrent social conflicts flaring up from different 
problems around water and water services. As discussed later, most of these conflicts result 
from citizens’ reactions to water-related threats and dangers that prevent them from living 
their lives to the formal standards prevailing in their own society.
Water-related hazards in the MCMA range from the dangers posed by recurrent flooding in 
the rainy season to a whole array of diseases associated with the way in which water and water
services are managed. The most threatening aspect is the incidence of water related-diseases,
including both old diseases associated with poverty, such as gastrointestinal and parasitic 
infections, and new threats derived from modern life, such as water pollution by industrial,
agricultural or domestic discharges. As stated in 1991 by the then Federal Health Minister, 
Jesús Kumate Rodríguez, ‘the main deficiency in the country’s development relates to potable 
water … as gastrointestinal diseases cause the largest number of deaths in the Mexican 
population’ (La Jornada, 1991). In the Basin of Mexico, people are exposed to a wide range of 
water-related infections, including amoebiasis, giardiasis and viral agents, which bring 
respiratory, gastro-intestinal and central nervous-system disorders (NAS, 1995). In particular,
acute diarrhoea is prevalent in the MCMA, and according to the 1991 census, this was the 
third leading cause of infant mortality in the State of Mexico and the fourth in the Federal 
District, with official mortality rates of 450 and 156.7 per hundred thousand, respectively.
These problems are especially severe in the less urbanized parts of the MCMA, which, in 
general, also show the lowest rates of access to water services (INEGI, 1991). Although there
is a notorious lack of systematic information about the connections between water 
management and public health, recent research has confirmed that preventable diarrhoeal
infections constitute one of the main health hazards in the MCMA. Evidence also shows that 
these infections affect particularly poor children living in the peri-urban areas of the city 
(Cifuentes García et. al., 1999; 2003). 
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Figure 1: Mexico City Metropolitan Area (circa 1990) 
Source: David Sansom, Cartographer, School of Geography and the Environment, University of Oxford
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Other important threats come from pollutants leached to water sources, such as nitrates, toxic 
metals, pesticides and herbicides, which can cause acute disorders, or even permanent damage
to humans, and are extremely difficult to remove in the filtration process. This type of 
pollution is associated with the inadequate disposal of toxic wastes, contaminated rainwater or
agricultural runoff, and there is evidence of agrochemical pollution in the Lerma River Basin,
one of the MCMA’s water sources, where studies have found alarming levels of pesticide
residues in humans. Moreover, although domestic water supplies in the MCMA are treated,
owing to problems in the distribution system, such as leaking pipelines and depressurization 
that cause the pollution of networked water by raw sewage or other factors, there is
widespread contamination of the supply at users’ taps. These problems are further aggravated 
by the fact that 90 per cent of the wastewater produced in the MCMA is exported from the 
basin untreated, including a vast amount of hazardous industrial effluents. Part of this 
wastewater is used to irrigate around 5,500 hectares in the Chiconautla area and 80,000 
hectares in the State of Hidalgo before it is emptied in the Gulf of Mexico (NAS, 1995; 
Cifuentes García et. al., 1993; 1995). 
From the perspective of ecological and economic sustainability, although around 70 per cent 
of water used in the MCMA is extracted from underground sources, the rest is imported from 
other basins with high investments in infrastructure and energy required for pumping and 
transporting water over long distances. However, piped water in the MCMA is highly 
subsidized, and users pay only a small fraction of the real cost, although most people have to 
also buy expensive bottled water for drinking, owing to the unreliability of the water’s quality.
Nevertheless, the hazards are significantly greater for the large population settled in shanty
towns in the metropolitan periphery who suffer inadequate housing conditions with poor or 
no urban infrastructure. These sectors are afflicted by chronic water shortages, poor quality 
water and higher water prices, which constitute a large share of their household income and 
accentuate their vulnerability to health threats.
Finally, the control and allocation of water resources in the basin is subject to acute conflicts
between competing users, political entities and different agencies, which has led to a very 
complex structure of water governance. The increasing exacerbation of these conflicts over
time has prompted several institutional reforms since the 1980s, which have formally sought to 
promote active citizen participation and the democratization of the structures of water
governance in the metropolis. However, in practice, water policy continues to be largely 
unaccountable to the citizens, and despite the formal recognition that the water problems are 
interwoven with socio-economic and political processes, the prevailing explanations and the 
adopted solutions continue to underplay the relevance of the social dimension. 
The techno-scientific approach to water conflicts 
Although, from a certain perspective, a large share of the population in the MCMA is 
defenseless against these water threats and dangers, the widespread conflicts flaring up around 
a whole range of water problems recorded since the 1980s suggest that people have been 
active in seeking solutions or, at least, voicing their grievances. These actions range from the 
presentation of peaceful demands to the authorities to violent events, which in extreme cases 
include the destruction of property and the loss of human life. We have also found that the 
annual cycle of these conflicts follows closely the rhythm of physical-natural processes, such as 
the seasonal distribution of rainfall, and the patterns of evaporation and temperature (see
Figure 2). During the period between 1985 to 1992 the number of events increases sharply 
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between November and December with the arrival of the dry season, reaches a peak between
January and February, and begins to decline slowly from March onwards, remaining more or 
less stable during the rainy season between June and October (see Figure 3). Notably, this 
pattern differs from that of the urban conflicts over land tenure, housing problems or 
environmental degradation which do not have such a strong correlation with physical-natural 
cycles (Bolos and Perdomo, 1990). 
Physical-natural and technical factors are often presented as the key explanatory factors of the 
MCMA’s water problems and conflicts, while the crucial socio-economic and political aspects 
continue to be largely neglected. Unfortunately, the most influential social science
contributions to this debate have also limited their scope to technical considerations, such as
designing mechanisms for creating private water markets or accelerating the conversion of 
water services into private goods. Nevertheless, these technical contributions by social 
scientists have paramount social and political significance, since they have informed far-
reaching institutional transformations in the water sector worldwide since the 1980s. Public 
policy reforms, such as water sector liberalization, de- and re-regulation and privatization, have 
often provoked widespread citizen reactions, ranging from public demonstrations to open 
violence, even leading to the collapse of national governments as in Bolivia in 2000, 2003 and 
2004. However, contemporary mainstream social scientists continue to neglect fundamental
socio-political considerations, such as the inequalities of power arising from the governance,
management, and distribution of water resources and services, which are the main focus of
this work. 
Figure 2: The cycle of social mobilization over water and the rhthym of natural cycles 
Source: Elaborated from Armentia, 1988-1997 and IMTA, 1996. 
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Figure 3: Annual cycle of water-related events 
In contrast with the low importance given in mainstream social science to what we call here 
the social character of water, the subject has been a prime concern for the Mexican authorities
for decades. This, perhaps, was helped by the high levels of social mobilization that have 
marked urban life in Mexico, and in which water played a significant role. For instance, since
publishing the 1975 National Hydraulic Plan (PNH) Mexican water authorities have 
increasingly recognized the conflict-ridden nature of the nation’s water management. Thus, the 
1981 re-edition of the PNH introduced the notion of ‘conflicts over water’, and even 
attempted to predict sequences and levels of water conflict in the country’s main ninety-three
urban centres between 1980 and 2000 (see Figure 4). 
Undoubtedly, acknowledging the paramount importance of water conflicts for policy and 
planning was a big step forward towards incorporating the social dimension vis-à-vis physical-
natural and technical processes. Nevertheless, in practice the notion of conflict laid out in the 
PNH was limited to hydrogeological and techno-administrative features, whereby conflicts
over water would be the outcome of a negative correspondence between volumes of ‘naturally
available water supply’, ‘expected water extraction’ and ‘expected water consumption’. For 
instance, the results mapped in Figure 4 were obtained by classifying cities according to the 
correlation between the volumes of water extracted and consumed and the volume of water
naturally available, where it was assumed that the latter would remain constant between 1980 
and 2000. The model predicted that cities with a favorable correlation would be free of water 
conflict, because the available water volumes would be adequate to meet demand, while cities 
where water volumes were very limited were very likely to experience water conflicts. On this 
basis, the PNH offered a classification of cities ranging from those already affected by water
conflicts to others where ‘no conflicts were expected until the year 2000’. 
The PNH forecasts seem to have been largely accurate, as the empirical indicators effectively 
confirmed the expected trends in the cases studied. For instance, in Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, 
a city classified as subject to ongoing and future water conflicts, the correlation between water 
availability and consumption significantly worsened between 1980 and 2000. By contrast, in 
Tuxtla Gutiérrez, the capital of Chiapas, the state with the largest freshwater reserves, the
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correlation remained highly favorable as predicted, and no water conflicts were expected.
However, despite its accuracy in predicting the overall trend in the water balance, the model 
was not effective in predicting water conflicts, as events of social unrest around water
problems mushroomed in both cities during this period (Castro, 1992). In fact, water problems
became the leading issue in the 1988 electoral campaign for the governorship of Chiapas, and 
shortly afterwards the federal government launched a vigorous investment programme to 
improve the state’s water infrastructure. 
More examples can be added, but what we want to emphasize here is that water conflicts
cannot be explained solely by their hydrogeological or techno-administrative aspects and that 
there is need for a closer examination of the interrelations between the physical-natural and 
social processes involved. After all, water ‘scarcity’ and conflict often happen where there is an 
abundance of water resources, as illustrated by Guayaquil, the largest city in Ecuador. 
Although Guayaquil is crossed by the fresh waters of the Guayas River, over one-third of the 
population has no access to safe water supply, while those connected to the network are 
subject to chronic water shortages. A protracted structure of social inequality, clientelist 
politics and collusion between the authorities and private water entrepreneurs are among the 
main factors that explain the deficiencies of the city’s water systems, which in turn underpin 
much social and political unrest (Swyngedouw, 1997). The description can be easily generalized
to many cities in developing countries. In fact, although water volumes are certainly a crucial 
and legitimate consideration, a closer examination shows that the availability of water for 
essential needs or the technical capacity to make these volumes available for human use are
not the main problem. 
In the current scenario of the MCMA, the socio-political roots of the reigning water stress may 
be much less obvious for the contemporary observer, as physical-natural constraints
undoubtedly reduce the room for maneuver for water management, and their saliency tends to 
overshadow the social character of the process. However, we challenge this reduction of water
conflict to its physical-natural and techno-administrative aspects by exploring the 
interdependence of hydrogeological, technical and socio-political processes. 
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Figure 4: Map of conflicts over water supply services in the
main Mexican urban centres (1980-2000) 
Source: David Sansom, Cartographer, School of Geography and the Environment, University of Oxford;
SARH, 1981. 
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The meanings of conflict
A clearer understanding of the different intellectual trajectories represented by our epistemic
subjects can be achieved by examining the meanings associated to the notion of water
conflicts. For instance, when the water expert refers to conflicts over water, as in the forecasts
presented in the 1981 National Hydraulic Plan, the observables are mainly quantities. The key 
concepts (in this case, water demand, supply, consumption and cost) point to water volumes
per time units, numerical series correlating expected population growth with water volumes, 
meters of pipes, kilowatt hours and so on, within a certain time period. For instance, in 
addition to the water balances used to predict water conflicts, the official diagnosis offered by 
the 1981 PNH listed as key factors explaining the conflicts, the 
deficient conservation and maintenance of networks and electromechanical installations; low
efficiency in the uses of water due to leaks in the networks and wastage by the users; lack of
financial sufficiency in the municipalities; low income in the water operational agencies due to
under pricing, and social and political problems due to water transfers between regions and
states, and to changing patterns in the use of the resource (SARH, 1981).
Despite this explicit reference to ‘social and political problems’, conflict is generally seen by 
water experts as the result of the lack of expected correspondence between quantitative
variables, which was the criterion employed to develop the map of water conflicts discussed 
earlier. However, for water functionaries, the notion of conflict derives from a very different
set of observables. Thus, they may be referring to the recurrent events of social protest in the 
city owing to the poor quality of the water services, to the civil disobedience of water 
consumers who are unwilling to pay their bills or to the more aggressive action of those who
have decided to take over the offices of the water utility or to destroy water meters in protest 
against a new policy aimed at improving cost recovery in the water services. These actions
constitute an intricate web when observed at the scale of the daily interaction between
demandantes (claimants) or usuarios (users) and the water utilities. 
Despite these differences in the understanding of what water conflict means, in the end these 
subjects have historically resorted to physical-natural and techno-administrative factors for 
predicting and explaining these conflicts, thus overlooking the social character of the process.
Unfortunately, the most influential incursions of social science in this sector have not 
contributed to the reversal of this trend but rather have exacerbated the reduction of the 
process to its physical-natural and techno-administrative dimensions. 
Making social regularities observable
If we remain within the techno-scientific and administrative framework, crucial factors 
underpinning the emergence of water conflicts are overlooked or underplayed. Let us consider 
the legal and technical requirements normally given by the water utilities in Mexico to deliver 
networked water services: legal land tenure and technical feasibility. Although these two 
requirements look straightforward on paper, when observed in more detail they actually have 
multidimensional ramifications. At least formally, to gain access to networked water services 
the claimants must have a legal title to their land in order to be ‘regularized’. However, 
regularization also refers to the technical feasibility of bringing the services to the 
neighborhood, which is often hampered by the difficult geographical locations of the most 
disadvantaged human settlements or by the overlapping of legal and political jurisdictions. The
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fact is that claimants are categorized into two main groups according to these characteristics:
regularized and non-regularized. 
The number of non-regularized claimants is enormous. Just taking into account the 
requirement of technical feasibility, about ten million people in the MCMA, especially in the
State of Mexico, live in urban areas considered unsuitable for the provision of public services, 
such as the rocky slopes southwest of the city or the now desiccated lake beds to the east, 
which are exposed to flooding during the rainy season and dust storms in the dry period. 
Moreover, many of these settlements have been developed illegally and are therefore not in 
compliance with the legal requirement of having a land title (Rowland and Gordon, 1996).
These irregularities continue to be the main formal impediment for the introduction of 
networked water and sanitation services. As stated by a former director of the State 
Commission for Water and Sanitation (CEAS) of the State of Mexico when addressing the 
situation of around half million people lacking networked water supply in the Valley 
Cuautitlán-Texcoco:
Most of these people are located in 120 colonias [urban quarters] that are in the process of
regularizing their land titles. Because of their situation, they are not creditworthy and do not pay
any taxes. … [T]hese people have settled in invaded ejidal and communal lands in the 
municipalities of Tultitlán, Ecatepec, Ixtapaluca, Chimalhuacán, Chicoloapan, Los Reyes-La Paz
and the Valley of Chalco where, unfortunately, the largest irregular human settlements are
located (El Sol de México, 11 March 1987).
Nevertheless, being regularized is necessary but by no means sufficient for gaining access to
services. In fact, there are cases of non-regularized colonias that have been able to circumvent 
the formal requirement of regularization in order to obtain public services. However, this does 
not change the prevailing pattern of individuals and families being categorized as irregular or 
regularized: unworthy or worthy of accessing essential water services. Thus, what initially
appears to be an abstract and universal identity, the claimant interpellated by the water 
authorities, acquires a richer texture when we explore the multidimensional facets of the 
problem, such as the qualitative and quantitative inequalities determining one’s status in legal 
and geographical terms. In the last analysis, the process that determines the inclusion or 
exclusion of individuals and families from accessing water services is composed of a dense 
web of social interactions.
As social scientists, we are skeptical of the undifferentiated treatment of the population as 
claimants or users, which overlooks those processes that create and reproduce the structural
socio-economic inequalities and injustices determining the lack of access to essential water
services affecting millions in Mexico and elsewhere. In this perspective, water conflicts cannot 
be reduced to physical-natural and techno-administrative considerations, but rather should be
analysed in their interconnections with wider socio-economic and political processes.
Unfortunately, although water inequality and the constellation of social blots associated with it 
have become the object of laudable programs and declarations of policy worldwide, the 
underlying processes remain unobservable as an object of knowledge and, consequently,
largely overlooked in the formulation and implementation of policy. 
In this regard, we argue that water conflicts such as those identified in Mexico are part and 
parcel of the social struggle for widening and securing a fairer access to the conditions that are 
essential for human survival and the enjoyment of basic living standards. Therefore, the 
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significance of the actions carried out by the population in relation to water problems cannot 
be reduced to their techno-bureaucratic aspects, because what is at stake is the conquest and 
defense of the conditions that make human survival and social life possible. 
Unsurprisingly, water is a recurrent object in social struggles over access to basic necessities, 
but these struggles constitute a territory often demarcated by rigid legal and social barriers and 
fiercely defended from intrusion. 
The events of water conflict
There are some characteristics of the water mobilization that may contribute to reinforcing the 
techno-scientific reductionism of conventional explanations. For instance, the temporal 
distribution of water-related events resembles the hydrological cycle. In a typical year, their
frequency increases sharply with the arrival of the dry season and then remains relatively stable
until the rainy season brings some relief. After a period of decline in the level of mobilization,
the cycle resumes with the arrival of the following year’s dry period. Figures 2 and 3 above 
provide a graphic reading of this situation, showing separately total percentages for the 
MCMA, the Federal District, and sixteen adjacent municipalities of the State of Mexico.
However, although the charts suggest a clear interrelationship between the seasonal climatic 
patterns and the water events, a closer inspection raises important questions about the 
meaning and extent of the correlation. For instance, in light of the technical sophistication 
characterizing water management in the MCMA, the fact that the metropolis imports water
from beyond the basin’s boundaries, and the high levels of coverage and per capita water
distribution reported officially, the interaction between the seasonal rainfall regime and the 
sequence of the events merits further scrutiny. 
The evidence suggests that the association between the arrival of the dry season and the steep 
increase in social conflicts over water cannot be explained as being just the outcome of the
‘natural’ hydrological cycle. As expressed sarcastically by one of the protagonists of the events, 
‘in some urban quarters the dry season has been with us for over 15 years’ (Metrópoli, 30-May-
1989: 2). The dry season undoubtedly exacerbates water scarcity and the problems associated 
with it, but water scarcity is the outcome of interwoven and relatively autonomous physical 
natural and social processes. 
One indicator of the degree of autonomy of social patterns vis-à-vis physical-natural cycles is 
the differential weight of the social mobilization over water in the Federal District and in the 
neighboring municipalities of the State of Mexico. As shown in Table 1, while the Federal 
District contains over 58 per cent of the MCMA population, only 33.5 per cent of the 
recorded events of water mobilization occured within in its territory. However, though the 
mobilization is more intense in the densely populated municipalities than in the Federal
District, there exist large differences between jurisdictions. In the Federal District, over 46 per 
cent of the events were concentrated in three of the sixteen delegaciones: Gustavo A. Madero, 
Iztapalapa, and Tlalpan.
Likewise, in the State of Mexico seven out of the sixteen municipalities accounted for 73 per 




Table 1. Relative weight of the events (comparative percentages).











 Source: Elaborated from INEGI (1991) and Torregrosa Armentia (1988-97).
This spatial distribution of the events may be connected with the process of demographic and 
urban expansion, as the delegaciones and municipalities where the larger proportion of cases are 
concentrated are also among the most affected by massive population growth since the 1960s. 
This is the case of Tlalpan, Iztapalapa and Gustavo A. Madero in the Federal District, which
recorded population increases of up to 1 million people each between 1960 and 1980. Also, 
municipalities such as Netzahualcóyotl, Naucalpan, Tlalnepantla, Ecatepec, Atizapán, and 
Cuautitlán Izcalli had the highest rates of population growth between 1960 and 1980, which in 
the case of Netzahualcóyotl meant a net increase of over 1.2 million people. During the 1980s, 
the most dynamic municipalities were Ecatepec, Chalco, Atizapán, Chimalhuacán, Tultitlán 
and Cuautitlán Izcalli, while Netzahualcóyotl and Tlalnepantla experienced significant 
decreases (Bolos and Perdomo, 1990).
However, the explanation of the conflicts over water cannot be reduced to the impact of 
population and urban growth. Understanding the situation of defenselessness and extreme
vulnerability affecting millions in the MCMA, not just in relation to water, requires the 
introduction of additional explanatory factors, which unfortunately we cannot discuss here due 
to space constraints (see Castro, 2006 for a more detailed analysis).
The structure of the events 
We analysed the water events by looking first at their internal components, such as the actors 
involved, their targets, the stated cause of the action and the instruments employed. Then we 
aggregated the cases into different combinations according to key characteristics, such as level 
of organization of the protagonists. Let us say that the sharpness of the analytical categories
and components presented below is a necessary simplification for heuristic purposes, as we do 
not wish to reify the data presented in tables nor the individual examples listed below. We use 
quantitative information to map the events and provide orders of magnitude that facilitate the 
understanding of the dynamics and directionality of the process, while the description of 
selected events offers a closer look into the multidimensional structure and interconnections
of the struggle as a whole.
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The protagonists 
An engagement implies the confrontation of two sides, an agent that takes the initiative and
carries out certain actions against an opponent, an adversary. Let us call the actor that takes the 
initiative the ‘protagonist’. The protagonists of our events range from individual members of 
the community, without demonstrable links to groups or organizations, to highly structured 
and disciplined collective actors, such as political parties, workers unions or NGOs. However,
it was not always possible to specify the identity of the protagonists or the nature of the 
organizations involved from the information provided in press reports. Local associations and
neighborhod committees, for instance, may be the outcome of self-organization, in which 
people join forces in their search for the introduction or improvement of water services or in 
response to the complete interruption of the water supply for long periods. However, 
frequently the creation of organizations is also stimulated from above, either by the 
government, political parties, workers unions or foreign-funded NGOs, among other external 
agents.
In any case, the character of the protagonists must not be taken for granted or seen as static:
on the one hand, self-organized actors can be co-opted or penetrated by more powerful 
organizations or state agencies, which can then influence if not totally control the original
actors. On the other hand, top-down organizations designed to secure political control over 
popular movements can develop autonomous initiatives or, to put it in other terms, can also 
be co-opted by grassroots processes. This happened, for example, in some municipalities 
during the early 1990s with local officers of the National Solidarity Programme, PRONASOL, 
launched by President Salinas, who enjoyed a higher degree of autonomy from the centre and
was sometimes responsive to local causes, even joining or awakening centrifugal forces.
Furthermore, depending on the level of analysis, the same protagonists can become vectors of 
contradictory forces. In another example considered below in more detail, a local community 
from Ecatepec defended their right to keep control over a water system (a well and a network
of household connections) that they had built when neither the state nor private entrepreneurs 
were interested in providing them with water services. They then managed and maintained it 
efficiently for many decades. Although theirs was a de facto decentralized, self-sufficient and
community-managed water utility not dependent on government subsides, which in theory 
would fit in with the policies of administrative decentralization and civil society participation
promoted by the government since the 1980s, in practice the authorities interpreted their 
refusal to hand over the water system as unlawful. What was very likely a legitimate action of 
the community observed at the local level and in historical perspective, constituted for the 
authorities an act of opposition to the new policies directed at integrating water management
activities under state control when observed at the basin level. This illustrates the multi-scale
and multidimensional character of the process captured in the water events.
Returning now to the character of the protagonists, although two-thirds of the events were 
performed by agents with some degree of organization, the number of cases carried out in 
apparently spontaneous circumstances, without an observable level of organization, is
noticeable (see Table 2). 
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Federal District 42.3% (264) 57.7% (360) 30.9% (624)
Conurbated Municipalities 24.2% (260) 75.8% (814) 69.1%(1,174)
Total MCMA 100% (624) 100% (1074) 100%(1,698)
Source: Elaborated from Torregrosa Armentia (1988-97).
Interestingly, in contrast to the Federal District, where non-organized protagonists accounted 
for over 42 per cent of the events, in the neighboring municipalities organized action was 
made up over 75 per cent of the cases. Most of these actions were carried out by local 
protagonists, who accounted for over 60 per cent of the total number of events. In this 
respect, the breakdown of the data according to the level and type of organization of the 
protagonists reveals the central role played by local institutions, such as neighborhood 
associations or the local offices of political parties, workers unions and other social 
organizations. This centrality of the local in the events is reinforced by the presence of
municipal authorities and politicians, particularly in the State of Mexico, where they often 
confronted state or federal authorities over water problems in defense of the specific interests
of their communities. Moreover, non-organized protagonists, among which the role of women 
was paramount, were also mainly locally based. 
However, the participation at the local level of regional and national organizations, such as 
political parties, workers unions or NGOs, suggests that the scale of the events may well 
extend beyond the neighborhood. For instance, even small community groups often joined 
forces with peers from neighboring colonias and neighbourhoods, a feature recorded with more 
frequency in the State of Mexico (20 per cent) than in the Federal District (only 5 per cent) 
(Bolos and Perdomo, 1990). 
The opponents
The antagonists in the water events have wide-ranging identities and share the 
characteristic of being held accountable by the protagonists for water-related problems. 
Unsurprisingly, a large share of the events targeted local authorities and water utilities,
although a significant number of cases were also directed to state and federal authorities, 
private organizations and individuals (Table 3).
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Table 3. Actors targeted by the protagonists. MCMA 1990-92 
Federal District ConurbatedMunicipalities Total
Federal/state authorities 30.2% (81) 26.1% (112) 27.7% (193)
Local authorities 52.6% (141) 55.9% (240) 54.7% (381)
Other actors 17.2% (46) 17.9% (77) 17.6% (123)
Total MCMA 100% (268) 100%  (429) 100% (697)
Source: Elaborated from Torregrosa Armentia (1988-97).
Most actions targeted municipal departments or the local offices of state or federal bodies, 
such as the Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources (SARH) or the Ministry of Urban 
Development and Ecology (SEDUE). The category ‘other actors’ includes people or 
organizations enjoying a degree of social power related to water and water services such as
‘local leaders’, ‘urban speculators’, the drivers of water trucks (both private and municipal) and 
local businesspeople. These actors are targeted because the protagonists hold them responsible
for real or perceived grievances, such as massive clandestine water tapping by hotel owners,
power abuses by municipal water distributors and overcharging for water by private vendors. 
Interestingly, in an important number of cases, the protagonists do not have a clear antagonist,
a culprit or a well-identified opponent. For instance, in some cases the actors recognize that 
the solution to the problem is beyond the reach of the local authorities, bureaucrats and 
technicians and blame the ‘current policies’ or the ‘economic situation’ for the particular issues 
that moved them to action. In other cases, they mention natural factors such as drought, 
excessive rain, heat and parasites as the causes of their complaints. In some circumstances, the 
lack of identifiable targets may be an indicator of institutional crisis, as suggested by one case 
in which the protagonists could not identify who was responsible for providing water services
in their neighbourhood, which was trapped in an inter-jurisdictional conflict between the 
municipality, the state, and the federal government. 
Reasons for action and instruments employed
Although water is the obvious object underpinning the events, the immediate reasons given by 
the protagonists to justify their actions are wide-ranging and distinctive. For analytical reasons,
we have grouped the causes of the events into three main sub-dimensions (see Table 4):
x actions to gain access to water or essential water services
x actions around deficiencies in the delivery of essential water services
x actions involving the control over water resources and water infrastructure. 
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Table 4: Stated causes of the events: MCMA 1990-92 
Federal District ConurbatedMunicipalities Total
Gaining access to water
and essential water 
services





58.6 (301) 55.8 (525) 56.8 (826)
Controlling water and
water infrastructure
9.3 (48) 15.4 (145) 13.3 (193)
Total MCMA 100 (514) 100 (941) 100 (1455)
Source: Elaborated from Torregrosa Armentia (1988-97).
The first group includes cases in which the action seeks to overcome legal, technical or 
administrative impediments precluding access to water and essential water services. The 
second concerns problems such as the irregularity or poor quality of the services, unfair 
pricing, administrative and operational inefficiency and water speculation. Finally, in the third 
group, we singled out those events where the social and political aspects of water control 
become more evident, such as competition for water sources, conflicts over the control of 
water infrastructure and confrontations concerning the legal status of water, which during the 
period under study the federal authorities were trying to change from a public to a private
good.
Regarding the instruments employed by the protagonists, we identified five main categories:
petitions, denunciations, mass mobilizations and parades, threats and direct actions. In most 
cases the protagonists utilize a conjunction of different instruments when carrying out their 
actions, although the most common recourses were the petition and the denunciation, which 
convey different degrees of antagonism. The petition is normally a formal request addressed to
the authorities asking for the connection or restoration of water services. Although most cases
are obviously directed to the local water and political authorities, petitioning is often routed to 
higher-ranking echelons and, typically, to the President of the Republic, reflecting both the
frustration of the claimants and the long-lasting Mexican tradition that gives the President a
fatherly authority, even over domestic affairs. 
86
An analysis of the origins and nature of water-related
unrest and conflicts in the urban context
Table 5: Instruments employed by the protagonists. MCMA 1990-92 
Federal District ConurbatedMunicipalities Total
Petitions 5.3 (14) 5.3 (24) 5.3 (38)
Denunciations 80.3 (212) 66.5 (302) 71.6 (514)
Mass mobilizations/rallies 7.2 (19) 10.6 (48) 9.3 (67)
Threats  5.7  (15)  9.3  (42) 7.9 (57)
Direct actions  1.5  (4)  8.4 (38) 5.9 (42)
Total MCMA 100 (264) 100 (454) 100 (718)
Source: Elaborated from Torregrosa Armentia (1988-97).
Denunciation is the next step among the actors’ tactics, and they normally resort to it when the 
petitions have failed to attract the attention of the authorities, though denunciations can also 
be triggered for other reasons, such as exposing power abuses by water vendors or clandestine 
water tapping by industries or hotels at the expense of domestic users. There are two main 
types of denunciations: those directed at the authorities, aimed at resolving a given situation 
and those directed at the media with the purpose of raising public awareness of irregular 
situations and thus moving the authorities into action. Denunciation is by far the most 
common instrument employed by the protagonists in the recorded events, although there is an 
important difference between the Federal District, where denunciations accounted for over 80 
per cent of the events, and the densely populated municipalities, where the figure drops to 66.5 
percent. That most events were denunciations can be partly explained by the fact that the press 
was the main vehicle used by protagonists to publicly voice their demands and complaints 
about water issues during the period of study. 
The third type of instrument employed is public demonstration, through parades, open 
meetings and other forms of collective and mass mobilization that usually take place in the
local Zócalo (public square), in front of government buildings, main roads and other public 
spaces. The fourth type is the threat of further action, normally a warning that direct action
will be taken if there is no response within a given period of time. The content of threats range 
from implementing actions of civil disobedience, such as non-payment of water bills and taxes, 
blocking roads and the occupation of buildings, to the kidnapping of water officers, the theft 
of vehicles and the destruction of goods and infrastructure. The fifth and last type of 
instrument is the materialization of the threats. 
There is a significantly higher occurrence of events involving mass parades, threats and direct 
action in the desely populated municipalities than in the Federal District. This may be the 
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outcome of the more extreme conditions of vulnerability affecting the provision of water
services recorded in the municipalities, or perhaps this reflects the fact that protagonists of the 
events outside the Federal District find formal channels, such as petitions and denunciations
much less effective. Also, this may be indicating the looser public control over water
operations in the State of Mexico, which leaves water resources and services more exposed to
political manipulation and factional power struggles between individual or collective water 
lords.
Concluding Remarks
Undoubtedly, the main motivation for the actions of most protagonists of the events is 
ensuring continued access to the essential services of safe water supply and sanitation.
However, we have argued that the events cannot be explained away only by reference to their 
techno-bureaucratic or administrative dimensions or to the impact of physical-natural or socio-
demographic determinations on the management of water and water services. From our 
perspective, these events are part of a structural social confrontation to overcome the
qualitative and quantitative inequalities preventing millions from full access to the territory of 
citizenship, a confrontation that is largely independent of the protagonists’ individual wills and 
reason. The autonomy of the process from its individual manifestations is clearer when 
analysed at the level of the combined result of multiple events happening throughout the 
complex spatial setting of the MCMA. Thus, the struggle over water cannot be reduced to the 
action of politically conscious protagonists, but must be also explored in connection with the 
largely unplanned political outcomes of the process. Unfortunately, the most influential 
contributions by social science in the field of water policy and management since the 1980s
have reinforced the already prevailing technocratic approach to these issues by playing down 
social, political and cultural dimensions in their analyses. 
Our study attempts to underline the importance of social struggle and power configurations 
for understanding the interweaving of social and physical-natural processes. However, we have 
attempted to avoid the reification of the empirical manifestations of the struggle, as our 
interest has been to deploy the concept as a heuristic device to capture the multidimensional 
and long-term character of the processes under consideration. Therefore, although the 
research was triggered by our interest in understanding the meaning of the water conflict 
recorded in the Basin of Mexico during the 1980s and 1990s we have placed these events in
the wider context of the struggle over citizenship. 
In this regard, the reasons driving the protagonists of water conflicts to act were multifarious:
most of these events were discrete and unconnected, and most actors may have been unaware
at the time of the multidimensional character of the process and the unintended implications 
of their purposeful action. Yet, we argue that these apparently unrelated contests are part and 
parcel of an evolving social confrontation that is autonomous from the actors’ individual wills
and reason. It is part of the struggle over the territory of citizenship, a territory composed of 
unfolding bundles of rights and duties formally bonding all individuals within a given 
community, but in practice is punctuated by structural exclusions and, therefore, the object of 
permanent and recurring social contests.
Comprehension and understanding of the multidimensional character of the process has been 
hindered by the overriding techno-scientific and bureaucratic rationality characterizing water
governance and management which has historically contributed to render unobservable the 
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social character of water. Unfortunately, social scientists’ most inflluential incursions into the 
field of water policy since the 1980s have tended to reinforce this unbalanced understanding of 
water problems. Thus, the far-reaching water-sector reforms informed by these policies have 
strengthened technocratic tendencies in water governance and management and continue to 
shift the focus away from fundamental socio-political considerations. In consequence, 
problems ranging from widespread water inequality and poverty to the depletion of aquatic 
ecosystems are reduced to their techno-scientific and bureaucratic aspects. Therefore,
‘technical’ solutions like converting essential water services into private goods or re-centering 
water governance around ‘non-political’ free-market principles have been the rule. Our work 
attempts to provide a framework for overcoming this prevailing reductionism and to 
contribute to the development of meaningful transdisciplinary coordination across the natural
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I am not the minister of Water Resources but the minister of water conflicts1
- Indian Minister of Water Resources
Introduction
Most cities in India are facing severe water scarcity. Other problems and concerns pertain 
to quantity and quality, equity across different segments and different sections of
population, poor sanitation, ineffective and obsolete wastewater management practices
and lack of long-term vision, planning and motivation. Cities expand at a rapid rate and 
use up resources like land and water available in peri-urban areas. While land in peri-
urban villages is taken by urban housing, industrial premises and for dumping urban
wastes (both solid and liquid), very little is ploughed back by way of developing these 
areas. The process of urbanization cannot be blind. It should ensure the sustainable use 
of natural resources, in particular land and water, and even more so groundwater. Indeed,
very little attention is paid to investigating the role of groundwater in the process of 
urban development. Available groundwater exploitation is unplanned and unregulated, 
resulting in ecological degradation. In India, not only is water never a part of urban 
planning, the peri-urban issues are completely ignored and given the least importance in
the overall planning process. This has resulted in serious livelihood problems in these 
areas. Furthermore, such unconcerned and unplanned urban expansions have triggered 
conflicts between urban and peri-urban interests. 




Resource scarcity is certainly one of the reasons for such conflicts, but resource scarcity 
is not only the consequence of hydro-geological factors: most often it is man-made 
(Janakaranjan, 2004). Regardless of its causes, the consequences imply that water supply
(both quantity and quality) are very much part of concerns such as urban water 
environment, water supply and sanitation. Moreover, as indicated earlier, the looming 
threat of serious conflicts in resource sharing between cities and their peri-urban and 
rural areas is something that needs due attention. This question is of growing importance 
in the ongoing context of Indian urbanization.2 Keeping these two elements, this paper
highlights the resource dimension in urban water conflicts along with conflicts that have
surfaced in the process of service provision in cities in India, such as private sector
involvement
One of the new Millennium Development Goals for the coming decades is the priority
given to access to safe drinking water and its financing. The failure of policies inviting 
investment from the water multinationals was discussed at the Johannesburg World
Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002. Two opposing viewpoints emerged:
following the Camdessus report, advocates of the private sector are trying to work out
ways of reducing the risks for operators, while challengers of water multinationals stress
the growing disparity of water access in the cities of developing countries (Lobina and 
Hall, 2003).
In India, this debate did not correspond to observed reality; until recently with the very 
controversial Delhi water sector project. Indeed, with the exception of short duration 
contracts for the construction of water treatment plants, attempts to initiate large-scale 
projects with the international private sector have failed3 (Zérah, 2001). Private operators 
are not wholly absent, but they are small in size; they undertake local contracts, involving 
a limited number of operations and no investment on their part (Zérah, 2003). There are 
two main institutional arrangements for water services. Specific urban water bodies are in
charge of water supply and sewerage. Beyond a certain size and level of autonomy, cities
also take responsibility for water resource development. For smaller towns, the State 
(state department or state-promoted agencies) plays a major role, especially in water 
resource development. In the case of mega cities (where population exceeds 4 million), 
supply is either managed by the Municipal Corporation or remains under the control of a 
separate water supply and sewerage board. Supposedly, these boards are financially and 
organizationally more autonomous. Urban water supply is thus largely dominated by the
public sector, yet restrictions on access (complete or partial) are no less real, mostly 
because of the inefficiency of the public service (Zérah, 1999; Llorente, 2002). 
This paper is organized into four sections. The first aims at refining a definition of urban 
water conflict, while the next two deal with case studies of Delhi and Chennai (formerly
Madras). The case of Delhi addresses conflicts linked to water access and to the 
2 Very few articles can be found on peri-urban areas; see Kundu et al. (2002) and Annapurna Shaw (2005)
on the specific dynamics of peri-urban zones. 
3 Various factors explain the absence of concession contracts: absence of a political will, civil society 
opposition, very low tariffs – which make it impossible to achieve economic equilibrium, insufficient return
on investment, lack of guarantees on the part of the federated States and the Union, etc.
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compensatory strategies associated with it. The study of Chennai looks at the most 
critical conflict, opposing the city and the peri-urban villages, as continuous water 
transport, in order to supplement the city’s drinking water needs, has drained water 
resources in peri-urban villages. A final section aims at considering the rather 
unsuccessful results of existing conflict resolution mechanisms in place. This socio-
economic analysis will enable us to point out the main reasons that explain why conflicts 
are emerging. It will open the debate on the community and cooperative solutions that 
could be implemented at best or at minima.
Our acceptance of urban water conflicts 
A conflict always implies, irrespective of its origins, objectives or progress, an opposition 
between at least two categories of actors, whose interests are temporarily or 
fundamentally divergent. We shift from a tension to a conflict when one of the parties
implements a credible threat. There are several indicators. For instance, one can use the 
media, or bring the other party before the courts or produce some signs (like a notice) or 
finally, both parties can enter into a direct confrontation (verbal or physical). 
Conflicts can generate debate or fights, but they can also lead up to new arrangements. 
Therefore, we want to underline that a conflict does not necessarily constitute the last
step of the degradation of a relation or a market failure. A conflict is a modality of
coordination and negotiation, and as such, it can contribute to change, which can be 
both ‘positive’ and ‘negative’. In our present context, the word ‘conflict’ need not be 
understood as referring to physical violence. It should rather be seen as a potential force 
for competition and change. This competition could lead to the stagnation or
advancement of an economy, depending on the degree of cooperation among 
stakeholders.
In the particular context of Indian cities, water conflicts take place due to one critical
factor: scarcity, which is caused by imbalance between supply and demand, as service 
provision is inefficient4 and groundwater is depleted and/or polluted. Excessive 
unregulated pumping results in the long-term lowering of water tables (in some cases, the 
damage due to depletion is irreversible), and groundwater pollution is caused by 
discharge of industrial effluent, use of chemical inputs in agriculture and leakage of
domestic and municipal sewage. The result of of both of these cases is scarcity – by 
means of over-extraction in the first case and contamination in the second.
This man-made scarcity increases competition between water users – both present and
future. We assume that a situation becomes conflictual when the existing conventional mode of supply 
does not suffice to provide water. Urban water conflicts in India can generally be divided into
one of three main categories or, more often, a combination thereof:
4 We usually enumerate the following failures: wastage, bad maintenance, low service recovery,




1. conflicts linked to quantity: conflict arises between sectors or users, like 
municipality vs. industries, connected vs. unconnected people, urban vs. peri-
urban, present and future generations 
2. conflicts linked to quality: unsafe water reduces the availability of potable water
and causes water borne diseases; poor people are more affected as they do not 
have any way to treat water; it is too expensive; domestic users complain to the 
municipality
3. conflicts linked to water access: legal (water rights), economic (price) or physical
barriers prevent access to water and their unfair settlements generate conflicts,
for instance, all the compensatory modes of provision are equivalent to a sign 
that reveals the conflict (see the Delhi case).
In all the cases, the protagonists have unequal bargaining powers, and there are winners
and losers. Seldom will a conflict generate a win-win situation, mostly with regard to 
sustainability criteria. We shall analyse this in the cases of Chennai and Delhi in 
subsequent sections.
Conflicts linked to the issue of water access in Delhi 
In Delhi, the public undertaking, Delhi Jal Board (DJB), is unable to meet the water and
wastewater needs of the nation’s capital and provides its citizens with an erratic and
unequally distributed water supply that is well below international standards. The 
mismanagement of water particularly affects the urban poor: the volume of water 
available in slums is around 27 litres/capita/day (Llorente, 2002). On the other hand, 
groundwater is depleting very fast as people get water from private wells to fulfil their 
needs. Until now, the solution adopted by the municipality consisted in supply-oriented 
partnerships, such as the construction and management of new water treatment plants, 
which resulted in adding more capacity to a leaky network. Low quality of service 
delivery was endemic and is becoming acute. The situation is very conflictual among
users, and there is sharp criticism of the existing conventional mode of supply, e.g. water
supplied through a centralized network.
The Government of India (GOI) and the Government of the National Capital Territory 
of Delhi (GoNCTD) recognize the urgent need for reform. They have therefore 
requested the World Bank’s support in helping DJB improve the reliability, sustainability 
and affordability of Delhi’s water supply and sanitation services. But the proposed water 
project, resulting from a consulting study, has been shelved becasue it has been much 
criticized by NGOs. Water delivery as a basic service is inextricably entwined with 
ideology and politics, which exacerbate conflicts.
Water access conflicts materialize through alternative provision modes (or compensatory 
strategies) and all the inequities that are generated as a result. Limitation of access is less
rigid for the better-off households, but on the whole, these modes appear unsustainable
(Llorente and Zérah, 2002). However, some exceptions illustrate the potential capacity of 
conflicts to generate sustainable change; they depend largely upon the degree of 
cooperation among stakeholders. A review of several of these practices will question 
their impact on access and their ability to prevent conflict in the long run.
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Ideological debate on Delhi's water reform project favours business as usual
The World Bank has been approached by the Government of India and the Government 
of Delhi (the National Capital) to support a programme that would improve the 
reliability, sustainability and affordability of water supply and sewerage services provided 
by DJB. It is planned to gradually improve service management,5 extending the 
infrastructure to underserved parts of the city and financially strengthening the water
utility through the recovery of efficient cost of operations. GoNCTD and DJB have
initiated a consultation on the proposed programme. This is, in fact, the starting point of 
the controversy that attracted all the attention, more even than the project itself. 
Stakeholders requested clarifications on the role and position of the World Bank in this 
process. As of late July 2005, the Bank was accused of putting pressure on the Indian 
government to select Price Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) for advisory work on the Delhi
Water Sector Project. The Indian anti-corruption group, Parivartan, used national 
freedom of information laws to gain access to the correspondence between DJB, which
oversees water supply in the Indian capital, and World Bank officials (Parivartan, 2005). 
The World Bank country director for India said ‘the insinuation that the Bank attempted
to favour PWC is completely unfounded’. But details given by Parivartan have put the
Bank in an awkward position.
The project is currently in the preparation stage: DJB is still in the process of designing 
and studying various aspects and preparing final documentation. The Bank’s Board of 
Executive Directors will consider approving the loan only after this process is completed
and has been appraised by the Bank. So far the Bank has provided a sum of US $2.5 
million under a project preparation facility to enable DJB to prepare the project.
As the controversy surrounding the Bank’s role expanded, a campaign against the project 
itself also came to light (fear of a hike in tariffs, unequal access, etc.). Some resident 
welfare organizations and opportunistic politicians have joined the contestation 
movement, which probably stems more from a feeling of general discontent. But
misunderstandings and the use of rhetoric on both sides have made everyone lose time 
and direction, and business-as-usual is the result. The case of Delhi illustrates how 
politically sensitive the water sector is to reform, particularly since the power sector is 
also facing a crisis and residents are fed up with inefficient public services. However, this
opposition also reflects the vested interests of the middle class as well as its will to
conquer political space and influence politicians. The first priority is to focus on public 
action reform and redefine the role of the different institutions involved in the 
governance of the water system. The key question is thus to find out the incentives that
would lead the government and public agencies to perform these new roles and become
accountable. It is certainly the main issue underlying the largely misleading public vs. 
private debate.
5 The objective is to achieve a 24x7 water scheme, first in some pilot zones.
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Alternative responses: An emerging conflict between present and future generations 
In most Indian cities, the distribution system is inequitable in the sense that many areas
are not served, including peripheral neighbourhoods (both rural and newly constructed 
dwellings) and many slums settlements.6 This is due to discontinuous spatial 
development and will probably persist along with the growth of the urban population. 
Both poor and well-off people are therefore affected by the lack of infrastructure or by
inadequate supply, but of course not in the same proportion vis-à-vis their respective
revenues.
In this context of highly inefficient public supply, people have developed compensatory
strategies, which we call ‘decentralized governance structures’; alternative modes of
supply have emerged, the social, economic and environmental sustainability of which is
questionable. They can be divided into two categories: formal and informal strategies. 
Formal strategies consist of relying on private operators, which sell water in large quantities 
via water tankers (containing around 12 cubic metres). Many people also buy bottled 
water and water in jars; however, such strategies are affordable only to high-income 
households. The major problem with these sources is that water quality is not 
guaranteed, and some opportunistic firms simply resell public water or sell untreated
groundwater. The absence of any regulation in this sector has enabled the emergence of
small companies with a short-term strategy. Such companies have taken advantage of a
booming market without investing in quality equipment and operate at a low cost.
On the other hand, companies that set up sophisticated production lines with a view to 
establishing themselves in the market on a long-term basis have complained of this unfair
competition. They are also dissatisfied with the high taxes imposed by the State 
Government in Delhi (bottled water is considered a luxury item) and favoured stricter 
regulations, which, as of 2002, had not been approved. So far, these private ventures, 
which are a direct result of the inefficiency of the public sector, have not been able to
come up with innovative solutions to provide services at affordable prices and to warrant 
the safety of water. The solutions they offer are only peripheral and temporary ones.
Informal strategies are external to any market structure. Poor and well-off households alike 
develop such strategies. Most of the time, the poorest people ‘free-ride’ on public water 
via illegal connections onto which they install cheap devices to pump water from the 
network. Higher-income households adopt more expensive strategies: some install 
electric pumps in order to pump more water from the network and get better pressure,
whereas others store water in rooftop tanks or dig tube-wells and rely on groundwater. 
The unsustainability of current arrangements
All compensatory strategies generate direct investment costs (storage facilities, motors,
filters, etc.). In 1995, in Delhi, the cumulated expense of households for such strategies 
6 Some of these have legal status while others result from illegal land occupation (squatter settlements). 
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was 6.5 times higher than what they pay directly to the public undertaking. Today, one 
can hypothesize that this figure is even higher. 
The aggregate cost of water unreliability at city level is equivalent to almost twice the
amount of the annual expenditure incurred by the former Delhi Water Supply and 
Sewerage Disposal Undertaking (Zérah, 2000). From an economic viewpoint, these
decentralized strategies are not the most efficient, and they are clearly not sustainable. 
Moreover, these private arrangements (formal and informal) also generate indirect costs
for society as a whole, as they contribute to the deterioration of existing infrastructure 
through unauthorized water connections. During service interruptions, contaminated 
water enters the network and increases the risk of waterborne diseases. Multiple 
unregistered private tube-wells deplete water tables. Finally, private arrangements 
aggravate the water shortage and congestion phenomena. In other words, a system of 
negative externalities becomes self-sustaining with a harmful impact on the environment 
and on users’ health. 
Yet storage solutions, rainwater harvesting and water supply via tankers may offer 
acceptable temporary solutions, provided that a well-defined regulatory framework is 
implemented and enforced, to avoid the present day chaos. Community participation in
the management of decentralized infrastructures could then help. Our work and other 
research suggest that the institutionalization of community participation mechanisms is 
desirable for at least three reasons. First, it would allow the additional costs of
compensatory strategies to be internalized and enable a more equitable redistribution 
system to be set up. Second, householders would be provided with an effective means
for ensuring that the infrastructure is properly maintained. Third, water resources would 
be more effectively managed by a demand-oriented approach and facilitating leak 
detection. Thus, access rights to water would be secured. 
However, this would require major institutional change and, in particular, the democratic 
representation of all interests, the setting up of agreed-upon negotiation procedures and
the abandoning of patronage relationships (Haider, 1997; Llorente, 2002). Current 
strategies are a response to an inefficient service administered by an incomplete 
institutional environment that is unable to provide suitable incentives. They are affected 
by the absence of formal rules, which results in a chaotic allocation of the resource.
Although they are not sustainable, the existence of such arrangements suggests that 
reform in the sector should be analysed in a systemic way and that consideration should 
be given to the opportunities offered by decentralized governance structures. By a 
systemic approach, we mean analysing all interaction between the agents, the resource 
and the institutional environment. In the case of water, this analysis reveals huge 
differences between developed and developing countries, which preclude the mere 
transposition of a contractual model without any other kind of consideration. 
The conflict as an adjustment tool: Cooperative action initiated by slum communities 
In this situation, aggravated by the lack of public financing, new approaches stress the 
role of community-based organizations, especially in the poorer districts. They are 
subject to several underlying assumptions. First, these much more flexible and innovative 
modes of organization can better meet demand in the poorer areas. Subsequently, within
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the context of public projects, it is more effective to let the users themselves take the
financial and technical responsibility for maintenance of the infrastructures (Nitti and 
Sarkar, 2003). In both cases, there is a positive feeling that the communities are more
capable of managing the problems of access at their own level. As a result, one can 
witness new forms of collective action, initiated by private individuals from 
disadvantaged communities, or by communities themselves, and by the public operators. 
These modes of service are still at the experimental stage in Indian towns but offer new
perspectives outside the trinomial of inadequate public service, individual compensatory
strategies and private lucrative niche markets.
Recent studies (Raghupathi, 2003) give an account of certain rather innovative practices
in a few Delhi slums. For instance, in an area where DJB’s water service is erratic, a
resident digs his own well, installs a powerful motor, and lays a rudimentary system of 
pipes through some nearby alleys. This ‘network’ can service about 200 households, for 
which the cost of individual connections amounts to the expenditure incurred on the 
necessary plumbing. The household also pays a monthly subscription, six or seven times 
higher than the cost of municipal water, but in return gains the advantage of a home 
service and neighbourhood service. In the area under study, such initiatives have 
multiplied, and this new type of service reaches a large section of the slum. In fact, the 
sums invested, often by taking a loan, are recovered in two years. Such an arrangement
confirms that households, even those that are the most impoverished, are capable of 
generating funds to pay for water, as many international and Indian studies have 
demonstrated. In this case, the process of commercialization emanates from within civil 
society itself: the enterprising players transform an individual solution into a common
alternative.
Other modes of supply owe less to private initiative than to genuine collective action, e.g. 
the gali or alley taps described by Tovey (2002) in a very detailed analysis of three slums.
Users contribute jointly to the installation and maintenance charges. A simplistic vision
would be to view these gali taps merely as the action of residents who have organized
themselves to dig channels and lay pipes for supplying water to a particular alley. This
would normally result in the proliferation of illegal connections, which is condemned by 
the authorities. However, when conducting a chronological analysis of the connections, 
the author highlights the role of political patronage and/or of local leaders as a triggering 
factor. Once the mechanism is operational, informal relationships come into play that
sanction and maintain these connections. These relationships can take different forms, 
depending on the type of area and the relationships developed by the local leaders. In 
each case, they involve different players (the police, local elected representatives,
parliamentarians and employees of DJB), and they mobilize a certain form of collective 
action. We are specifically concerned with the way in which regulations of the gali taps
are instituted at the resident level. According to Tovey (2002), the modus operandi that
all users have implicitly accepted largely depends on the local context of the resource,7 i.e. 
to the distribution of the resource and its mode of management. At several levels, it is
rooted in a hierarchical system of the attribution of rights. Households that contributed 
financially to the gali taps have priority. Residual rights are then granted to the tenants,
7 The soundness of the system (capacity to negotiate, settlement of disputes) is significantly correlated to
the absence of water problems. When water is scarce, the rules and conventions fall apart more quickly.
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then to households situated in the vicinity of the water points. The ultimately complex
system of gali taps demonstrates the usage value of water. But at the same time, and
especially when there is no shortage, all the players involved recognize the social value of 
water, which is not monetarily calculable. This explains the attribution of residual rights
to households not having contributed financially. In the same register, the police 
authorities, the elected representatives and the municipal employees generally justify their 
indulgence on humanitarian grounds, which is clearly highlighted by Tovey (2002).
Chennai: Expanding needs and growing conflicts with peri-urban users8
The Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board (Metro Water Board or
MWB) takes the sole responsibility of augmenting water supply and sewerage in the city 
as well as ensuring service provision. It was formed via a legal Act of 1978, and in 1987 
the Chennai Metropolitan Groundwater (Regulation) Act entrusted MWB to control 
abstractions and prioritize public water supply. The city of Chennai suffers from an acute 
water scarcity, in particular during low rainfall years. MWB supplies less than 50 per cent 
of the requirement of the city’s population, and in an irregular fashion at that (Ruet et al.,
2002). Groundwater then plays a crucial role in filling the gap,9 as seems to be the case in 
most Indian cities. (Zérah, 2000). However, the city’s groundwater is overexploited: its 
level has reached an alarming low, and in many places intrusion of seawater has been 
reported. This has affected its potability as indicated by a battery of indicators 
(Janakaranjan, 2005). 
So far, there has been no solution to overcome water crisis in Chennai. Mega projects
(which also involved inter-basin transfers), have been explored but seem too expensive. 
First and foremost, before launching mega projects, it is absolutely necessary to examine 
what is locally available. This question is particularly important, because the city’s rainfall 
is quite substantial (over 1,200 milimetres). Despite observed cyclical fluctuations like
anywhere else, over the past 100 years, no declining trend in rainfall has been observed. 
Nonetheless, the city continues to pump increasing amounts of groundwater in the 
periphery as it expands. 
The central role of peripheral groundwater in Chennai’s mode of supply 
For the past two decades, MWB has relied heavily on the transport of water from public 
wells and agricultural wells located in peri-urban villages. This impacts both local water
tables and living conditions and result in conflicts because of imbalance in the water 
equity between the city and peri-urban areas. In October 2004, MWB used around 6,000
tanker-trucks of 10, 12 and 20 cubic metres (m3) capacity to carry water throughout the 
city, in addition to the supply through the piped network. The present supply to Chennai
is about 103,000 m3/day. Water is pumped from well fields in Minjur, Panchetti and
other places into the system. Plans are also there to rent about 125 field wells around
Poondi to pump an additional 30,000 m3/day into the Red Hills water treatment plant.
Groundwater extraction from village common lands is not new; in 1969, MWB dug 10 
wells in the common lands of a nearby village to solve a water crisis in Chennai and 
8 Chennai (formerly Madras) is the capital of Tamil Nadu, a south India state.
9 Estimates for Delhi are of around 50 per cent. 
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transported water through pipelines. MWB also compelled farmers of many villages to
sell water from their irrigation wells, and many agreed.
It is interesting to note that a large share of this water is actually provided to a small
number of industrial users (Gambiez and Lacour, 2003). Yet, to convince reluctant
farmers, MWB put forward the needs of the thirsty urban dwellers. In fact, through a
rapid cost assessment based upon a study of two villages, Gambiez and Lacour made the 
point that profits were made by MWB by selling groundwater to these industrial users at 
a higher rate. Indeed, these industries, especially a cluster located in the north of Chennai, 
contribute a considerable share of MWB’s revenues (Ruet et al., 2002). This highlights 
the distorted allocative process of water, further leading to intra-urban conflicts. Among 
the approximately 6,000 private tankers in operation daily during the summer of 2005, 
not to mention those hired by MWB, the fraction supplying water to the city’s residents
is decreasing. A number of apartment buildings were prepared to pay the money, but the
quality of water was not assured. As industry sources point out, a number of fly-by-night
operators, most of them with just one lorry, got into the business, seeking good fast 
money. But with groundwater levels going down, water quality is suffering. According to
industry sources, a 12 m3 tanker of water is on average available for 450–600 rupies (Rs), 
depending on the area of supply and the periodicity with which water is required.10
In 2004, MWB paid well owners Rs 3.30 per m3 of water, whereas it charged urban 
consumers Rs 40 to 50 for the same quantity when supplied through tankers. It is alleged
that the huge price difference is due to increasing fuel and transport costs. Prices charged
by the private tanker operators are even higher, and can reach Rs 80 per m3. MWB also 
transports this water bought from farmers through pipelines, which turns out to be
cheaper. Altogether, according to official sources, MWB spends around Rs 300 million
each year to buy 200 million litres per day (mld) of water from various places. In summer
months, the amount is expected to go even higher. For privately opearated bottled, 
purified water, the amount is as high as Rs 50 per 25 litres or Rs 2000 per m3. Rs2 are 
being charged for 25-centilitre polythene water sachets. 
Impact on poverty and livelihoods 
From a resource perspective, the existing system looks more like a stop-gap policy. 
Groundwater is under threat, and there is a consensus to consider Tamil Nadu as one of 
the worst States in terms of underground resource degradation. Clearly, the way in which
urban water needs are met conflicts with environmental sustainability. Notwithstanding 
this fundamental dimension, we focus here on the socio-economic tensions generated by 
the overuse of peri-urban groundwater.
In one of the villages affected by this agreement, fieldwork carried out by Gambiez and 
Lacour (2003) has produced very interesting results. The authors distinguish three types
of farmers. The first type owns wells and sells its water to MWB. The second type does
not have wells and depends on the former to buy water and irrigate its fields. The third 
does not give its water to MWB and is not affected by the tripartite agreement. The
10 US $1 = 50 Indian Rupees
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authors assessed the evolution of agricultural practices and its consequences in terms of
income. The results show that the independent farmers, who serve as a reference group, 
suffered a slight fall in their income due to the reduction of the cultivated area. We can 
hypothesize that this trend is explained by the growing influence of the city, as can be
seen from the transformation of the peri-urban zones: a steady decline of agricultural 
employment had already been recorded in the last census. On the other hand, for the two 
other categories the evolution of both cultivated areas and incomes is very marked.
Between 2000 and 2001, farmers contracting with MWB reduced their cultivated area by
43 per cent. Out of the approximately thirty farmers selling water, only three, owners of
several borings, have maintained their previous level of activity. The others reduced their
cultivated area, as the sale of water is much more lucrative than agriculture: their revenue 
increased by 80 per cent between 1999 and 2002. Dependent farmers were the losers:
whereas fifteen farmers supplied water to them before 2001, only two of them have
maintained this relationship. This has resulted in a considerable reduction of the irrigated 
area and, in consequence, a substantial drop in income for the dependent farmers. This
arrangement, initiated by a public undertaking, highlights certain crucial issues of urban 
growth. Following the example of other metropolises (Kundu et al., 2002), the city of 
Chennai is expanding and developing by imposing new social and environmental costs. 
In-depth research carried out by Janakaranjan (2005) substantiates and reinforces the 
preceding results (see appendix). A comparison of present occupation with the situation
20 years ago in the selected villages, clearly shows that there has been a huge shift from
agricultural employment to non-agricultural employment. Similarly, the research also
highlights inter-village variations. On the whole, although the worst affected in terms of
lack of agricultural activity, one of the villages is doing better mainly because of 
availability of better alternate employment opportunities. This is correlated with 
locational advantage (proximity to Chennai) and connectivity factors (the village is on an
expressway).
A close look at these conflicts between city requirements and agricultural activities is very 
important in the Indian context, particularly because of rapid urban expansion. The 
conventional notion that cities are the engines of development needs much closer
examination. After all, there is a vicious cycle: declining agricultural activities and
ecological and environmental degradation compels people to migrate to cities; growth
of slums and pollution in turn results in stress on urban infrastructure, creating serious
problems for drinking water and sanitation. In order to cope with this pressure, cities 
expand in an unplanned manner, and this process goes on indefinitely (Janakarajan, 
2005).
Inefficiency of regulations 
These tensions occur despite a stringent regulatory system, with specific laws designed to 
curb the over-extraction of groundwater. However, in a sharply polarized political arena, 
the laws are twisted. The main example is the groundwater legislation in place in Tamil
Nadu.
By the mid-1980s, when the available sources of water supply to Chennai started
dwindling, a legislation was deemed necessary: the Chennai Metropolitan Area Ground
Water (Regulation) Act was passed in 1987. Its main features are as follows: (i) MWB is 
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entitled to grant or deny permits to sink wells in the designed area, and to grant or deny
licenses for extraction, use or transport of ground water, (ii) a database has to be 
maintained showing the number of wells that were in existence in the area, (iii) no person 
shall extract or use groundwater in the planned area for any purpose other than domestic
uses, and no person shall transport groundwater by means of lorry, trailer or any other 
goods vehicle. 
However, after almost two decades, the Government agency is the main violator of the 
Act. MWB has been mainly responsible for groundwater overdraft in many peri-urban 
villages. It draws groundwater from the identified areas but also from surrounding peri-
urban areas as far as 50 km away from the city limits, and its lorries run without license. 
Many private lorry-tankers are also drawing water up to 50 km from the city without any 
licence. Some of them complain that having applied for a permit or a licence a long time 
ago, they have not received any, and therefore they break the rule and supply water
mostly to industries. As concerns new well/borewell licensing, the procedure exists only 
on paper. Many industries are not only drawing groundwater in violation of the Act but
also degrading the quality of the groundwater. None of them have ever paid any penalty,
nor has MWB taken any stringent action against them. A more recent act has also been
passed as well as government resolutions. However, loopholes and weakness of 
implementation remain the same (Geetalakshmi and Janakaranjan, 2005). Indeed, India 
has a powerful set of legislation, but enforcement remains a major issue. Other conflict 
resolution mechanisms, such as Public Interest Litigation are not leading to policy 
implementation.
In the specific case studied here, even though in some cases, villagers are eager to sell 
water, the tension level between rural and urban interests is high. It can even lead to 
open conflict (see appendix). But mostly, there is clearly an asymmetry of bargaining 
power among actors. Local opposition raised by some villagers is not credible enough to 
stop powerful actors, backed up by the priority given to drinking water by National
Water Policy to supplement their water requirements with short term measures.
Is there a way out for peri-urban problems?
The critical question is how to reach the point where one can anticipate a win-win
situation, going from conflicts to cooperation. It is not easy to define this path, nor the 
time frame needed to travel through it. On the one hand, free riders are also politically 
and economically powerful; this group will lose if cooperation is attained. On the other
hand, present losers are vulnerable and therefore fatalists; this group would be willing
and more than happy to participate in dialogue and reach the level of cooperation, but 
can it speak up? Precisely for these reasons, it is not going to be easy to involve these 
diverse groups in a meaningful dialogue until one reaches a threshold level of crisis; but this
does not mean that one should not start the dialogue process beforehand. This is 
precisely where multi-stakeholders platform (MSP) and multi-stakeholders dialogue 
(MSD) play a key role (Janakarajan, 2005a).
MSP and MSD are important tools for achieving sustainable development anywhere 
individual rationality is in contradiction with collective rationality. While initiating a MSD
process, it is important to remember that dialogue is not a one-off phenomenon: it is a 
process, and it is time- consuming. A facilitator should not work with a finite time frame 
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and should have patience, be sufficiently motivated and be emotionally stable, in addition 
to having access to resources. And most of all, a MSD initiative will be successful only 
with the support of a democratically elected government.
MSD experience in Chennai and peri-urban water conflicts
Field research, followed by stakeholder analysis and then multi-stakeholder dialogue 
process was initiated in Chennai’s peri-urban area. A survey of sixty-four villages in 
different segments of the city’s peri-urban area helped not only to collect data and 
document ongoing conflicts, but also to build contacts with various stakeholders within
villages. Finally, the MSD process was initiated on negotiating and finding solutions to 
the city and peri-urban water conflicts.
Several local multi-stakeholder meetings were held from July 2004 to February 2005, 
which were attended by researchers, NGOs, farmers from peri-urban villages and some
government officials. Subsequently, after completing the meso-level survey in sixty-four
villages, two regional stakeholder workshops were held. These helped to build both 
knowledge of the situation and contacts. One of the main goals of the project was to
develop an MSD process. Furthermore, the regional meetings have helped to understand 
more about the socio-economic and political status of peri-urban stakeholders and the
extent of water transport and its implications on livelihood.
As soon as September 2004, a Round Table was organized in Chennai to set up a 65-
member multi-stakeholder committee of water users from urban and peri-urban areas:
farmers from peri-urban villages (both water sellers and non-water sellers), landless 
agricultural labourers, women self-help groups, NGOs, researchers, lawyers, urban water 
consumers and a few government officials. It was decided to include more members in 
the committee later. The first Committee meeting was held on 26 November 2004 in 
Chennai with full active participation of all members. Invited government officials came 
but refused to talk. The Committee met again on 4 February, 2005. It addressed several 
key issues, such as declining groundwater levels, declining agricultural activities, emerging 
serious livelihood problems, seawater intrusion, deteriorating water quality problems, 
water and soil pollution, drinking problems, sand mining and people’s growing unrest. 
The Committee agreed to work on the specific agenda within a given period and came up
with new ideas. 
Alternative solutions to Chennai water problems
It was agreed to first consider the availability of water resources from within the city. 
There are at least seventy temple tanks and ponds located in different parts of the city, 
which used to get filled during monsoon months. Now most of them are silted up, and 
supply channels have disappeared due to civil construction. One should restore all these
tanks to their original condition and re-capture rain and flood water during monsoon 
months. The simplest way would be to link storm water drains with these tanks; 
otherwise, huge amount of floodwater will wastefully flow into sewage drains or into the
city’s polluted rivers. This particular measure would not cost much compared what is




Second, the city generates about 700,000 m3/day of sewage, which is under-utilized. Only 
around 100,000 to 150,000 m3/day is supplied after primary treatment for industrial use 
by Chennai Petroleum and a fertilizer company called MFL. The rest is discharged into 
the city’s rivers, either untreated or after primary treatment. There is a scope for recycling
this water even for some domestic uses. At least 80 per cent of the sewage can be 
recovered and recycled; sludge has a very good commercial value and could be used as 
bio-manure after proper treatment. This means at least 500,000 m3/day of water can be
retrieved and supplied to the population, representing 70 per cent of the city’s domestic 
water requirements. Environmental engineering experts point out that the cost of tertiary
sewage treatment is cheaper than seawater desalination.
Third, according to old records, in the peri-urban areas around Chennai, there are 3,600 
tanks (in Tiruvallur and Kancheepuram, adjoining districts of Chennai) that are at present 
only partially used for agriculture. Many farmers have left their villages, or land has been
sold out for urban use. These tanks are mostly silted and encroached. There is an urgent 
need to revamp them, restore inlet channels, desilt them, strengthen bunds and restore
water supply during monsoon months. In other words, rainwater should be harvested in 
these tanks, if only to reduce farmers’ unrest in peri-urban villages: the steady decline of 
the water table causes seawater intrusion in several villages close to the coast. If tanks are
restored, groundwater levels in these villages will improve considerably; which will ensure 
better livelihoods through rejuvenated (and peri-urban) agriculture. Surplus water can be
diverted to help meet Chennai’s requirements. This is a clear win-win situation in
contrast to the present arrangement, where city benefits only on the short term and peri-
urban areas consistently lose out.
Fourth, new check dams in Araniar and Kosathaliar would help save more rain water. 
And, finally, water treatment and supply should be decentralized in order to cover both 
city and peri-urban areas more effectively and efficiently.
These proposals must be checked with additional research: a survey of all water bodies in
and around the city, an economic study of wastewater recycling, and feasibility studies of
check dams. This phase would necessarily require the State’s cooperation, in particular 
the support of agencies such as MWB, Tamilnadu Water Supply and Drainage Board
(TWAD board), farmers associations, NGOs etc. The MSD process points out the 
necessity of these measures, but we need to think seriously about how to implement 
them, within which time frame, with which community implication and with what public 
funding.
Conclusions
It should be stressed that a rationed water supply and an often inefficient service in the 
cities, together with the disregard of formal rules (that are moreover vague), lead various
users to a ‘pumping race’ and over-exploitation of the resource, through either individual 
or joint initiatives. All these decentralized solutions have a fairly high cost, despite water
being apparently free. Presently unsustainable, they have a potential for improvement, 
subject to several conditions. 
One concerns the institutionalization of community participation mechanisms. They are 
welcome for at least three reasons: it would help to internalize costs and facilitate the
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organization of a system of transparent redistribution; residents would actually be able to 
ensure the up-keep of the decentralized installations; it would facilitate a more effective 
management of the resource through the detection of leaks and better demand
management. Finally, the rights of access would be better ensured. This requires 
considerable institutional improvements, and in particular setting up consultation,
negotiation and, above all, regulation mechanisms.
Private markets for the resale of water are not sustainable in the long term, given the 
present state of affairs. The lax regulatory framework offers private operators, an 
opportunity to supply a private commodity at an excessive price without any guarantees 
of quality. Only can the most affluent households take advantage of this service, which 
ultimately contributes to the segmentation of the different categories of the population. 
These are provisional solutions that do not really meet the overall requirements of urban
management, nor of the resource. They reduce the scope for territorial equalization
systems or any other unifying mechanism specific to a public service monopoly.
These modes of organization reveal the incapacity of the institutional environment to
stop agents from carrying on, as most of the rules can be bypassed. In return, they 
cannot evolve much, being tuned to major malfunction and growing discontent. Each of 
the system’s factors is governed by its internal dynamics, without clear interaction with
others, which emphasizes the magnitude of the institutional deadlock. Thus we have a 
situation of tacit laissez-faire, which contributes to the depletion of the resource and the 
degradation of the infrastructures. 
The role of the institutional environment is, among others, to lay down the rules enabling
transactions to take place and at a lower cost, i.e. to ensure the transfer of rights that 
accompanies these transactions. In most Indian cities, several problems combine to 
exacerbate the bad management of water and infrastructures: poor coordination between 
various agencies, both vertically and horizontally, which results in erratic planning; 
political instability, which constitutes a permanent threat, holding the public hostage; the 
problem of corruption; and the judicial system, independent but overworked and unable
to enforce the rules. 
All these problems are, of course, very difficult to resolve, and we can only indicate the
goals that should be kept in view. This confers a very normative character to our 
propositions. The first goal should be the simplification of the institutional framework by 
redefining responsibilities in order to better coordinate the various decision levels, avoid 
the overlapping of tasks and limit the intervention capacity of discretionary powers. The
second stresses the concept of a democratic decision-making process in which all the 
interest groups in the system would be represented (from the infra-local level to that of 
the whole area), which would act like a broad-based regulatory framework. Lastly, we 
consider it essential to redefine the constituents of the public service and its articulation
in operational terms. This implies a reversal of the perspective, in the sense that the 
service should not be conceived in a technocratic top-down manner by imposing 
arbitrary norms, but rather in terms of the fundamental needs that should be met, taking 
into account the different systemic effects. 
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Appendix: Water conflicts in two peri-urban villages of Chennai city 
Palayaseevaram Village 
This village is located 50 km away from Chennai on the National Highway. Its population is
5,285 (2001 census). The village has witnessed a sharp increase in land value. 
Main irrigation surface sources and their command areas 
A series of tanks, spring channels; 5 kulams (small tanks used by villagers for non-irrigation
purposes, such as washing, etc.) and 4 kuttais (ponds used for washing cattle) 
Wells
In 1980, there were 71 wells with depths in the range of 24 to 27 feet. Now there are 150 wells
with a depth in the range of 60 to 100 feet; 50 are bore wells and the rest are open wells. At
present only 20 wells are in use. Quality of water is reduced as water table dropped.
Drinking water 
In 1990 drinking water was supplied for 5 hours per day vs only 1 hour per day in 2002. 
Background to conflicts
Original plan was to pump water from Palar River bed to supply to the adjoining areas of 
Chennai city. The estimated demand for this region was 22.5 mld in 1979. It has at least doubled
since then.
The people of Palayaseevaram village opposed this move on the grounds that it would affect 
groundwater availability. A memorandum was submitted to the District Collector. The matter 
was taken to the then Chief Minister, who took a decision in favour of the city and against the
village population. The CM sought the support of the village people, who eventually gave their 
consent to pump and transport the Palar water. The work was executed.
Originally in 1972, the TWAD Board dug 5 wells in the Palar bed. These wells are collection 
points of water in the riverbed. For the past 5 years, supply of water in these wells has been
reduced drastically, and 6 more wells were then dug in 2004 on the other bank of the river. The
main reason for decreasing availability in these wells is substantial and illegal sand mining in the
riverbed, much beyond permissible limits. This has drastically reduced the water withholding
capacity of the riverbed aquifer and groundwater availability in the village, even for drinking.
Agriculture is badly affected by the water scarcity
In the entire stretch in this region, groundwater was pumped in the years 2003-04 to supply water 
to the city; water was transported by MWB through tanker-trucks. Everyday, at least 2,500 loads 
were sold from these areas (1 load = 12,000 litres). This has also affected groundwater supply in
the Palayaseevaram village
A sugar mill was built in the year 1987 despite opposition from the village. It discharges a good 
deal of untreated effluents into a tank that is supposed to irrigate 423 acres. The sugar factory has
not only occupied and purchased land irrigated by the spring channel, the mill has also blocked
the water flow which eventually was supplying water to the Al Kondan tank. 
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Outbreak of Conflicts
MWB wanted farmers to sell water from their irrigation wells, and many farmers in the region
agreed. But as concerns Palayaseevaram village, the TWAD Board objected to this proposal,
claiming first-in-time rights, with 12 wells of their own. Therefore, the farmers of this village
were requested not to sell water. Only one sold water for one month.
How was the conflict represented? 
Several petitions and memorandums were sent to the government; NGOs organized a series of
demonstrations and issued public notices. They also organized a public hearing on the issue of
illegal sand mining in Chennai, which attracted considerable attention from the civil society and 
the media. Lawyers condemned the illegal sand mining and suggested that the Government
appoint a Committee to go into the details of damage done to the river and suggest ways to
protect it.
Mediatory/legal process: None
Outcome of conflicts: None
Present status
Passive struggle: people are absorbing the shock created by water depletion or leaving the village
for urban employment. Many have sold their lands (growing absentee landlords) and many more
are planning to sell land. The village is located on the main corridor linked to Chennai
Sand mining, like sugar mills, is a lucrative activity and has a powerful lobby with political
connections and threatens local people. There is both growth of non-farm employment, and
unavailability of farm labourers who find more gainful employment in non-farm activities.
Responses
The responses from media and civil society are encouraging, but the political parties are




This village is located at a distance of 50 km from Chennai city with a total population of 4,379.
Very high increase of land value.
Main surface irrigation sources and their command areas 
There are 2 Tanks, 2 Kulams and 1 kuttai.
Wells
In 1980, there were 280 wells with depths in the range of 50-80 feet. Now there are 220 wells and 
the depth is in the range of 130-160 feet. Quality of water is bad compared to 10 years ago. Until 
the mid-1960s, there existed only dug wells; borewells have become common after the
introduction of HYV technology in the region. Since 1990, dug wells have become literally 
useless; at least 60 dug wells are abandoned.
Drinking water 
In 2000, drinking water was supplied round the clock from 4 bore wells. In 2004 it was supplied
only 2 hours per day from a total of 12 bore wells. 
Background to conflicts
In 1969, 11 bore wells were installed to pump water from the common land of the village in
order to provide additional water to Chennai city and supply nearby industries. The estimated
water supplied from this village was 16 mld in 1969. In 2000, out of the 11 bore wells, 9 had
failed; since then, water has been purchased from farmers.
In the village, farmers sell water (40 mld) from a total of 75 wells, but out of these, only 55 were
working in the year 2004. Furthermore, the TWAD Board was planning to install 7 more bore 
wells in the common lands of Velliyur in order to supply water to Thiruvallur town; but due to 
farmers’ resistance, only 4 were actually commissioned. 
Groundwater availability considerably shrunk in the village, even for drinking. Agriculture has
been badly affected by water scarcity. Water sales from 75 irrigation schemes belonging to
individual farmers made things worse; landless labourers were forced to migrate; extensive and 
intensive sand mining activities also drastically reduced water yields in wells. The TWAD board
project which triggered-off conflicts.
Narration of conflict
The people of Velliyur village had remained quite passive for more than 3 decades. However,
when groundwater table decreased progressively, farmers had to spend substantial amounts on
deepening activities. This prompted the NGO that worked in the area to motivate the Self Help
Groups (SHGs) and other landless population. Subsequently, SHGs started to oppose water sales
in April 1995. SHGs insisted that the Panchayat should pass a resolution banning water sales
from Velliyur village, but the Panchayat did not do so since groundwater is pumped only from 
Government land. Since 2000, water is purchased from the farmers, which has led to severe 
water crises, impacting on agriculture and creating serious livelihood problems in the village. This
was precisely the reason why SHGs and the SC, ST population of the village prompted by the 
local NGO got themselves organized to oppose water sales and pressed for passing a resolution
in the Panchayat against water sales again. This time also, the Panchayat refused to pass a 
resolution on the grounds that it is individual farmers who sell water from their own land. Since
the property rights on groundwater are undefined nothing much could be done. 
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Some of the village residents filed a case in the court to ban water sales from the village. They
were successful in getting standing in court, but soon it was vacated through an appeal petition
filed by a water-seller supported by MWB. Under such duress, in the year 2003, almost all the
agricultural land was left uncultivated, and the labourers migrated in search of employment.
Meanwhile, there was sand mining by the government from the river Kosathalaiyar, which
drastically reduced the groundwater table. The farmers who were selling water took the sand
mining issue to the Metro water and informed them that water sales would be stopped if sand
mining was allowed. Metro water took the issue to the government and stopped sand mining. So
the labourers who were working in sand mining were affected and started opposing water sales
severely. The conflict was tense between the sellers and non-sellers and finally broke out in
August 2004. The entire village, apart from the sellers, asked the Panchayat to pass a resolution to 
ban water sales and resorted to road blockages. The Metro water officials, RDO, Thasildar and
some other officials arrived at the scene and tried to solve the issue. Since the entire village was
against water sales, a peace committee was formed consisting of water-sellers, non-sellers, SHGs
and officials. During the peace committee meeting, it was decided to stop the water sales from 
farmers to MWB after 15 September 2004. Everyone including the MW officials, sellers, non-
sellers and all other villagers agreed to abide by this decision. After the peace committee decision, 
the entire issue was put into cold storage until 14 September 2004. On 15 September, MW
officials reported that water purchases would not be stopped, since their own higher authorities
did not accept the agreement reached at the Peace Committee meeting. Water-sellers were also
willing to sell water. In the meantime, water sellers tried to sway the court and obtain stay from
the court against the decision taken during the peace committee meeting. Since the non-sellers
had a doubt that the sellers might seek legal protection, they also moved the court to get a stay on
water sales. It was an unsuccessful move for both sellers and non-sellers. On the evening of 15
September 2004, a notice was issued to the villagers by the sellers stating that the non-sellers who 
were objecting to the sales are rich and were trying to fool the poor people, and that they had
encroached upon the common lands and were cultivating land that could have been given to the 
poor people if the non-sellers had real concern for the poor. This notice had no effect.
Since water pumping was not stopped by 16 September 2004, the entire village was gathered near 
the sump from which water was pumped. The road was blocked. Though the officials (including
the RDO, Thasildar and MW engineers) arrived, they did not agree to stop water purchases. At
this point in time, some people from the agitating group broke the pipeline structures which
belonged to MWB. After this violent protest from people, the police arrested 47 people
belonging to Velliyur and filed a FIR. They were booked under the Public Property Damaging
Act. MWB requested the court to order Rs.30,000 in damages towards compensation for 
breaking their infrastructure. The court also instructed the arrested farmers to pay the
compensation. They were released on bail, and the case is pending.
Present status 
Water selling was stopped. Again MW officials are asking farmers to sell water, and some of them
are willing to sell. MW has posted a notice and even circulated it among the farmers, stating that 
whoever is willing to sell water can approach the MW to have an agreement for one year and that
the tender should be submitted before 22 February 2005. But to date, water sales have not
started.
Responses
The responses from media and civil society and the political parties are encouraging. The present
MP (DMK) of the Sriperumbudur constituency visited the village and asked the police to release 
the arrested persons immediately, stating that the public has the right to question and that the
government had failed to keep the promises made in the peace committee meetings, which
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Introduction: Watering Jakarta 
In contrast to many other Asian cities, Jakarta has relatively little water supply and waste-
water disposal infrastructure and is characterized by lower rates of urban services 
provision than other national capitals. The World Bank characterizes its water and
sanitation sector as one of the weakest in Asia (Brennan and Richardson, 1989; 
Leitmann, 1995; McGranahan et al., 2001; World Bank, 2004). The official (generous) 
estimate is that 56 per cent of the city’s residents are connected to the network (Jakarta 
Water Supply Regulatory Body, 2004).1 The water delivered through the network is not 
potable; medical studies repeatedly find faecal coliform contamination, and residents are
advised to boil their water.
In a strategy openly backed by international financial institutions, the Indonesian 
government has adopted a twinned strategy to improve the water supply sector: private 
sector participation and water law reform. Government support for private sector 
involvement in the water supply sector has been articulated as a means of attracting 
increased private investment and increasing connections for the urban poor. In addition,
the government has enacted broad-based market-oriented water sector reform, including 
the controversial new Water Law (supported by the World Bank as conditionality for 
refinancing) establishing tradable water rights and redefining water as an economic good 
1 Figure calculated using 2002 data from annual reports of the two private concessionaires operating in 
Jakarta. This was cross-referenced with ADB (2003b), which reports a figure of 51.2 percent. Coverage 
ratios should be understood as rough estimates; their calculation is dependent upon a number of variables
that are only imprecisely measured, such as urban population and average household size. Reported figures 
vary significantly and do not indicate the number of households that have a connection but rely primarily
on other sources (e.g. groundwater) due to quality or service concerns (e.g. low pressure).
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(Jakarta Post, 2003; World Bank, 1999; 2004b; 2005). NGOs and civil society groups 
have launched campaigns and court cases against the new Water Law, arguing that water 
is a human right. Advocates of water supply – notably many government officials – insist 
that the (foreign) private sector is the only reliable source of expertise and finance. They 
contend that water is a service like any other, which requires rationalization and efficient 
management and support the commodification of water implied by the new law. These 
developments are in line with the evolution of governance frameworks internationally 
over the past two decades, in which state authority has been increasingly delegated to 
non-state (usually private sector) actors (Pierre, 1995; 2000; Rogers and Hall, 2003). This 
is characteristic of neoliberal framings of solutions to environmental problems (for 
recent critiques of neoliberal approaches to water, see Bakker, 2005; Goldman, 2005;
Haughton, 2002; McDonald and Ruiters, 2005; and Swyngedouw, 2005).
As discussed in the following sections of this paper, a number of other conflicts have
arisen over water supply in Jakarta: social, economic, and environmental. The private 
sector participation contract signed in 1998 has been an important source of conflict, 
actively contested by NGOs and consumers. Conflict has arisen between the private 
company, the municipal government and the regulator over water prices and tariffs.
Labour unrest, due to conflicts between water industry workers and the two private 
concessionaires, has also flared up. Underlying these conflicts is a severe environmental 
inequity, in terms of access to clean, potable water for the city’s residents.
Going Private: Conflict over the water supply concession contract for the City of 
Jakarta
Proponents of private sector participation (PSP) in water supply have argued that PSP is
a means of improving service delivery to the poor (see, for example, Cross and Morel, 
2005; Nickson and Franceys, 2003),2 critical in a world in which an estimated one billion 
people – the ‘unserved’ in development jargon – lack access to safe, sufficient water 
supplies (WHO, 2000). Specifically, through efficiency gains, improved management, and
better access to finance than public utilities, private companies improve performance 
(including cost recovery rates) and increase access through extending networks and
providing new connections to previously ‘unserved’ customers. This benefits the poor,
particularly in urban areas, who are often served by a variety of informal arrangements, 
such as water vendors, and typically pay much higher prices per unit volume for poorer 
quality water than wealthier consumers (Johnstone and Wood, 2001; Shirley, 2002; World 
Bank, 1994; 1997; 2004a).
Opponents of private sector participation argue that PSPs are not reliable mechanisms to 
supply water services to the poor, because private companies are unable to supply the 
poor on profitable terms. As proof, critics point to the withdrawal of the private sector
from contracts and regions of the world, in light of risk-return ratios that have remained
2 See, for example, the Global Water Partnership (http://www.gwpforum.org/) and the World Water
Council (http://www.worldwatercouncil.org/), two influential networks of private water companies,
governments and lending agencies. The Business Partners for Development links the World Bank with
private water companies and governments, and ‘aims to produce solid evidence of the positive impact’ of
PSPs (http://www.bpdweb.org).
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unacceptably high (Hukka and Katko, 2003; Smith, 2002),3 in part because of the low 
‘ability to pay’ of poor consumers. Moreover, some critics argue that the potential
contributions and sustainability of private sector involvement will be undermined by
political conflict and civil society resistance to PSPs arising from the belief that water is a
human right. Indeed, mobilization of social movements in opposition to PSPs has 
occurred in many countries, at times resulting in the cancellation of contracts by 
governments (e.g. La Paz and Cochabamba, Bolivia). In other cases, such as Manila, the
opposition of social movements has factored into the decision of the private company to 
withdraw (Barlow and Clarke, 2002; McDonald and Ruiters, 2005; Shiva, 2002; Trawick,
2003; Swyngedouw, 2005; Wateraid, 2003). Many of these critics argue that PSPs are not 
ethically appropriate, and call for the management of water as a commons, often with
reference to idealized models of indigenous water governance. Even where critics agree 
in principle to the management of water by the private sector, they argue that political
conflict over the socio-economic identity of water will further elevate risks and decrease 
the likelihood of the private sector being able to supply the poor on a profitable basis.
The private sector participation contract in Jakarta 
These debates between proponents and opponents of private sector involvement have 
been acute in Jakarta. The private sector participation contract signed in 1998 with two
international operators promised to improve water quality, mobilize international finance 
for network expansion and thereby improve and increase access to water supply for 
Jakarta residents – particularly the poor. As documented in this section, however, key 
original performance targets have been dramatically scaled back, and new connections
have not been pro-poor. Tariff pricing (with lower tariff bands below marginal costs), 
decided by the municipal government in negotiation with concessionaires, is implicitly 
‘anti-poor’, providing a disincentive to both the municipality and the private 
concessionaires to connect the poor. The physical layout of the network, which is 
spatially concentrated in wealthier areas of the city – a legacy of public sector 
management – is an additional barrier to connecting the poor.
Moreover, poor users have multiple disincentives to connect to the network. Total costs 
of networked water supply may be higher than alternative sources (such as groundwater
or water bought from vendors). Other disincentives include insecure tenure, the need for
flexibility of payment, convenience, status and high ‘transaction costs’ associated with 
dealing with the formal water utilities. ‘Transaction costs’ – infrastructure costs to build 
storage because networked water supply is only intermittent; line-ups and time off work 
to pay bills (for those without bank accounts and regular income); fear of time required 
to deal with mis-read meters and over-charging – are other disincentives. 
Jakarta’s government exhibited a heightened interest in the urban environment and
services provision in the 1990s, as typified by the then-governor’s favourite slogan for 
3 For academic studies critical of the privatization process with a focus on developing countries, see the
Municipal Services Project website (http://qsilver.queensu.ca/~mspadmin). For an international public
sector union perspective, see the very comprehensive PSIRU website (http://www.psiru.org). For a 
campaigning NGO perspective, see the Council of Canadians Blue Planet Project




Jakarta: ‘Bersih, Manusiawi, Wibawa’ (Clean, Humane, Powerful) (Leaf, 1996). Concerns
about the poor level of service in the water sector had persisted for decades, and water
shortages and water quality problems were perceived to be increasingly acute (Berry,
1982; Lovei and Whittington, 1993; Gilbert and James, 1994; Indonesia Times, 1996).
One response (in Jakarta as in other Indonesian cities) was limited private sector 
participation: out-sourcing of routine repairs, billing and payment collection by Jakarta’s
water supply utility, PAM Jaya (Mandaung, 2001). Water supply was one of many PSP 
initiatives ongoing in the country; the Indonesian government had passed legislation 
enabling private sector participation and privatization for most public sector utilities in 
the mid-1990s, and had embarked on private ventures in various sectors over the past
decade, for example privately funded toll highways throughout the greater Jakarta area.4
Discussions regarding a long-term PSP concession contract with foreign firms began in 
the mid-1990s. International water companies were keenly interested in entering the 
water services market in Indonesia, as a large, middle-income country with an expanding 
middle class and relatively low penetration of networked water supply services. After 
protracted negotiations, ‘cooperation agreements’ for the management and expansion of
Jakarta’s water supply system were awarded in late 1997 to two of the largest water
services companies5 in the world: (British) Thames Water International and (French) 
Ondeo (Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux). The process of awarding the contract for Jakarta’s 
water supply was characterized by what the political science literature defines as ‘collusive 
corruption’, where government and private sector officials collude to deprive the 
government of revenues (Bardhan, 1997; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). This occurred 
instead of a public tendering process, where international water companies put forward 
unsolicited proposals directly to the government. Under then-President Suharto, 
partnership with an Indonesian firm was a prerequisite for international corporations 
hoping to take over the operations of a utility network. This is not unusual in the 
international water supply sector, in which private sector consortia typically have local 
minority shareholders. In the case of Indonesia, however, these private sector consortia
were frequently linked directly to the President. By the early 1990s, the large Indonesian 
conglomerates had ‘already [become] active within other public service areas, and these
groups expected to benefit from the privatization of water services’ (Baye, 1997). The 
two international firms were partnered with two local private firms, respectively members
of two of the most important conglomerates in Indonesia: Salim Group (run by Bob 
Hassan, a crony of then-President Suharto) and Sigit Group (run by Sigit Harjojudanto, 
Suharto’s eldest son).6
4 Private sector participation contracts in water supply have been signed in several other Indonesian cities:
Bali, Batam, Medan, Lhok Seumawe, Sidoarjo and Pekanbaru (Baye, 1997; ADB, 2003). 
5 Sanitation services were not included in the contract and remain the responsibility of the various 
municipalities that make up the greater Jakarta area.
6 Corruption in Indonesia is internationally recognized as being particularly pervasive (Transparency
International). ‘Market consumption’ and ‘parochial consumption’, where the latter hinges on kinship, 
caste, etc. and the former on wealth, (Scott, 1969) were conflated in a system that came to be known in 
Indonesia by the triad of ‘Corruption, Collusion, Nepotism’ popularized as an acronym (Korupsi, Kolusi dan 
Nepotisme or KKN) which came to symbolize the Suharto regime (Robertson-Snape, 1999). That the
contracts were awarded despite national laws prohibiting foreign investment in drinking water delivery
(Law No. 1/1967; Ministry of Home Affairs Decision No. 3/1990) and local regulations (No. 11/1992 and 
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In January 1998, each consortium signed a 25-year contract with PAM Jaya, the 
municipal water supplier in Jakarta, which retained ownership of the water supply assets.
The private consortia were to be responsible for the operation of the water supply 
system, including the administration of the customer database and billing. Thames’ 
contract allocated the local partnership, Thames PAM Jaya (TPJ), the exclusive right to 
operate and manage the existing water supply system in the eastern half of the city,7
supplying 2 million people connected to the supply system out of a potential customer 
base of 5 million. Simultaneously, Lyonnaise des Eaux’s subsidiary, Palyja, was given a 
contract to supply the western half of the city (see Figure 1), covering a slightly larger 
number of potential customers. Ambitious targets were set: the private companies
committed to reaching universal coverage by 2023 and to supply potable water to
consumer by 2007. 
Figure 1: Water Supply in Jakarta 
No. 11/1993) precluding private sector involvement in community drinking water supply was to be a 
source of conflict in the early years of the contract (Argo and Firman, 2001). 
7 Indonesia Times. 1998. Privatised water supply begins soon, 16 January, p. 3.
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The contracts were expected to be lucrative for both the local and international partners.
Under the terms of the contract, this profit was not to be linked directly to the revenues
of the municipal water supply system. Instead, each consortium was to receive a fee on
the basis of volume of water supplied and billed, not on the basis of the water tariff (set 
by the municipality) or the percentage of cost recovery. With no direct equity stake, and 
with profit de-linked from cost-recovery rates, the international water companies thus
sought to minimize the risk inherent in cost-recovery. An additional safeguard was built
into the payment mechanism: an indexation formula, linked to the rupiah-US dollar
exchange rate and the (Indonesian) inflation rate was built into the ‘water charge’ formula 
used to determine payments made to the private operators – who are paid according to 
unit volume of water delivered to the distribution network, rather than billing revenue. 
Cost recovery and currency risks, in other words, were to be borne by the local 
government.
Re-regulation: Tariffs, profits, and conflictual re-negotiation of the contract 
The political and economic turmoil that unfolded in Indonesia in 1998 vitiated these
strategies. Riots, the resignation of Suharto, and the abrupt and dramatic devaluation of
the Indonesian rupiah8 threw the country into a period of chaos. After a tense interlude
in which senior expatriate managers of the private concessionaires fled the country, local 
managers cancelled the PSP contracts, and senior British and French executives and 
diplomats pressured the federal government to have the contracts reinstated, the private 
concessionaires resumed operations (having discreetly abandoned their Indonesian
partners, now tainted by their association with ex-President Suharto) (Harsono, 2005).
Confronted with public protest over rising prices of staple food items and gasoline, the 
municipal government refused to raise tariffs to compensate for the devaluation of the 
rupiah (Rp). In theory, his delay in tariff increases should not have posed any difficulties 
for the private water companies, as revenues are determined by a ‘water charge’ paid per 
unit volume of water delivered into the network. This means that revenue of the private 
operators is not linked to amounts billed or collected from consumers. In other words,
the revenue of the private concessionaires is, in theory, independent of cost-recovery as
well as tariffs. Indexing the water charge to the rupiah-US dollar exchange rate provided 
protection against currency devaluation; should the rupiah fall in value, the water charge
(expressed in rupiah), would rise accordingly. 
The limitations of this strategy were revealed when receipts in dollar terms plummeted 
from 1998 onwards. Given the political unrest in Jakarta, the Governor was unwilling to 
implement agreed-upon tariff increases. The gap between the water charge required for 
compensating the private companies and the average water tariff increased dramatically.
Whereas the water charge paid to the private operators was 11 per cent below the average 
tariff in 1997, it rose to over 60 per cent above the average tariff in early 2001. Subsequent 
tariff increases did not raise the tariff above the water charge until early 2004 (Jakarta
Water Supply Regulatory Body, 2004). The result was that the amount charged by the 
private concessionaires – via the water charge – to the government increased 
dramatically, while revenue fell just as dramatically. PAM Jaya (and thus the local 
8 From approximately 2,300 Rupiah/US $1 in 1997 to 10,000 Rupiah/US $1 in 1998. 
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government) bore the risk for the revenue shortfall, and became increasingly indebted to 
the private companies. The cumulative deficit by the end of 2001 was Rp 469 billion
(approximately US $46 million) and had reached Rp 990 billion (approximately US $97
million) by September 2003 – excluding late payment interest and retroactive tariff 
increases (Jakarta Water Supply Regulatory Body, 2005).
The time period for repayment of this debt by PAM Jaya is likely to be protracted. With
the fall in the value of the rupiah, its operating revenues fell approximately four-fold in 
dollar terms. PAM Jaya’s revenue can be expected to be on the order of Rp 400 billion 
per year (approximately 5 per cent of the outstanding ‘debt’). The negotiated annual tariff 
increases are likely to be less than 10 percent. Thus, although tariffs were raised and will
continue to increase, these increases will not generate sufficient revenue to quickly repay 
the ‘shortfall’. By mid-2001, the prospect of slow repayment of the still increasing ‘debt’ 
provoked a renegotiation of the contract, transforming it into a management contract –
with a guaranteed internal rate of return of 22 per cent – rather than the original
concession agreement.9 Technical targets have been dramatically scaled back (see Table 
1); most notably, the commitment to provide potable water supply at the point of 
consumption was dropped. 
Water workers united: labour-led protests and unrest 
Prior to the initiation of the concession contract, employment at PAM Jaya fluctuated 
between 1,100 and 1,200 full-time (equivalent) employees. The cooperation agreement 
signed in 1997 between PAM Jaya and the private operators allowed for the secondment
of employees to help TPJ and Palyja run water facilities on the production and 
distribution side. Of these, between 800 and 900 employees were permanent and on
direct contract, with the remaining 200 to 300 on yearly contracts. Secondment
arrangement like this one are quite common in PSP contracts in developing countries; 
local employees retain their jobs while the (often foreign) concessionaire obtains required
local expertise and language skills. 
The secondment arrangement has given rise to concerns on the part of employees with 
respect to their status and benefits. PAM Jaya is a municipally owned company,10 subject 
to the relatively restrictive labour legislation applying to the public sector. Confronted 
with what a perceived surplus of employees (relatively frequent in public utilities in 
developing countries), and prevented from firing those who remained nominally civil
service employees, TPJ and Palyja re-assigned staff to PAM Jaya, while complaining to 
the municipality of the rigidity of the labour laws and weak sanctions available to the
private concessionaires against poor performance. The civil service employees, on the
other hand, resented being excluded from day-to-day operations, particularly as new 
private sector employees – with higher salaries and sometimes benefits like company cars 
– were hired directly by the private concessionaires. By mid-May 2000, labour relations 
had degenerated significantly; ten of fourteen offices were vandalised by employees, who
9 As with many such contracts, profits are ‘backloaded’. The Internal Rate of Return is calculated over the
lifetime of the contract and is, to date, negative.
10 The formal category is BUMD (Badan Usaha Milik Derah) which loosely translates as a ‘local state-owned 
company’, the owner in this case being the municipality.
119
Urban Water Conflicts
refused to work and instead vandalized offices, took operational computers and
threatened employees who decided to continue working.11 Some office doors were even
welded shut, as the union demanded cancellation of the contract. Employee protests
continued throughout 2000.12 Company managers accused workers of acting to protect 
lucrative and corrupt practices entrenched in PAM Jaya’s billing and subcontracting 
practices; these accusations were countered by accusations of corruption on the part of
the foreign water companies in tendering and, of course, the original bidding process. In 
the context of endemic corruption in Indonesia with recognized effects on urban
management (see, for example, Server, 1996), these unproven allegations were mutually
damaging yet unsurprising.
Prior to Suharto’s eventual departure, labour relations were worsening and the political 
situation in the country was deteriorating. Widespread political unrest led the expatriate 
staff to flee the country, and the municipality declared that the contract had been
cancelled. Against the backdrop of political unrest and the generalized backlash against 
foreigners, protests by the local water company staff grew increasingly vehement. Protest
peaked in 2000, with union members demanding cancellation of the contract, staging 
public protests, physically closing neighbourhood kiosks and company offices, and even 
welding the doors of company offices shut. The municipal government’s adoption of a
middle-ground position, refusing to raise water tariffs (despite a contractual obligation to 
do so) while also refusing to cancel the contract, was a key factor in dampening union 
protests. Although work slowdowns were still in place in 2001, strikes action had tapered
off. The union continues to attempt to undermine the water companies by using 
‘weapons of the weak’, to use Scott’s term (1969), disseminating information that 
counters the claims of the water supply concessionaires regarding investment,
performance and profit.
Connecting the poor? Conflict over tariffs and pricing 
Implicit in the original target of 100 per cent service coverage and explicit in public 
justifications of the PSP contracts, was the belief that private sector participation in water
supply would lead to a higher rate of connection of poor households. Service coverage
has increased since 1998, but the distribution of new connections has not been ‘pro-
poor’, if this is defined as a rate of connection equal or greater to the percentage of poor 
in the urban population. This has led to an increase in consumer protest, including court 
challenges brought against the municipal water utility (highly unusual in a society that was 
characterized, until the fall of Suharto, by an authoritarian style of governance in which
consumers’ rights were not articulated through the legal system).
An important goal of the original concession agreement was the extension of the 
network and increase in coverage, for which targets were specified in the original 
contracts. By 2002, however, service coverage for both concession areas remained just 
above 50 per cent, well below the 70 per cent target specified for 2002 in the initial 
contract (Global Water Report, 2002) (see Table 1). New connections have occurred, but 
these have not targeted poor customers in proportion to their representation in the urban 
11 Jakarta Post 16 May 2000. 
12 Jakarta Post 19 Oct 2000.
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population. Figure 2 illustrates the disproportionate weighting of consumer connections 
in middle-income tariff bands in 2003; whereas the majority of residents in Jakarta would 
fall into the ‘lower middle’ and ‘low income’ categories, 87 per cent of networked
connections are provided to tariffs for middle-income households or above. This is, to 
some extent, the legacy of public sector management, attributable to unwillingness by the 
municipally-managed utility to extend the network into poor areas, due to fears about 
low cost recovery (Taylor 1983). It is also due to a tariff pricing policy in which water
rates for public hydrants (used by poor households and water vendors) was higher per
unit volume than water rates for individual households – implying a reduction in revenue 
when a poor household was connected to the network (Crane 1994). 
Table 1: Service coverage for TPJ and Palyja
This legacy of the public sector under-provision of individual household connections to 
poor customers was not, however, redressed by the private concessionaires. Table 2 
provides data on the numbers of new consumers connected in each tariff band by TPJ
between 1998 and 2004. Only 25 per cent of new connections were targeted in the two 
lowest tariff bands (public hydrants, intended to serve those without household
connections; and ‘poor’ and ‘very poor’ households). In other words, three quarters of 
new connections were for middle-income and upper-income households, government 
enterprises and commercial enterprises.
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Figure 2: Customer connections and tariff bands 
Table 2: Tariff groups and new connections 
Given that the private concessionaires are paid via a ‘water charge’, which is linked to 
volumes of water delivered into the water supply system but independent of revenues 
and tariffs, this bias towards wealthier consumers might seem surprising. There is no
apparent direct disincentive to the private concessionaires to connect low-income 
households. Why, then, were customers in the lowest tariff bands less likely to be 
connected? An important part of the explanation lies in the pricing levels of the tariff 
bands (Table 3). The lowest tariff (May 2005 data) is Rp 550 per cubic metre (m3), well 
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below the production cost (of approximately 3,000 m3)13. Increasing the number of 
connections in the lowest tariff band thus decreases the average revenue per cubic metre 
supplied. Reducing the average revenue per cubic metre by connecting poor households 
would lower the municipality’s revenues, in turn reducing their ability to pay the water
charge, and to repay the debt shortfall owed to the private operators.
Table 3: Tariff band pricing 
A secondary disincentive is the higher average cost per connection in poor 
neighbourhoods, which raises installation costs: given the lack of land-use planning in 
informal settlements, the highly dense and disordered distribution of homes means that
installing connections may be more time-consuming (if conventional underground 
infrastructure is used). 
The municipality thus has two direct incentives not to target poorer neighbourhoods for 
new connections. This is an important explanation for why the utility, when under public 
management, did not connect poor customers. In turn, this produces an indirect 
disincentive for the private operators to connect poor customers: the revenue received by
the municipality is the source of funds from which the private operators are paid, and
decreasing revenues imply a greater chance of debt, a longer repayment period and an 
increased possibility of municipal default. 
The disincentives built into Jakarta’s water supply tariff structure are an example of how
pricing strategies intended to increase access may have the opposite effect (Whittington,
1992). The remedy, as most commonly prescribed by international financial institutions,
is to increase tariffs (a seemingly counterintuitive strategy), thereby removing the 
disincentive for connecting poor consumers and providing more capital to finance new 
connections (Azdan, 2001; Yepes, 1999). This recommendation is supported by studies, 
which assert that ‘willingness-to-pay’ and ‘ability-to-pay’ of poor customers is higher than 
previously thought. Frequently, the higher rates per unit volume paid by poor customers 
relying on water vendors are cited as evidence for this argument (Soto Montes de Oca et 
al., 2003; Winpenny, 1994). Indeed, the response to the problem of low tariffs in Jakarta
has been a series of negotiated tariff increases, which have disproportionately raised 
tariffs for poorer and middle income groups (Table 3).
This, in turn, raises a more general point about water pricing, pertaining to the limits of
cross-subsidisation within a water-pricing regime in cities like Jakarta with a large 
13 Interview with Alizar Anwar, Advisor to the Jakarta Regulatory Body, May 2005. 
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proportion of poor residents. With a ratio of domestic to industrial customers of 4 to 1 
and with relatively few users in higher tariff bands, possibilities for cross-subsidies in 
Jakarta are relatively limited. This suggests that in the absence of subsidies external to the
water supply pricing regime – as are used in Chile, and were used in OECD
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries like the UK 
(Bakker, 2004; Gomez-Lobo, 2001) – raising tariffs will not necessarily result in increased 
revenues and increased connection rates for the poor. As discussed in the following 
section, additional measures to reduce or remove disincentives for poor customers to
choose network connections will also be required.
The failure to connect poor customers and the renegotiation of the contractual targets 
for connections have been the target of sustained critique by Jakarta-based NGOs, such 
as WALHI (Indonesian Forum for the Environment), Kruha, the Indonesian 
Consumer’s Association and the Urban Poor Forum. These groups have launched 
campaigns using the media, direct action protests, testimonials from poor communities 
and a civil suit against the municipality of Jakarta and water companies, contesting the 
legality of tariff increases. The emergence of water as a conflictual issue in this regard is 
striking; interviews during a research visit in 2001 indicated that no NGOs in Jakarta 
thought water supply was a major issue, whereas it was the most high-profile and hotly 
contested issue for most of the same NGOs in 2005. 
The controversial response by private companies and international financial institutions 
Recognizing some of these barriers to connecting the poor, both private concessionaires
have undertaken limited initiatives to improve access for poorer households. To render 
in-house connections more affordable, Palyja introduced a policy allowing poorer 
households (on the lowest tariff bands) to pay the connection fee in monthly instalments
included in the monthly water bill.14 Partly as a result of this, in West Jakarta, the number
of poor people served increased from 72,816 in February 1998 to 177,164 in December
2000 (ADB, 2003a), but monthly bills remain at a level above what many households can
afford. In the eastern concession area, the community of Marunda was targeted by TPJ, 
which used a grant from its British parent company to subsidize the provision of in-
house connections. Fewer than 500 households were connected; to facilitate payment, 
connection fees were waived and households were instead required to pay a deposit of 
approximately US $2.50 (ADB, 2003a). Levels of water consumption have reportedly
increased dramatically, while water bills have fallen substantially (ADB, 2003a). Prior to
the concession contract, households in Marunda District generally received their water 
from private vendors who purchased water from tankers. Households used to spend, on 
average, US $7.50 a month for 3 m3 of water (five 20-litre containers per day, at US $0.05
a container); now they pay approximately US $1.125 for 30 m3 of water (at US $0.0375 
per m3 – most customers being on a low tariff, reflecting the small size of their 
dwellings), consuming 10 times as much water but paying approximately one-seventh of
their previous monthly bills, which is partly the reason for the high levels of cost
recovery from the newly connected households (BPD, 2003). Recognizing the limited 
14 The pro-rated monthly connection fee of US $0.71 is included in the monthly water bill. A household
consuming 20 m3 of water a month will thus have a monthly bill of about US $1.50 (US $0.0375 x 20 + 
$0.71).
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penetration of water supply network into poor neighbourhoods, the federal government
launched a water supply programme in some of the poorest kampungs in 2004,15 but the
provision of household connections was severely limited by the disincentives discussed 
above, compounded by an unwillingness of private partners to extend the network in 
conjunction with the government and by suspicion on the part of some public sector 
managers that publicly-provided infrastructure would end up providing implicit subsidies 
to the private sector (Shofiani, 2005). 
Given, however, the high level of indebtedness of the municipal water utility to the 
private concessionaires, little interest has been shown on the part of the private 
companies in extending what are essentially charitable, loss-making initiatives. 
Accordingly, these ‘pro-poor’ initiatives have remained limited in scope and have not 
been duplicated elsewhere in the city. Without an explicit ‘pro-poor’ policy on the part of 
the Government and in the absence of specific pro-poor targets in the contract, new 
connections in poorer areas are likely to lag in proportion to the overall increase in new
connections for the reasons discussed above. Recognizing this, donors have begun re-
funding community water supply in Jakarta. The American bilateral aid donor USAID, 
through its Environmental Services Program (with a budget of US $40 million over five 
years), is funding decentralized small-scale community water supply systems in West Java, 
including Jakarta. These community systems will not connect users to the network, but
will rely on alternative technologies. The World Bank has approved a US $5 million of 
‘output based aid’ concessional loans for expanding network coverage in Jakarta.16 With 
an explicitly ‘pro-poor’ focus, this latter project provides cheap capital to the two
concessionaires to connect the poor.
This, in turn, raises questions about the long-term ability of PSP contracts to supply
water to the poor. Similar questions were raised in the World Panel on Financing Water
Infrastructure report released at the Third World Water Forum in Kyoto in 2003. The 
panel articulated the need for a new financial architecture to stimulate and support flows 
of private capital for water and sanitation (Winpenny, 2003), including controversial calls 
to use official aid funding to support private sector involvement through the provision of 
low-cost finance and risk mitigation mechanisms, such as currency guarantees for private 
investors in developing countries.17 Implementing the pro-poor approach in this way 
would entail a potentially dramatic transformation in the premises and mechanisms of
ODA finance, in which public funds are provided to subsidize poorer households,
enabling private sector operators to manage water supply systems at a profit. Ironically, 
one of the key promises by advocates of PSP contracts has been the independent
15 Under the auspices of the Kimpraswil Fuel Subsidy Reduction Compensation programme, created to
offset the impacts of a reduction in fuel subsidies on poor households.
16 At the time of writing (October 2005), the USAID project was underway and the World Bank project
was in the tendering stage.
17 These proposals, as well as the composition of the Panel and the lack of public consultation on the 
report have been criticized by a number of organizations, which have raised numerous points: the focus on 
large-scale infrastructure and lack of emphasis on alternative technologies, levels of service, governance
models, citizen input and methods of improving public sector performance; the focus on encouraging
private sector involvement to the exclusion of other business models; and the ethics and feasibility of 




financing that private companies could provide under some types of PSP agreements. In
contrast to these promises, some private water companies have more recently argued that
they must have access to public funds, on concessionary terms (from governments, 
bilateral aid agencies or multilateral developments banks) if they are to meet universal
service coverage targets.
Conflict over alternative sources of water supply: A culture of corruption?
In order to understand conflict over water, it is necessary to put the situation in context; 
in Jakarta, as in many mega-cities in developing countries, most residents use multiple 
sources of water in the home (see Table 4). Due to poor quality, low pressure and 
incomplete coverage of the network, most residents depend on a variety of water 
sources, including deep and shallow wells, water vendors and bottled water (Berry, 1982;
Gilbert and James, 1994; Lovei and Whittington, 1993; McGranahan et al., 2001). 
Residents of Jakarta obtain their water supply through a complex, heterogeneous set of
sources, techniques and modes of delivery. Few residents rely on one source, using a 
combination of household piped network water connections, shallow and deep wells,
public hydrants and water vendors for their water supply needs (Surjadi, 2002; 2003). 
According to our survey of 110 households in six Jakarta neighbourhoods in 2005, 61 
per cent of households surveyed used multiple sources (the three most frequent 
combinations being network and vended water, network and groundwater, and 
groundwater and vended water).18
Table 4: Water sources in the home 
Water source Numberof houses Percentage
a) Groundwater 39 37
Groundwater with bottled water/vended
water/public hydrant 41 39
Network water 10 09
Network water with groundwater 02 02
Public hydrant/vended water with rain water 14 13
Total 106 100
Total households using at least two sources 65 61
b) DW 03 03
Bottled water 12 11
Groundwater 70 64
Vended water 34 32
HU 07 06
PAM 32 29
Other: public toilet 04 04
Public hydrant 08 07
TA 13 12
Total 183 166
Total percentage exceeds 100, because some households use multiple water sources.
18 These findings are similar to the results of surveys conducted by Surjadi (1994; 2002; 2003) and 
McGranahan et al. (2001), the two most recent academic studies available.
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The use of different water sources varies temporally and seasonally, due to quality and
pressure concerns. Low pressure in the piped network means that households prefer to
have a backup source – often a well. In some areas of the city, however, shallow 
groundwater cannot be used for drinking due to salinization and aquifer pollution 
resulting from pumping, sea-level intrusion and surface wastewater disposal in the 
absence of a sewerage system.
This heterogeneity of use is further complicated by Jakarta’s spatial pattern of urban 
development and urban services provision. Within the city, an ‘estate’ pattern of blocks 
of commercial properties and colonial-era mansions on broad avenues is intermixed with 
dense ‘illegal’ settlements of poorly serviced houses and self-built dwellings in the inner
blocks, empty lots and along any streets wide enough to accommodate built structures
while still permitting the passage of traffic (Cowherd, 2002; Ford, 1993; Leaf, 1996; 
Porter, 1996). This is a pattern that has intensified since the informalization of much of
the city’s economy following the currency devaluation in 1998. Many neighbourhoods do 
not have access to piped water, as the water network is concentrated in wealthier areas of 
the city (Martijn, 2005). The resulting spatial differentiation of land-use and income has
created an ‘urban dualism’, with middle-class houses abutting informal housing in a 
highly variable urban micro-geography in which multiple water sources will be in use 
simultaneously.
Even in those areas with networked water supply, many homes do not have individual 
household connections. In an extensive survey, Susantono (2001) has found that 
informal water services ‘thrive’ in neighbourhoods where formal services are available,
with households relying on water vendors even when they have the option of house 
connections with the municipal water utility. Physical proximity of the network (as
indicated by the distribution of a tertiary pipe network in the neighbourhood) is not, in
other words, linearly correlated with residential network connections. 
Why would this be the case? The answer is that the choice of which source to use is
influenced by factors other than physical availability of a network. One important factor 
is the total cost of water supply (as distinct from the cost per unit volume of water). In a 
pattern typical of cities in the developing world (Cairncross et al., 1990; Gulyani, 2005; 
Swyngedouw, 1997), piped water supply costs less per unit volume in Jakarta than other
modes of water supply, particularly vended water. In comparisons of the prices of vendor 
water versus networked water supply, the price per unit volume was found to be from 10
to 32 times more expensive for vendor water (ADB, 2003; McGranahan et al., 2003b).19
Poor households typically rely on vendor water, whereas wealthier households have 
access to the networked water supply system; as a result, many poor households pay 
more per unit volume of water than do wealthier residents of the city. Given their lower 
incomes, many poor households pay a much higher proportion of their income for water 
than wealthier households. In our survey of 110 households, 43 per cent of households 
spent more than 5 per cent of their income on water bills (often cited as the appropriate 
19 Another source for this finding is a survey conducted by the author in the neighbourhood of Sunter
Agung in January 2001. ADB gives a maximum figure of US $4.17/m3.
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threshold by international aid organizations).20 In other words, wealthier households with 
a networked connection receive water at a lower cost per unit volume, spending lower 
proportions of income for much greater quantities of water. Unsurprisingly, there is a
positive correlation between levels of water consumption and wealth in Jakarta
(McGranahan et al., 2001).
On the basis of cost per unit volume alone, then, it seems counter-intuitive that poor
households would not connect to the water supply network where possible. However, 
the disincentive for connection becomes more obvious when we consider the total cost of 
connecting to the water supply system (as opposed to price per unit volume of water 
supply). Monthly bills include more than charges per unit volumes of water consumed. 
Fixed charges, such as the meter fee and the annual charge, are also added on to the bill
(Table 3). For a poor household whose residents consume 50 litres per person per day 
(the World Health Organization recommended minimum), the fixed charges will be
anywhere from 5 to 10 times as high as the volumetric consumption charge; the effective 
cost per unit volume will thus be higher than that of vended water for the poorest 
consumers. Moreover, a networked water supply implies additional infrastructure costs
to be borne by the consumer, in the form of a water tank or holding device, made
necessary because of the intermittent nature of water supply through the piped network 
(with cutoffs of several hours occurring daily in some areas). Transaction costs are also 
significant; long waiting times at water utility offices to pay bills and clear up meter mis-
readings increase transaction costs compared to the ease of complaint handling and 
convenience of home visits by vendors to collect bill payments. Connection fees are also
significant (ranging from Rp 200,000 to Rp 350,000 in the households surveyed), relative
to average incomes of poor households (which averaged Rp 1.4 million in the
households surveyed), and must usually be provided as a lump sum, which may pose
significant barriers to households with small, irregular incomes. Connection fees also vary 
depending on distance from the network. Poor households are more likely to live in areas
of lower network density (Figure 1) and thus pay higher fees for connecting. For all of 
these reasons, overall costs to poor households of vended water may be lower than 
networked water supply, even though the latter has a lower price per unit volume. Given 
these cost barriers, payment flexibility permitted by vendors (some of whom even allow 
customers to buy water on credit) is an important incentive for poor households, often 
with a limited budgeting ability, to choose vended water over networked water
(Susantono, 2001; Shofiani, 2003).
Another important factor is land tenure. Deep wells are expensive and have higher 
maintenance costs, which effectively prohibits development by those without permanent
tenure. A significant proportion of the city’s population lives in temporary (often self-
built) accommodation without secure tenure. In these instances, public hydrants and
vended water become the sole or primary source of supply. Surjadi et al. (1994) found 
that over 20 per cent of the city’s residents regularly buy drinking water from vendors. 
The most recent academic survey have found that approximately one-third of Jakarta’s
20 A study of 1,000 households in Jakarta examining the different prices paid by different wealth groups
found that, overall, the poor pay on average twice as much per cubic metre as the wealthy (McGranahan et
al., 2001), and that water expenditure represents, on average, 10 per cent of income in poor households.
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households purchase water from street vendors (Crane and Daniere, 1996); these figures
correspond with the results of our household survey, which found that 31 per cent of
respondents regularly bought vended water (Table 4).
Another disincentive to connect to the network is its perceived low water quality. In our
survey, networked water was perceived to be of lower quality than other sources of water 
(especially groundwater), particularly by more educated respondents. Residents of Jakarta 
perceive groundwater to be of higher quality than either vended or network water. 
Indeed, the most comprehensive comparative survey of water quality of different sources 
in poor neighbourhoods in Jakarta to date found that samples of drinking water from the 
network were more contaminated with fecal coliform than groundwater (Surjadi et al., 
1994). In some cases, vended water was perceived to be of higher quality than networked 
water supply. The fact that vendors check water quality and may strain the water or let it
settle before delivering explains why perceptions of vended water quality may be higher, 
despite the fact that vendor water often originates in hydrants connected to the
networked water supply system.
Weak governance, violence and environmental deterioration
International financial institutions often claim that one of the most important factors 
contributing to low levels of water services provision in Jakarta is the low level of
infrastructure finance (Akhtar, 2005; World Bank, 2004), exacerbated by the Asian
financial crisis and currency devaluation. Initiatives such as the Indonesia Infrastructure 
Summit (held in Jakarta in early 2005) have explicitly targeted foreign direct investment.
The government has identified a significant shortfall in financing requirements for 
rehabilitation and extension of urban infrastructure. Jakarta’s infrastructure ‘crisis’ is not,
however, a new phenomenon. Indeed, the current lack of funding for services is 
compounded by the legacy of deliberate under-investment during the 1960s and 1970s, a 
period of extremely rapid population growth as policy-makers sought to discourage rural-
urban migration21 and articulated a policy stance that sewerage was a ‘private concern’
(Argo, 1999; Cowherd, 2002). Population growth and a lack of finance are only partial
explanations for this situation. Where International Financial Institutions do mention 
governance, they tend to focus on jurisdictional fragmentation and municipal budgetary 
governance. Certainly, jurisdictional fragmentation has reduced the ability of any one 
level of government in Jakarta to effectively govern water resources within a watershed,
or even within urban boundaries.22 Municipal governance structures are another factor. 
21 The city of Jakarta alone grew from 1.8 million people in 1950 to 6.5 million in 1980, with equally rapid
population growth in the surrounding metropolitan areas (with the total population of the greater 
metropolitan area now estimated at 18 million), implying rapid increases in population density and
significant changes in land-use (Chifos, 2000; Firman 1997; 1998; 2000; Lo and Yeung, 1996).
22 In the Jakarta region, for example, the majority of the JMA is a politically constituted as an independent
territory with a status of a province – ‘DKI Jakarta’ (Special Capital Region of Jakarta). The city governor is 
independent from West Java province, and (together with the municipal government) controls the city’s
water supply company: PAM Jaya. The province of West Java is responsible for the urban areas that fall
outside of DKI Jakarta, and for the watershed in which the main Jatiluhur reservoir for Jakarta’s water
supply is sited, well upstream from the city. Environmental and urban planning regulations are not 
systematically applied within the watershed, and the open canals, which act as conduits for Jatiluhur water, 
are polluted by residential and industrial effluent, posing serious water quality challenges to the municipal
water supply utility engineers. Meanwhile, within the city, tackling groundwater pollution from effluent 
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In Jakarta (as with other cities in Indonesia and indeed around the world), water utility 
budgets were not seperated from the rest of the municipality budget. Rather, a small tax
base and the presence of few alternative revenue-generating activities for the municipal 
government encouraged the use of water utility revenues for non-water related 
expenditure by municipal politicians and managers. For many water supply utilities in 
Indonesia, this had the effect of reducing the amount of revenues available to cover 
operating costs and fund capital expenditure (notably infrastructure rehabilitation and 
improvement) exacerbated by relatively low cost recovery rates. Like water supply
utilities in developing countries, Indonesian water providers are often caught in a vicious 
cycle: low cost recovery, low revenue, low investment and low levels of service (Bakker,
2003a; Cross and Morel, 2005; Nunan and Satterthwaite, 2001).
This view of the reasons for failure to supply water in cities like Jakarta overlooks some 
of the major causes of conflict over water and also overlooks other factors relevant to 
the ‘weakness’ of Jakarta’s water supply system. As discussed in the previous section, 
urban poor households have strong disincentives to connect to the network, and the 
water companies and municipal government have economic disincentives to connecting
them. These disincentives are often overlooked by international financial institutions. In 
addition, two other factors reinforce these disincentives.
First, a culture of violence underpins alternative water supply systems in the city, 
particularly standpipes and water vending, which are controlled by an interlocking set of
mafia-like groups in the city. Water vendors typically operate as spatial monopolists; in 
Jakarta, vendors do not compete, but rather collude to establish monopoly supply zones
and a captive clientele (Susantono, 2001). Water vending is controlled by a complex 
network of middlemen running tankers, ambulatory water vendors and public standpipes
connected to PAM Jaya’s network (Lovei and Whittington, 1993). The monopoly rent 
extracted from the city’s poor represents an attractive source of profits. Indeed, the 
potential profitability of extracting rent from the captive market of water consumers is 
recognized through the practice of selling informal ‘licenses’ amongst water vendors 
(Susantono, 2001). In Jakarta, as in other cities, this monopolistic behaviour is sometimes
linked with organized crime and is at times characterized by the intimidation of (if not 
outright violence towards) customers, competing vendors and police and water company
employees who attempt to eradicate informal water vending practices. To put it crudely,
mafia-like control of water vending in poor areas of the city is a significant barrier to 
network expansion. This is significant, as surveys have found that approximately one-
third of Jakarta’s households purchase water from street vendors (World Bank, 1993; 
Crane and Daniere, 1996; 1997; and survey by author in June/July 2005) (Table 4). An 
even more startling form of illegal activity are the illegal network builders (some of
whom even operate with business cards), who install illegal tertiary pipes and household 
connections without the authorization (and often the knowledge) of the water supply 
concessionaires; Palyja/Suez estimated 30 kilometres of illegal pipeline in their concession 
area alone in 2005.
within the city is complicated by the division of responsibility amongst the sewerage authority, the
municipal water utility (which controls networked water supply), and the national government’s Ministry of 
Mines, which bears responsibility for regulating deep (i.e. drilled) wells, from which a substantial
proportion of the city’s residents draw water. 
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Second, a culture of urban governance in Indonesia shapes urban planning policy in ways 
that discourage government initiatives for systematic, structured water supply initiatives. 
As Anderson (1990) and Kusno (1997) have argued, the idea of ‘power’ in Javanese
culture can be understood via the spatial metaphor of the ‘beacon’, in which the 
concentration and affirmation of power at the centre (the palace or the capital city) 
enables an extension of power over the periphery. Power, in other words, is defined by 
the centre, projecting a strong and unified source of authority. State governance and the 
patron-client hierarchies that embody it are directed towards affirming the centrality of 
state power. In the context of urban planning, this means that state activities are often
geared towards the reaffirmation of prestige and the reinforcement of networks of 
patronage, rather than public welfare per se (Cowherd, 2002; Kusno, 1998; 2000). In the
post-Independence era, high priority was given to an urban redevelopment agenda
focused on highly visible infrastructure (avenues, highways, parks, monuments and 
sculptures). This ‘monumentalist’ infrastructure served a dual purpose of urban 
development and source of pride for the new nation, whereas urban services provision 
and the urban environment were given relatively low priority (Chifos and 
Hendropranoto, 2000; Firman and Dharmapatni, 1994; Ford, 1993; Kusno, 1997; World 
Bank, 2004b), despite sporadic national government-led development plans to accelerate 
service delivery (Silas, 2002). The ‘monumentalist’ architecture of Jakarta’s central 
corridor under Presidents Sukarno and Suharto (whose reigns lasted successively from 
Independence until 1998), together with the relative neglect of infrastructure and public 
services of all kinds for the urban periphery, are illustrative of the implications of this 
model of urban governance. Where ‘pro-poor’ water supply initiatives do occur, they are 
often sporadic, intermittent and emphasize state largesse (and recipient gratitude) rather
than an integrated and long-term approach to network extension. 
Conclusions: Externalizing the costs of conflict to poor households and the 
environment
As discussed above, multiple factors underlie water supply conflicts in Jakarta: a prestige-
oriented culture of urban governance; violence and illegality in the informal water supply 
sector; and multiple disincentives to connect the poor on the part of the government,
private concessionaires and poor households themselves. The costs are largely
externalized to poor consumers and the environment.
With respect to poor consumers, domestic per capita water consumption is estimated to 
be between 70 and 80 litres, one of the lowest of the 18 large Asian cities surveyed by the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2003b). The city has almost no sewer system, with 
fewer than 2 per cent of households connected to a sewerage system (ADB, 2003b); the
vast majority of wastewater is disposed directly to rivers, canals, or (often poorly 
functioning) septic tanks (Crane, 1994; McIntosh, 2003; Surjadi, 2002). Rivers and canals 
are sometimes too polluted to use for even washing clothing. Contamination by 
wastewater and industrial effluent, as well as seawater infiltration due to over-pumping 
have in turn polluted the shallow aquifer in many areas of the city. Reliance on 
groundwater as one of multiple sources of water is common in Jakarta and provides a de 
facto alternative to networked water. But while wealthy residents rely on cleaner, but 
more expensive, deep wells, poor residents rely on shallow aquifers (see Table 4). In
some areas, depletion and salinization of the latter has rendered water unfit for drinking 
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and cooking (Braadbaart and Braadbaart, 1997). The public health impacts of this 
situation are predictable and have been well documented: high rates of water-related
diseases, including gastrointestinal illness due to contaminated water and parasite-related
illnesses due to poor drainage, particularly in poorer areas (Agtini et al., 2005; Leitmann,
1995; McGranahan et al., 2001; Simanjuntak et al., 2001; Surjadi, 2003). This has 
deepened the reliance of poor households on water vendors in North Jakarta (the 
poorest part of the city and the area with the greatest salt intrusion into the aquifers), 
further entrenching the parallel and informal networks of vended water suppliers. The 
failure to extend water supply has, ironically and tragically, increased environmental
degradation and the ‘informalization’ of the water supply sector in Jakarta.
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Introduction
Urban water services (UWS) have undergone a radical transformation in the last 20 years 
in most developed countries (de La Motte et al., 2005; Finger and Allouche, 2006;
Massarutto, 2006). Some of the most important axes include changes from local 
management to regional integration; from public subsidies and public finance to full cost 
recovery and market finance; from direct management of local authorities to various
forms of independent and professional water industry, often (although not necessarily)
with the involvement of the private sector;2 from the dominance of water supply and 
urban network to that of water resources management at the river basin scale and the 
growing emphasis on cleanup, treatment and conservation of resources; from simple,
discretional and benevolent regulation to more sophisticated, controversial and 
adversarial regulatory systems; from sectoral water policy focused on infrastructure 
development to integrated management focused on sustainability. 
This modernization has been driven by powerful forces. To use a famous image by
Boulding, human societies are learning a new way of managing water, from the 
‘extensive’ model of the ‘cowboy’ economy, where natural resources do not represent a
limit to growth provided that enough investment is put in place, to a ‘spaceship’ model,
1 Support of the FIRB research programme, Evoluzione delle forme di mercato e delle modalità di regolazione dei
servizi locali di pubblica utilità in Europa, and of the EU-5FP Euromarket project is gratefully acknowledged.
The author wishes to thank Vania Paccagnan, Elisabetta Linares and Alessandro de Carli for their
collaboration on both projects. Special thanks to Bernard Barraqué and Esteban Castro for useful
comments on a previous version of this paper. 
2 Private sector involvement (PSI) is intended here in its widest meaning; it involves regulated private 
monopoly with full divesture (e.g. England and Wales), full or partial delegation via competitive tendering




in which finiteness of resources requires careful management aimed at reproducing them 
locally in the long term. 
On the other hand, modernization also implies complex and unwelcome outcomes that
go largely beyond the sphere of water management. The rising costs of water 
management pose questions of affordability and challenge basic social rights. Integrated
management forces local communities to give up control over their local territory in 
order to share resources (and problems) with other communities on a larger territorial 
scale. Water uses that have been established during centuries may have to be given up in 
order to allow space for new emerging societal demands. Increased corporatization (if 
not privatization) of water service operation implies a loss of control and a strong 
delegation of power to professionals and ‘water experts’, whose faithfulness to the
general interest of the community has to be proven. 
To put it differently, the sustainability of UWS is not only and simply a technical, 
managerial and economic problem; it requires instead a thorough adaptation of the 
institutional, political and social spheres. The outcome of transformation cannot be 
reduced to different technological solutions; it should be able to reproduce the basis of
cohesion, trust, legitimacy and consensus; which on its own implies that patterns of 
allocations of costs and benefits (or, more generally, negative and positive outcomes) be 
perceived as fair. And much more than that, since this perception also has its roots in
common ‘cultures’ and ‘rules of reason’ that need to be developed and shared through an 
open participation (Swyngedouw et al., 2002). In this perspective, the transformation of 
UWS can be described as a problem of governance (Hanf and Jansen, 1998; Picciotto, 
1997), whose solution cannot be asked of the interplay of individuals within the given set
of cultures and institutional rules, but rather implies a reconstruction of both (Amin,
1997).
This transformation has a particular meaning in European Mediterranean countries, 
where the tradition of municipalism and local management has been historically stronger 
than elsewhere, and where public subsidies still represent a substantial part of UWS 
financing, and government policies have traditionally been biased towards infrastructure,
not only for UWS but also for irrigation and industry. The Italian case represents a good
illustration of the kind of problems that the transition is causing in similar contexts. 
The aim of the present paper is to single out the most important critical aspects of the
ongoing Italian reform of UWS. It adopts a framework derived from ecological 
economic theory, based on the idea that UWS are a substantial component of water
sustainability; ecological, economic and social sustainability issues concern physical water 
assets, as well as natural resources: effectiveness (in terms of environmental policy and 
provision of access to water); economic efficiency of investment, long-term viability of 
water industry and equitable sharing of water utilities costs. 
We begin with a brief overview of the ecological economic approach to water
sustainability that enlightens the crucial importance of UWS; this is followed by an
analysis of the present trend of UWS management and the crisis of the supply-side 
approach. Pressures arising from this change towards private sector involvement and
full-cost recovery are then discussed in general terms. The main features of the Italian 
UWS reform are discussed, followed by a broad and general analysis of conflict 
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dimensions that are suggested by the analysis. The final section presents the results of an 
original study carried out in two Italian Regions (Lombardia and Emilia-Romagna) aimed 
at an assessment of the likelihood of such conflicts and trade-offs to occur in the
medium to long term. 
An ecological-economic framework for urban water conflicts
The reason why UWS modernization might cause conflicts is not obvious. After all, in 
everyday life, people must often choose between alternatives that are mutually exclusive, 
and this does not necessarily imply conflict, provided that the rules followed in the
decision are agreed and perceived as legitimate, fair and reasonable. Allocation of a scarce
resource implies that some social demands will have to remain unsatisfied: this is intrinsic 
in the very meaning of the word ‘scarcity’. Allocative choices imply trade-offs, whose 
solution might or might not cause conflict, depending on the capability of the existing set
of rules, property rights and management systems to solve the related issues in a way that
is both socially acceptable and sustainable in the long term. Conflict arises, in turn, when 
the institutional setting is not compatible with the ‘technical’ solutions that might be
foreseen.
In pure mainstream neo-classical economics, conflicts do not exist, since the market is
the universal engine providing solutions to trade-offs in a way that ensures the maximum
of benefits. If a would-be user of a scarce resource has to remain unsatisfied, this is due 
to the fact that his demand is not worthy enough. Welfare economic theory has provided 
a coherent framework to deal with trade-offs when they entail an economic dimension:
i.e. when the values at stake are commensurable with each other. Cost-benefit analysis 
states that a given alternative is better than another (from a social welfare point of view) 
if its total cost is lower than its total benefits; where ‘costs’ mean the ‘opportunity costs’, 
that is the economic value of alternatives that are sacrificed. Since society is an aggregate 
of individuals and groups that are affected by costs and benefits in a different way, this
test can be refined by introducing compensation for the ‘net losers’: if total benefits are 
larger than costs, distribution of outcomes can be re-arranged in order for all concerned 
groups to gain. 
However, in the real world, this does not necessarily take place: first, because the
redistribution of outcomes does not actually occur, or cannot occur in a given 
institutional framework (Johnston, 1996; Saleth and Dinar, 2004); second, because trade-
offs are not always and not only economic – in other words, values cannot always be 
expressed in the same unit of measurement (e.g. monetary values), allowing them to be
evaluated in a coherent way (Martinez-Alier et al., 1998); third, because the net losers
could be future generations (Ekins, 2000). The theoretical framework of ecological 
economics has developed the concept of strong sustainability, according to which values
that cannot be traded off require the definition of specific constraints and threshold 
values to be achieved in order to achieve sustainability; this occurs in particular whenever
‘critical natural capital’ is at stake, namely, environmental resources that cannot be 
substituted for the provision of valuable functions that society cannot accept to give up. 
The water sector is an excellent example for applying these concepts, due to its
multifunctionality. Water sustainability involves ecological dimensions (because it is a 
scarce and fragile natural resource and a basic necessity for ecological life), as well as 
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economic (water as a scarce valuable input having an economic value) and social
dimensions (water as a basic need to be guaranteed as social right and shared in an
equitable way). Water provides a large set of valuable environmental functions (EFs), 
entailing economic as well as non-economic values (Fontana and Massarutto, 1995).
Many of these functions are critical (‘water needs’ to be satisfied at any cost; ‘social rights’
to be guaranteed, etc.), while others can be even in principle traded off (‘water demands’,
whose value can in principle be compensated by other economic values). 
In a narrow sense, an economic approach to water policy issues can deal with the 
concept of ‘water intended as an economic good’, i.e. considering only those values that 
belong to the economic sphere (Dalhuisen et al., 2001). In a broader meaning, the 
economics of water should be able to understand the multiple dimensions of scarcity that 
arise both from economic and non-economic spheres (Green, 2003). Following this latter
perspective, an economic approach – ‘applying reason to choices’, by Green’s own 
definition – is not incompatible with the recognition that some demands are not to be 
evaluated in terms of economic efficiency, but rather in terms of social justice, ecological
soundness, political acceptability, etc. 
On the other hand, the water domain is also characterized by some degrees of 
substitution between man-made and natural capital: at some (finite) cost, the production
and transfer of freshwater can be made in virtually any desired quantity.3 This is true at 
least for some EFs, especially those in which economic values are predominant.4 The
social choice problem here is whether this cost is worthwhile (i.e. if the value of water 
demands is higher) and if it is acceptable for users to pay for it. This consideration is
fundamental, since it enlarges the spectrum of trade-offs (and potential conflicts): these
do not concern only appropriation and use of water as a natural resource, but also the
inter- and intra-generational allocation of the costs of artificial water systems; in the same 
way, sustainability does not only regard inter-generational aspects of natural resources
management, but also includes economic and financial viability of the UWS industry (de
Carli et al., 2003). In other words, both natural and man-made capital belong to the
category of ‘critical capital’ and therefore require strong sustainability criteria (Massarutto,
2005).
Governance issues arise when there is a mismatch between social demands and 
availability (see Figure 1). Given the multidimensional nature of water values, governance 
issues can arise from many different mismatches between available and demanded EFs.
We have identified the categories reported in Table 1. From the above discussion, water
availability is constrained by physical scarcity, depending on hydrologic factors 
(opportunity cost of water) as well as by costliness of water services (opportunity cost of 
labour and capital) and by the set of institutional rules, property rights and shared 
cultures that, in any given historical context, frame the spectrum of available alternatives.
3 At a given cost (high, though finite) it is possible to produce any quantity of water. Desalination, which
can be considered as the backstop technology, has reached costs in the order of 0.5-1 €/m3 (Lora et al., 
2003).
4 Although these uses do not exhaust the spectrum of water-related EFs, it should be noted that they
represent by far the greatest source of water abstraction and impact on water bodies. 
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Figure 1: Governance issues 
For example, a community can be simply too poor to afford UWS, or the cost of UWS
can be higher than the value of additional environmental functions; or, finally, people 
may be unwilling to pay higher taxes or higher water prices for ideological reasons. The 
effectiveness of the management system provides a further dimension to understand.
The institutional setting represents the ultimate constraint, determining in the short to 
medium term what governance issues are capable of being solved (Saleth and Dinar,
2004). In this sense, scarcity might result also from institutional reasons, because existing 
institutions are not able to achieve an acceptable solution to certain governance issues 
(Massarutto and Verga, 2005). For example, the existing set of water rights might be 
incapable of solving a given problem (e.g. the over-exploitation of an aquifer), but the 




Table 1: Governance issues in the water management sphere 
TYPOLOGY Description Dimension Critical aspects
Access
x who has the right to use the resources?
x what criteria are used for allocating water rights?
x are those that cannot have access to water being 











x some users’ actions make water unusable or 
inaccessible to other users 
x some users generate externalities that are
suffered by other (potential) water users or by 










x local communities fear to become “the garbage 
can” of other communities or
x to be forced to share resources and problems 
with other communities;
x local communities lose control over what they










x the increased technical complexity of decision 
forces the community to delegate decision to 
professionals and ‘experts’ and to subtract power
to the individuals and the community;
x users with large political or market power can













x conservation of NC for the next generation is not 
guaranteed because conflicting demands tend to 
overuse it and next generations are not 
represented
x Resilience of water management systems and
capacity to adapt to future challenges 
x Basic ecological functions of water systems







water as a 
constraining factor
Artificialization
x Is development of water infrastructure
worthwhile?
x Allocation of costs should be fair and not 
jeopardize affordability
x Water management systems should remain 
economically and financially viable;










patterns of PSI 
Is economic growth
rapid enough for 
guaranteeing






x Is the allocation of costs (between individual
users / sectors of use / territorial regions) fair? 
x Are some users excluded because they cannot
afford the water bill? 
x Is the allocation of costs between users and
taxpayers compatible with the constraints on 
public budget and with the need to avoid perverse
incentives?
x Is the allocation of economic risks coherent with





Instruments for cost 
equalization
Economic balance 
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The inability to develop an appropriate set of property rights can be driven back to the 
situation known in the public choice literature as the ‘tyranny of the status quo’, which
typically arises when a decision requires unanimity of consensus (Mueller, 1990). North
(1990) and Bromley (1991), in turn, emphasize that the process of institutional building 
does not occur mechanically, but rather through trial and error, in which communities 
that are more able than others to develop appropriate institutional settings will be able to 
solve environmental problems. The process of institutional change is constrained by the 
rent-seeking of economic actors and transactions costs of change (Johnston, 1996). 
Massarutto and Verga (2005) argue that a ‘tyranny of the status quo’ might arise in all of 
those cases in which the policy-maker has the formal power to decide (even with a 
majority rule), but is unable to exert power over the implementation chain because of
information asymmetries or lack of control over essential resources. As Saleth and Dinar
put it, ‘water scarcity, whether quantitative, qualitative or both, originates more from 
inefficient use and poor management than from any real physical limits on supply 
augmentation’ (Saleth and Dinar, 2004). 
We can affirm that a carrying capacity has been reached when one of the above scarcity 
limits has been violated. This poses a ‘limit to growth’ to environmental functions that
can be satisfied by the existing set of water and economic resources. Reaching this limit 
means that a trade-off between social demands has to be managed and solved, and if it
cannot be solved in the existing framework, this poses a sustainability issue. 
The limit is not set once forever: an income improvement may enable the community to 
pay for UWS that would previously have been unaffordable; technological improvements 
might render UWS provision possible (or simply cheaper); new governance institutions 
might cope with political incapability to decide. But in the short term, the individuation
of a carrying capacity limit leads to considering water resources – at that particular
territorial scale – as a CNC, and thus to pose an upper limit to their consumptive use. 
This discussion also underlines the importance of UWS for sustainability. Water
sustainability does not only regard natural water resources, but also the long-run viability 
of the management systems, the capacity to renovate artificial assets and finance its long-
term maintenance and operation. For this reason, the assessment of cost-recovery is 
crucial for sustainability. It is not necessarily intended in neoclassical economic terms as 
the need to ensure optimal allocation of resources through marginal-cost pricing, but 
rather to assess the long-term capacity of the community to raise the financial means that
ensure its viable operation, whether through prices or taxes, or which equalization
measures are actually put in place (Green, 2003; Massarutto, 2005).
Economic development, sustainability and new water management paradigms 
This simple conceptual model helps us to understand the evolution of water policies in 
the past and the present. Economic development in the long term affects the relationship 
between water and society in two different ways. On one hand, it increases the capacity 
to finance WSS expansion and positively affects innovation; on the other hand, it causes 
demand growth (especially for those EF that are income-elastic) and causes increasing
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external effects. The final effect on sustainability is thus ambiguous. Sustainability of 
actual patterns of water use requires that the GDP grow more rapidly than the cost of
WSS induced by demand expansion and/or depletion of natural capital. 
In the literature, the optimist attitude is shared by those believing in an ‘Environmental 
Kuznets curve’ (namely, a positive relationship between economic growth and 
sustainability). In the case of water, for example, many indicators seem to show that last 
century’s growth patterns have been sustainable, since the GDP has grown more rapidly 
than the deterioration of water capital, thus allowing for investments in WSS that have 
ultimately improved both supply and water quality. As a result, in most developed 
countries, water quality as well as river ecosystems are much better now than they were 
100 years ago. On the other hand, the very belief that this trend will not be reversed in 
the future is not based on any empirical evidence. Water being a CNC, a precautionary 
principle might therefore be invoked. 
The dominant model of the last two centuries – what Arrojo et al. (2005) have referred 
to as the ‘structuralist’ model – can be described as follows: 
x Substantial growth of demand for EF is correlated with economic growth; as a 
result, per-capita water demand and per-capita pollution loads have increased
over the last two centuries, much above the ‘natural’ carrying capacity of water
environments.
x This demand growth is compensated by a dramatic increase in artificial WSS; this 
can be shown for example by the continuous increase of the per capita cumulated
investment in water assets, which is made possible both by the significant 
improvements of civil works engineering and economic growth. 
x In a first phase, social investment in WSS expansion improves the supply of EF, 
complimenting those furnished by the NC; in a following phase, NC itself 
deteriorates (because of increased pollution loads and over-abstractions), and 
WSS expansion is also required for compensating this loss. 
x Much of the supply increase is made possible through the development of public 
services with substantial investment costs carried on by the public budget. 
The crisis of the structuralist model arises from many different sources of 
unsustainability:
x Emergence of new social demands for water quality, while ‘traditional’ demand, 
focuses on quantity, has reduced its growth, demand for environmental quality 
cannot be easily satisfied through a simple expansion of WSS. 
x Deterioration of NC reaches critical levels and hampered further critical EF. 
x Evidence that at least some uses are greatly subsidized, and this subsidization is
unjustifiable, since they hardly belong (anymore) to the ‘merit’ uses category.
x Evidence that further expansion in WSS (at least for water supplies) is often 
unjustified in economic terms. 
x Crisis of public finance and requirement for involving users in the financing of 
WSS, in the context of rapidly increasing costs of service provision. 
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The Water Framework Directive (WFD) can be seen as a turning point, beginning a new 
European water policy focused on sustainability (Barraqué, 2004; Kallis and Nijkamp, 
2000). Among its basic principles are the conservation of natural capital at a good
ecological status; the prevention of further deterioration; economic assessment aimed at 
implementing an efficient allocation; full-cost recovery aimed at avoiding that artificial 
water assets are developed beyond the social willingness and ability to pay; public 
participation in order to ensure that all social stake are duly taken into account.
Transferred into the analytical framework outlined above, the crisis of the structuralist 
model can be interpreted on the base of the increasing costs that society has to face (and
consequently share). This is particularly true for external costs. 
As far as UWS are concerned, Barraqué (2005) has argued that the supply-side approach 
at some point starts to be a vicious cycle: increasing social demands call for further
artificialization and further delegation of power and responsibility to the ‘experts’ and the 
technical structure. This causes further costs (both in terms of financial costs and
externalities that are generated on other water users) and calls for further pressures to
develop the artificial system. This vicious cycle generates conflict through the tension 
between social demand for water services and the need to allocate the underlying
increasing costs. 
Further forces drive conflictual outcomes. This process also entails growth in territorial
scale (and thus increasing physical distance between citizens and decision-makers), 
increasing professional specialization (and thus increasing cultural distance) and finally 
increasing pressure to become economically efficient, which usually ends up in the
acquisition of a business-like mentality of water operators if not full privatization (and
thus increasing motivational distance between profit-oriented water companies and local
political stakes). 
All of these factors erode the basis of consensus and legitimacy of the dominant model 
of managing UWS and generate the pressure towards new solutions. 
Pressures towards modernization of UWS 
Figure 2 summarizes the main forces that drive UWS modernization (Massarutto, 2006). 
Pressures for change arise from the water policy sphere and are started by the appearance
of new governance issues (e.g. new stakeholders bringing in new dimensions of demand;
degradation of water quality causing the impossibility of traditional water management
and regulation to carry on providing the same environmental functions as before);
however, governance issues are not relevant as such, but rather are filtrated by the water 
policy network.
On one hand, we can thus individuate those actors in the policy community having the 
capacity to make pressure on policymakers: ‘water experts’ recognize problems and 
propose solutions; the scientific community provides means for appreciating issues; 
water industry develops technologies and declares its capability to solve problems; water
users make pressure in order to have more water available; environmental pressure
groups ask for improved water quality, etc. Of course, there might be a close interaction
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between these actors: for example, scientific research can be influenced by the water
industry financing it; the appreciation of some problems and issues might by strongly 
conditioned by investment already made by the water industry and by its perception of 
what can or should be done. 
Figure 2: UWS Modernization 
On the other hand, we can find factors that constrain water policy action: availability of 
financial resources, readiness to pay by consumers, as well as geographical and
institutional factors (e.g. localism, efficiency of the public administration, relative weight 
of water-related issues in the political arena). 
Altogether, these factors shape and determine new water policies putting pressure on 
UWS, e.g. increasing quality standards and/or promoting new water investment. As we 
have argued before, a significant change has occurred in recent decades, causing a shift 
from traditional ‘extensive’ towards more ‘intensive’ water policies.
New water policies impact on the equilibria of the water industry through five channels,
each threatening traditional forms of public management and pushing towards innovative 
forms, either implying the involvement of the private sector or at least the development
of more independent and business-oriented public systems.
First, UWS require fixed costs that are for the most part sunk; these costs grow as long
as UWS provision becomes more difficult and demand (arising both from service users 
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and from environmental policy) more exigent. This represents a formidable pressure on
growth of the territorial size of water undertakings (in order to share these costs on a 
larger base of customers) and the outsourcing of activities implying economies of scale or
high labour costs (e.g. public works, customer services, billing, emergency management, 
project and design, RTD, etc). 
Second, the increase of technical complexity of water management forces local water
management systems to delegate decisions to professionals having the necessary
expertise. This leads to the creation of specialized water management organizations,
whose belonging to private or public sector follows a good deal national paths and 
traditions. Specialization and complexity also means that less and less critical inputs can 
be produced ‘on site’ and more and more are incorporated into ‘technological objects’
that local operators will select and purchase on the market. Therefore water operators are 
required to be in the best position to dialogue with external suppliers of technology, and
this in the end, might represent a strong incentive towards corporatization of water 
service operators and an increasing recourse to the market for the provision of inputs.
The value chain of water services includes more and more value added that is produced 
by specialized firms on the market.
This does not necessarily mean that water operators will themselves be privatized, at least 
not in the forms of delegation or full divesture: Italian and German municipally-owned 
water companies, as well as the Dutch water companies or the British Water Authorities 
before privatisation are well-known examples of water industries that developed within 
the public sector, though with some sort of entrepreneurial autonomy. At a certain point, 
however, these pressures might become strong, either because of a more general policy 
trend in this direction, or because autonomy becomes so strong that public control
becomes very weak. The need to engage in heavy sunk costs (e.g. research and
development) also requires larger scale of operation and thus weaker control of 
individual municipalities. The sale of shares to the market, often forced by budget 
constraints, completes the process, until companies finally behave as private companies,
even if formally owned by the public sector.
In other countries, the need for professional skills has led quite early to delegation of 
operation to private companies, rather than developing the same skills in-house. Peculiar 
institutional mechanisms might influence this development; for example, in the French 
case, delegation to private companies was often made necessary by the difficulties that 
the French law opposes to the creation of local publicly-owned companies and by the 
difficulty for municipalities to have access to credit (Barraqué, 1995). 
The third channel is the financial one. The increasing cost of water services in the 
present phase is paralleled by the crisis of public finance, therefore ending the traditional
way of financing through the public budget. Self-finance through full-cost recovery starts 
to become necessary; on the other hand, tariffs and prices paid by consumers will serve 
as a cash flow for sustaining market-based finance, for which the water operator 
becomes the intermediator.
Once again, this does not necessarily lead to private operation of services, since public 
companies might also have the capacity to access financial markets; on the other hand,
given the high capital intensity of the water industry and the very long depreciation 
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schedule of water assets, the financial reputation of operators is a crucial part of reducing 
the cost of capital and finally the cost of water to final consumers. Even if remaining
under public control, many water companies have engaged in enlargement of capital to
new investors, buyouts and other financial operations opening their property to external 
investors.
Moreover, the decision to privatize can be ‘political’, in the sense that governments and
local authorities might wish to sell property in order to give a signal that eventual losses 
in the future will not be transferred again on the public budget. Privately-owned 
companies, from this point of view, will need to achieve a good balance between 
revenues and costs and therefore will not engage in new expenditure unless they will be 
able to finance it through prices paid by consumers.5
In some other cases, the decision to privatize operators might be in a way or the other
imposed by financial institutions, especially in developing countries, where the financial
rating of local firms, the trust of international agencies such as the World Bank as well as
the lobbying capacity of western water transnational firms were all factors conditioning 
the lending of capital to the delegation of operation to private companies (Hall, 2001; 
Finger and Allouche, 2001). 
The fourth channel is the ‘division of competences’ between UWS operation and 
regional water policy. In the traditional model, water management could remain ‘local’
and ‘simple’ as far as external subjects (the state) carry out the necessary actions through 
public works aiming at making water available at the local level. ‘Water plans’, carried out
at the state, basin or regional level, were the policy instruments in which this role of the
public sector materialized.
As a result, the water industry is required to play a more important and responsible role, 
with substantial degrees of freedom; one important consequence is that local water 
management cannot be considered anymore as a ‘simple’ task within the frame of a 
publicly-controlled water plan; the water operator itself has to become ‘a planner’, and 
therefore acquire both suitable geographical scale and vertical integration. 
In other words, the task that water service operators have to deliver has more and more
to do with decisions at higher degrees of autonomy. While in the ‘traditional’ model 
public planning provides solutions and decides facilities and investment, in the ‘new’ 
model asset management, project of solutions, gathering of consensus is more and more 
delegated to operators, while river basin plans mostly limit themselves to indicating the 
desired environmental functions (e.g. final quality of the river), leaving water users high 
discretion regarding the means to reach these objectives. 
5 The history of British Water Authorities is enlightening. When they were created in 1973, they were
required to operate on a cost recovery base; however, charges used to be kept low for political reasons,
while significant new investment had to be carried on; so the WA experienced a substantial rise of their
debt, what was possible only because financial markets treated this debt as if was warranted by the central
government. At the moment of privatising the Water Authorities in 1989, the British government had to 
write off this debt and absorbe it into the public debt, otherwise the whole operation would be a failure 
(Barraqué, 1995; Rees and Zabel, 2001) 
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Finally, the fifth channel regards the need of water service management to interact with a 
larger number of conflicting stakeholders, with stronger emphasis to be put on the 
demand side rather than on the displacement of new assets and technology. In the ‘new’ 
water policy network, the ranking of public water services, though still in some way
predominant against the others, has lost the centrality it could have in the past. It is not
obvious whether ‘what is good for water services is also good for water policy’; urban
water users become one among the stakeholders of water policy.
Governance in the water sector becomes more and more a complex exercise, the 
meaning of the ‘public interest’ less clear and univocal. In many countries, the trend
towards privatisation also means the search for a new model of regulation, based on 
‘arm’s length’ distance between water regulation and planning versus water service 
operators, seen as a counterpart rather than as a partner.6
Pressure factors and constraints arising UWC in Italy 
The Italian case provides an interesting illustration of the above described trends and the 
related trade-offs and conflicts (Massarutto, 1993) 
Over the last 20 years, a far-reaching reform process has invested the whole water 
management system and consequently of WSS organization. 
Italy is an overall water-rich country, where supply for human consumption has never
represented a major problem. This is especially true in the North and along the
peninsula, with the few areas suffering from water shortage being concentrated in the big
islands and some southern districts. 
Local availability of good quality resources, easily distributed thanks to gravity,
historically allowed water management systems to maintain a local dimension and a 
relatively low development in terms of industrial and technical complexity; until the
1990s, it was even impossible to have a precise figure on undertakings, which were 
estimated in the reach of 13,000 in the whole country. However, this very well known 
data probably overemphasizes the degree of fragmentation. In fact, local responsibility
for urban water systems is accompanied by responsibility for the State – and later 
increasingly for Regions – to provide municipalities with the means for fulfilling this 
responsibility.
Local WSS management has been thus increasingly wounded into a planning system 
taking care for all infrastructure required for meeting local needs. The need for water
supply plans started to be felt in the 1960s, as a consequence of the rapid urban
development growth of the post-war period, and was accomplished through regional 
plans assigning to each urban area given rights to obtain definite amounts of water
6 This does not necessarily imply that independent regulatory authorities are created, as in the British case;
rather, it underlines the fact that as far as UWS undertakings become more autonomous and concerned on




calculated on the basis of the estimated needs; wherever these quantities were not
available in the same municipality, state (and later on regional) authorities were compelled 
to realize and finance transfer schemes, aqueducts and supply facilities. In a following
phase, the same approach was adopted once sewage collection and treatment became
mandatory and required urban areas to be endowed with appropriate sanitation and
treatment facilities; this occurred in particular after law 319/1976, starting water quality 
protection policies in Italy.
Regional planning can be seen therefore as the counterpart of urban water systems 
managed by local authorities. In fact it was in the planning sphere that the bulk of capital
expenditure was financed (meaning that local finance was able to cover only a small
fraction) and where the decisions on infrastructural development were taken.
Urban networks for distribution and sanitation, in turn, remained in municipal hands. In 
a number of cases – and especially in the urbanized areas of the North – municipalities 
were able to create own management systems that were capable enough to deal with local
problems and develop urban networks. The model of the municipal company (similar to 
many respect to the German Stadtwerke), often organized as multiutilities also dealing 
with electricity, gas distribution, transport, waste management and other local services)
provided quite a successful management system; as in the German case, it allowed cross-
subsidies and provided municipalities with a powerful engine for activating infrastructural
policies. This model, however, remained for the most part confined to cities, although in 
some areas, especially in the North, voluntary associations and syndicates of small
municipalities in rural or semi-urban areas were also created. 
Dualism between regional planning and municipal management, dominance of a supply-
side approach (estimated ‘water needs’ as the base for regional planning), financing 
through the public budget of all new facilities, physical fragmentation of water 
management systems were the main characteristics of the ancién règime.
Poor performance records, overall lack of professional inefficiency and financial
unsustainability of this dualistic model became apparent quite soon, and especially in the 
second half of the 1980s (Massarutto, 1993). Regional planning of facilities revealed a 
powerful and effective way of starting the process and ensuring a baseline of treatment 
facilities. Yet its bureaucratic approach, dominated by a culture of public works, 
construction and engineering – easily exposed to the ‘capturing forces’ of construction 
industry and suppliers of technology – quite soon revealed to be inconsistent with the 
need to ensure efficient design and appropriate management of the newly built facilities. 
Infrastructure development was often considered as an end in itself rather than a way to
improve management systems.
Many observers at the time pointed out that regional planning had been quite effective
where its local counterpart was a municipal water company with adequate managerial
capabilities and enough ‘contractual force’ to impose its investment agenda to the 
regional planner. Much worse results had been obtained where regional planning met 
with small, under-staffed and poorly professionalized direct management organizations 
(for a survey of the debate see Massarutto, 1993). 
Another pressure for change arose from the increasing difficulty of the municipal firms 
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to survive in a world that was increasingly dominated by liberalization of public services, 
increasing need to self-sustain budgets and reduce costs. Liberalization were considered 
as a strategy for ensuring that the market could carry on both the task of relieving the 
public budget and allow the water industry to develop, possibly allowing the most
efficient among municipal firms to evolve as players on the national market. 
The main pressure factors arising unsustainability of UWS systems before the reform can 
be summarized as follows (IRSA-CNR, 1999): 
x Availability of resources for drinking water supply is threatened by qualitative factors in 
the North and by quantitative factors in the South. Water supplies in the North are 
relying substantially on underground resources that are increasingly contaminated
by agriculture and threatened by the inheritance of unplanned and poorly regulated
urban and industrial development during the past decades. In the South, the main 
challenges regard the need to share storage facilities between drinking water and 
other uses – what also gave rise to inter-regional disputes7 – and the still 
insufficient supply of many areas especially in Sicily. Peak summer demand for 
tourism is also representing a pressure arising temporary scarcity problems. 
x Surface water quality is overall poor. The torrential nature of most Italian rivers makes 
the comparison with Northern European situation more difficult; anyway, the few 
water quality protection plans issued by Regions according to the WFD show that 
the actual situation is quite far from the target of “good ecological status”. This 
problem is substantially contributed by urban water discharges. The EU Urban 
Wastewater Directive (Dir. 91/271) is still to be fully implemented and is currently
driving the capital expenditure. During the last 30 years, treatment capacity has 
been rapidly reached 60 per cent of pollution loads but in later years investment has
stopped and existing facilities have been suffering from poor maintenance and 
managing difficulties. The outcome in terms of pollution control has been far 
insufficient; while stopping (and in some cases inverting) deterioration trends in the
bigger rivers, there is also evidence of worsening conditions in smaller rivercourses 
even in rural or semi-urban areas. 
x Increasing difficulties in rainwater management, especially in the large suburban areas, 
characterized by urban sprawl and chaotic development.
x Low water prices guaranteed affordability, but in the context of a drastic reduction of 
available public funds this simply was implying severe underinvestment and 
incapability of facing any new challenge, while EU directives were calling for a
dramatic investment effort. 
x Leopard-skin management system with many areas of excellence but also very poor
performance in other areas. Reproduction of ‘best practices’ and cross-fertilization
aimed at exporting good management solutions to under-developed areas is 
required. Given the centralized financial system, most operators suffered from 
limited decision autonomy and limited capacity to start the search for new solutions 
autonomously
7 This happens for example in the case of upstream reservoirs located in Basilicata Region and supplying
drinking water and irrigation in the downstream Region Puglia. A complex institutional agreement has
finally been found between both Regions and the national government (for details see Mazzola, 2005). 
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Law 36/1994 aimed at a comprehensive reform tackling with these problems. Its basic 
principles were (Massarutto, 1993): 
x Full intermunicipal responsibility for public supply and sewerage within geographical areas
individuated by Regions (ATO8) with the aim of increasing size of management areas
in order to redistribute water resources and costs, minimize the need of inter-area 
transfers, make economies of scale achievable. 
x Vertical integration of responsibility on the whole urban water cycle under the same 
authority (inter-municipal agency for each ATO). Basic quality requirements are 
provided by legislation and regional environmental planning and external regulation. 
x To make professional operation compulsory through the elimination of direct labour 
organizations and the obligation for the ATO to delegate a single operator for the 
management of the whole UWS. Alternative allowed models range from publicly-
owned companies to delegation; mixed-venture solutions were also allowed. In all 
cases, including public undertakings, a contractual approach is required in order to
formalize obligations. 
x Full-cost recovery through charges (although some margin remains for the state to
subsidize large projects judged to be in the general interest); the state fixes rules for 
water prices concerning tariff structure, maximum increase rates and benchmarks to 
be respected. 
More in detail, the regulatory system devises a model in which investment choices are 
made by the ATO (through the asset management and development plan – AMDP –
representing the base for the contract with the operator). Assets are provided as a 
gratuitous loan for use, while the plan foresees that tariffs increase in order to allow the 
operator finance the investment levels to which it is committed by the AMDP. There are 
margins for the operator to renegotiate the AMDP, in the first place through the
tendering process, and secondarily through subsequent voluntary agreements during the 
contract.
Larger scale UWS management and full responsibility over asset planning and operation 
has the aim of creating self-sufficient management units that can have a better oversight 
over available resources and feel more responsible for their appropriate management.
Individuation of ‘reserve zones’ – water resources that are suitable to be used in the
future for drinking water purposes and should be managed according to precautionary
principles – is a legal requirement for each ATO. In general it seems possible to single 
out such resources quite easily almost everywhere, at least from a technical point of view.
However, this requires selective limits to development imposed for the general interest of 
the ATO. 
The ATO system is also conceived in order to allow market-based financial mechanisms,
leveraged by water tariffs, to carry on the burden of investment. Regional planning, 
following this design, would concentrate on environmental regulation and framing of 
long-term investment strategies. Larger scale is also conceived in order to alleviate the 
impact of water prices by keeping together areas with different marginal costs of supply 
8 ATO is the acronym of ambito territoriale ottimale, which means optimal territorial units.
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(especially urban and rural areas, assuming that the main explanatory factor for cost
differentials is urban density). 
Self-sustainability should also guarantee industry viability and allow investment to restart
– both new investment required by the EU and renewal of ageing infrastructure. 
Privatization and corporatization of water companies is expected to foster efficiency 
gains and favour an economic rationality in the setting up of asset management and
development plans. 
In the following years, however, the reform had to face many problems and difficulties. 
After 11 years its implementation is still on a leopard-skin base, although the institutional 
transformations are consolidating (Muraro, 2005). All Regions have finally transposed the 
national framework legislation, but this required many years. The number of ATOs that
have completed the necessary steps (constitution of the agency, check-up of existing 
systems, issue of the AMDP, choice of the operator, contract) is currently below the 50
per cent of the total.
In the meanwhile, UWS reform was also affected by liberalization policies affecting 
public utilities (in general) and local utilities in particular. The reform of gas and 
electricity industry, in particular, created the opportunity for many municipal companies 
– as we said, in many cases they were organized as multi-utilities – to act as players in the 
new liberalized industries. Either forced by legislation or building on their own business 
capacity and assets, the most dynamic companies started a repositioning process that is 
still taking place. Transformation into private-law establishments, mergers (mostly on a 
territorial base), quotation in the stock exchange, vertical integration (e.g. through the 
acquisition of power generation facilities or bulk gas import contracts), diversification 
(e.g. towards telecommunications and other market activities) are some of the most
distinguished trends (Vaccà, 2003). While allowing municipal companies to obtain 
brilliant economic results, these strategies also imply a reduced commitment to invest in 
local infrastructure development; the water sector, characterized by low economic
margins and heavy long-term risks due to investment has been one of the first to be 
penalized (Dorigoni et al., 2005). 
At the same time, the national government – also pressed by the EU – has engaged in a 
reform of local utilities that was clearly oriented by a liberalization design (Massarutto, 
1999). Project laws on compulsory competitive tendering for all utilities – including water 
as well as waste management as the most likely candidate - were nearly passed, and finally 
blocked or weakened due to fierce resistance of local powers. Three legislative reforms 
have been passed between 2000 and 2003 (Bognetti and Piacentino, 2005; Robotti, 2002; 
De Vincenti, 2005). 
In the actual legislation – still exposed to pressures to change in the direction of further 
liberalization – municipality maintain the possibility to directly entrust own undertakings 
only by following the strict criteria of in-house provision;9 otherwise, a competitive
9 ‘In-house provision’ is an EU term for undertakings of any legal form, provided that municipalities have
the same degree of control that they would have on their own offices; and provided that the concerned
undertaking is delivering the substantial part of its activity on behalf of the owner local authority. 
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tendering process must take place, even if the company is participated by the local 
authority. Tenders may regard delegation, as well as the choice of private partners in 
municipally-owned companies. This latter mechanism was used for example in the first 
ever tender implementing law 36/94, in the ATO of Arezzo in Tuscany, where the 
French multinational Suez (with some local partners) finally won the tender and become 
co-owner of the company (de La Motte, 2005). 
A new model for providing UWS: challenges and trade-offs 
The management system before the reform was clearly giving origin to unsustainable
trade-offs. It was unable to guarantee adequate appropriation of resources for future 
urban water supplies and to avoid segregation problems caused by diffused pollution and
externalities. Management system seemed unable to ensure viability and economic
efficiency of the water industry.
The new model aims at providing a sustainable and economically viable solution, and was
welcomed at its appearance by an overwhelming consensus. After eleven years, however, 
its implementation is still lagging behind.
The reasons of this delay have often been deemed as transitory and reduced to simple 
‘technical’ problems. Many observers have blamed local authorities unwilling to give up
privileges, municipal companies reluctant to abandon their captive markets and the 
related monopoly rents, the incoherence of regulatory behaviour (at least once it came to 
allowing price increase), etc. Our point is, instead, that the policymaker has dramatically 
undervalued the political and institutional dimension of the governance problem of 
reform design and implementation; this neglect, if not adequately resolved in the future,
could seriously hamper the potential benefits of the reform. 
We can use the governance issues framework outlined above in order to elaborate on 
this, and later on to extrapolate some insights on future sustainability of the reformed 
system.
First of all, concentration of management systems into the ATOs has raised status issues 
representing a formidable obstacle that has blocked achievement of consensus for many 
years, and is still causing tensions and conflicts within the ATOs.
An example of status issues is the designation of reserve zones, just cited, where some 
municipalities are forced to impose restrictions on local development for the sake of 
safeguarding resources in the interest of the whole ATO; these restrictions cannot be
compensated (unless through general measures such as rural development plans; these 
measures, however, are not managed by the same authorities being in charge for water
policies).
More generally, converging into compulsory intermunicipal agencies is a process in which
loss of autonomy over service organization and tariff setting is causing many 
redistributional effects. These do not only regard decisionmaking and tariffs, but also 
more practical issues, as for example the need to define common criteria to evaluate 
assets that municipalities will have to put in common. Some of them had old and ageing
assets while others were new; some of them had spent their own money while others had
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been largely subsidized, and so on. Governance structures of the new boards require 
complex balances between larger urban areas and small municipalities, whose weight in 
terms of population is usually smaller. Regions – in charge of defining ATO’s governance 
rules – have introduced complex mixtures weighing on the number of municipalities, 
surface, population and so on. 
The second category of trade-offs regards legitimation and democracy, and is directly linked 
with the setup of the regulatory framework and the choice to move away from public 
finance systems. 
As we noted above, the institutional system created by l.36 is not fully consistent with the
kind of development – both in industry strategy and liberalization policies – occurring in 
the present phase, since the latter would call for a more flexible but firmly adversarial 
regulatory approach, while the existing one is dominated by rigid ex ante norms
(contracts, tenders, price regulation formulas) and is subject to collaborative discretional
renegotiation.
Even if the preferred option that municipalities have adopted so far is that of the mixed 
venture publicly-controlled company, in fact these undertakings are becoming much 
more autonomous from local strategic control. They grow in size acquiring a much larger 
scale than that of the original municipality, whose individual weight declines; the entrance 
of private partners or the stock exchange is another factor enhancing the business-like 
nature of former municipal companies.
Privatization, even in this relatively soft version, is often presented as an undue sale of 
assets of public property aimed at allowing private profit from the provision of essential 
services (Somma, 2003). So far, this has resulted in more active campaigning without too
strong opposition; yet the big challenge will be to face people reaction when the 
privatized water industry will have to face the first critical decisions. 
In the present phase, while public reaction to privatization seems overall not very strong, 
the main problems seem to lie in the institutional sphere and in the regulatory model.
Weakness and inconsistencies of the regulatory system have to be underlined. There is an 
evident lack of regulatory devices enabling local authorities to engage in a more 
adversarial relation with the UWS operator, especially if this relation is conceived for the 
long term (twenty to thirty years of concession are the norm) and operator is charged 
with investment responsibility. Ex-ante regulation, based on tenders and contracts, very 
soon revealed to be ineffective as a means to renegotiate contract obligations. Risk of 
regulatory capture is evident; but there is also a corresponding risk that municipalities will 
not fully remain committed to maintain business viability after the contract has been 
released. If this occurs, the water company takes the risk that the recovery of its sunk 
costs will not be allowed once the assumptions of the original AMDP will reveal wrong.10
10 An example is provided by water consumption levels. In order to maintain the price per cubic meter low,
many AMDPs foresee a significant increase in per capita water consumption. Contracts do not usually
guarantee that the total revenue will match costs. In many cases, water companies have not been able to
obtain the foreseen revenues since demand did not actually grow so much; but municipalities were
reluctant to consider this as a case for renegotiation.
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It can also be questioned whether asking a private to carry on investment plans that have
been designed in detail by local authorities is the best way to ‘delegate’ investment 
responsibility. In fact the risk for the water company is reduced (since investment level
are clearly indicated in the contract and further investment would need renegotiation),
but also increased (since there is no guarantee that the choice made has been really 
effective and efficient, and the company before the tender is not in the best position to
assess its validity. 
These difficulties at the moment are causing obstacles and delays. Investment has not
started according to plans, takeover of responsibilities slower than expected. With no 
surprise, systems that could count on a previously established management structure
continue to perform substantially better, but with the serious risk that formerly public, 
now semi-privatized water companies, also engaged in development strategies in other 
sectors, are left free to ‘forget’ the local water system, while they continue to enjoy an
information monopoly that makes ATO enforcement less effective and credible.
Many observers have underlined that the ongoing evolution is quite contradictory: while 
promoting market development and competition, it creates strong obstacles to the 
overall transformation that municipal companies had started autonomously (Massarutto,
2002; Drusiani et al., 2004). In fact, mergers and partial privatization have favoured an
overall development of the local utility industry between 1995 and 2005, but this was also
favoured by the fact that municipalities still could maintain degrees of freedom in the 
choice of the organizational model. The rigid model based on the alternative between “in 
house” and tendering has the paradoxical effect of bringing once again in vogue the 
management models that the previous reforms had tried to get rid of. Fearing the risk 
that tenders would force them lose control over water utilities, most ATOs are now
favouring the creation of brand new 100 per cent public water companies operating at 
each ATO level; the future relations between these companies and the former
municipally-owned companies, now partially privatized, are still unclear. 
A third category of issues regards patterns of risk allocation that are implicit in the chosen 
regulatory model. In the economic literature there is a broad consensus on the idea that 
in order to provide the base for efficient tendering, investment responsibilities should be 
relieved from the operating company. This is in fact what ATOs try to do with the very
detailed AMDPs they use as the basis of tenders and contracts; however, this reproduces 
the same dualism between operation and investment planning that law 36/94 aimed at 
eliminating. On the other hand, as the world experience shows, placing investment risk
on operators is feasible at acceptable costs only if adequate degrees of flexibility are 
allowed by the contract and if market risks are substantially reduced (Massarutto, 2005).
This remark has found a nearly immediate empirical proof (Drusiani et al., 2004).
Immediately after the first tenders and service assignments, most ATOs have met 
unexpected difficulties in the management of the approved AMDPs and relations with
water companies. After the contracts were released many water companies discovered
that economic and technical assumptions on which they were based had to be 
substantially changed, and this gave origin to conflicts in particular where the water 
company had been significantly privatized. 
Evolution of regulatory institutions, framed by law 36/94, was dominated by the idea of
delegating managing responsibilities, from operation to investment and asset planning, to
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water companies. The AMDP, first issued by the ATO and later renegotiated with the 
water company, was quite obviously implying a direct relation between both actors and a
collaborative regulatory framework. On the other hand, this is made increasingly difficult 
both by the strict legal requirements for tendering and adversarial contracting out, and by 
the increasing distance – in terms of strategy and behaviour – of former publicly-owned 
companies, now clearly oriented to the open market and quite unwilling to sacrifice their 
economic margins in order to accomplish local water policy agendas. Often municipal
officers feel the contradiction of being at the same time members of the shareholders’ 
assembly of water companies and of the boards of the ATO, with the conflicting
pressures of maximizing company returns, consumers’ welfare and long-term 
sustainability.
Such a mechanism could encourage local politicians to sacrifice sustainability, being 
pressed at the same time by the need to avoid service price increases maintain economic 
viability of the companies; this also allows municipalities to alleviate their budget crisis 
through dividends, capital gains and eventually company sales (Dorigoni et al., 2005). 
Long-term investment is thus the best candidate for the sacrifice, since the time horizon 
of public decisionmakers is constrained by their electoral mandate. 
Many municipalities are now trying to avoid this problem by creating own asset 
ownership companies that rent facilities to water companies in exchange for concession 
fees that can be calculated on the base of asset value. This solution is regarded as a 
practical way out of the dilemma, since it can at least guarantee that cash flows originated 
by depreciation of assets come under the control of municipalities (Fazioli and Matino, 
2003). On the other hand, there are obvious counter-indications: if final prices do not 
change, the net loser is the shareholder of the water company (sometimes the
municipality itself, but often also the private partners to which shares have been sold on 
the basis of a business plan that did not include a fee for the municipality). Yet the major
risk lies in the fact that asset ownership companies could be tempted to play a stronger 
role, not limited to financial management of assets but also extended to design and 
investment decision. This is not to be welcomed, since it would reproduce once again the
dualism between asset management and operation that l.36/94 appropriately had tried to
eliminate (Massarutto, 2005). 
A fourth issue, finally, is related to allocation of costs, and regards the actual capacity of the
existing mechanism to transfer the finance of the UWS on tariffs without causing 
substantial tensions and conflicts. In fact, the lack of evident conflicts in the present 
phase can also be attributed to the fact that the change really perceived by final 
customers is still very limited. What will happen once the water prices will rise up to the 
cost-recovering level? The next section develops a first exploratory analysis of this issue. 
Implementing the WFD: the first challenge for the privatized water system 
In order to provide a first explorative answer to the this question, we have made a 
simulation based on the ongoing experience in two Regions – Emilia-Romagna and 
Lombardia – that have been among the first to complete the regional planning 
documents implementing the EU water framework directive, and allow therefore a 




The study has been originated by the legal requirement posed on Regions by Dlgs 
152/99 to set up an action plan aimed at implementing requirements of previous 
directives (with special focus on 91/271 and 91/676) as well as achieving GES (thus 
anticipating the WFD, though with some inconsistencies).11 Thus, the action plan
contains either obligatory actions or discretional ones. Economic assessment of the 
action plan is also required, although the approach chosen was far from a real cost-
effectiveness analysis (much less a cost-benefit analysis), since scenarios and action plans
were individuated by regional technicians after a simulation made out of hydrologic 
models, and economic analysis could intervene only in the last phase for assessing costs. 
Therefore, no real trade-off of alternative scenarios and actions was possible. 
A second limit lies in the fact that only structural actions (new treatment facilities and 
connection to sewage systems) could be modelled in some detail, thus achieving a 
reasonable approximation of final costs; other actions could be assessed only on the base 
of literature data and very simplified models. 
A third limit – indeed acknowledged by both Regional plans – lies in the fact that the 
envisaged plan is only a starting point towards GES, since there is no guarantee that the
foreseen actions are sufficient to achieve it in all cases. This phase of the planning
process is conceived as a first selection of actions that apply in a general way to all water 
users, while ad-hoc actions will be singled out in a later phase in basins that do not 
achieve GES. For this reason, the plan also lacks a proper individuation of criteria for 
deciding about how ‘disproportionate costs’ have to be intended. 
A fourth limit lies in the fact that models operate in a deterministic way and are based on
average situations; the impact of short-run problems (e.g. temporary water shortages) is 
not considered, nor are specific actions foreseen in order to cope with emergency and
temporary problems.
With these limitations, the action plans individuate two categories of actions: 
x Structural actions: improvements in the existing sewage treatment, reduction of 
leakage in both household supplies and irrigation, reuse of treated effluents for 
agricolture and industry 
x Non-structural actions: increasing minimum flows, reducing licensed abstractions
from rivers, introduce cleaner technologies in industry and codes of good 
practice for agriculture and livestock breeding, relocation of discharge points. 
The related costs are individuated both in total absolute terms and with respect to the
actors that are materially required to pay for it. Thus for example infrastructure cost
regarding the WSS system is translated into water price increases for consumers; those 
regarding irrigation networks are supposed to be partially subsidized and partially paid by 
farmers through charges; non-structural actions are normally referred to income losses of
economic actors affected. 
11 See Iefe and Gruppo 183, 2004, for an analysis of the main divergences from the approach of Dlgs 152
and the WFD.
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Table 2 summarizes the main economic indicators elaborated.Scenarios are characterised
in terms of institutional arrangements for achieving a greater perequation of costs among
areas or at avoiding too drastic increase of water prices. 
The main results, aggregated at the regional level, are summarized in Table 3. As we can
see, the sustainability gap is quite pronounced in both Regions but especially in Emilia-
Romagna (where a larger amount of investment has been made in the past); conversely, 
the additions required to the existing system are comparatively greater in Lombardia.
In both Regions, the starting point shows a substantial gap between water prices and
actual full costs. Overall, a significant increase of the water price is expected (up to 120 
and 150 € per capita/year, with significant differences among areas). The most relevant
determinant of this cost can be individuated in pipelines rather than in treatment 
facilities, with a dramatic increase in rural and less concentrated areas. Overall, the total 
cost of planned actions can be quantified in 101 million euros/year for Emilia Romagna 
and 588 million euros for Lombardia). In terms of affordability, the overall cost remains 
below critical thresholds on average (around 1 per cent of average per capita GDP in all 
cases); on the other hand low-income families can suffer a much higher impact, that in 
some districts has been estimated in 4 to 7 per cent. 
These results are highly dependant on the assumptions concerning capital cost. In the 
simulations, two alternative values have been considered, for public and private sector 
indebtment, respectively for new and existing capital assets. In scenario 2 we have
simulated the impact of a strict full cost recovery requirement, implying the adoption of 
the market rate for all assets. The result is striking: the regional averages jump at 1.2 to 
1.9 per cent (though remaining below the threshold of 3 per cent);12 yet average values 
are problematic in some districts (reaching peaks of 2.6 per cent in some cases). Low-
income families in some cases would have to pay little less than 10 per cent of their 
annual income on water, what would be very difficult to accept. Both indicators show 
that actions aiming at an inter-district perequation, as well as alleviating the condition of 
low income families are needed in order to make the policy acceptable. In any case, the 
increase of water prices will be quite significant and sudden, and will require a careful 
management on the political side. These results are even more worrying, since the
estimate of total costs is probably undervalued, being based on standard costs and 
estimates; moreover, it does not take into account further costs that are required for 
upgrading the water supply and sewerage system but are not directly linked to the WFD. 
Once these considerations are made, the affordability of full-cost recovery is seriously in
doubt; this confirms what other authors have noticed in other case studies in other EU 
countries (Barraqué, 2004). Even in England and Wales the acceptability of FCR has
reached a critical limit in correspondence to the need that many water companies have to 
engage in high investment for replacing existing assets. In some cases this difficulty is at 
the origin of the creation of innovative financial solutions substantially based on the take-
back of ownership of facilities and responsibility on the public sector or mixed public-
private entities that take over the ownership of investment and the responsibility for its
long term maintenance (Di Domenico et al., 2005). 
12 In the literature, critical thresholds for affordability are commonly considered in the range 1 to 3 per cent
(see de Carli et al., 2002 for a review). 
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Table 2: Economic indicators for structural and non structural actions
Structural actions Non-structural actions
Identification of main use and non-use EF 
Quantification of main consumptive usesTotal full cost of existing assets
13
Total value of water for productive uses
Actual sustainability gap14 Total cost depending from actions (brokendown by economic sector15)
Differential total cost (per year) of new 
assets, broken down by single actions
Total cost
(social cost) 
Total investment in new assets
Water price increase (per m3 and per 
capita)
Estimated number of dwellings, surfaces
and working places affectedSpecific cost (cost to specific
stakeholders) Irrigation water price increase (per ha) Income reduction for affected firms 
Affordability
Total per capita annual expenditure (of 
average and low-income families)/per
capita GDP
Cost-
effectiveness Cost per unit of target achieved (in terms of reduction of main pollutants concentration)
Table 3: Summary of main economic indicators
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 








181 75 354 169 149 75
Averag
e 0.7 1.2 1.2 1.9 0.7 1.2Average water
bill as a % of 
family income Range 0.4 - 1.8 0.8 - 1.9 0.7 - 2.3 1.3 - 2.6 0.4 - 1.7 0.8 - 2.8 
Averag
e 3.1 3 4.9 4.8 2.8 3Affordability
index16
Range 1.8 - 7.3 2.2 - 4 3.0 - 9.8 3.4 - 5.6 1.7 – 7 2.1 - 3.8 
13 Criteria for cost assessment are based on reconstruction costs of existing assets and a depretiation 
schedule that is coherent with true economic life. For more details see Appendix I and II.
14 Sustainability gap is intended as the difference between actual full cost of existing assets, calculated as in 
note 10 and direct revenues from water prices
15 For agriculture, industry and hydropower the criteria adopted are the same as described in par.
16 Affordability index = % of water bill on poorer families’ income. 
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The cost of non-structural measures has been evaluated considering alternative scenarios
for minimum flow requirements and their likely impacts in terms of reduced irrigated 
land and power generation. In the first case, the diminution of available irrigation water 
due to the minimum flow is sometimes compensated by actions aimed at using water
more efficiently. 
Table 4 shows the expected reduction of irrigated surface, and the related income loss, in
some of the district considered. In the finally chosen rule for minimum flow, the 
expected reduction is contained to 1 to 2 per cent due to the above cited compensative 
actions.
Overall, the expected cost of minimum flow requirements is of an order of magnitude 
lower than for infrastructural actions (7 million in terms of reduced income for farmers 
plus 9 million for water-saving actions that are funded by public contributions in Emilia-
Romagna; while in Lombardia the expected impact on farmers is 0, since the hypothesis
is that water savings compensate fully the reduction in raw abstractions); on the other
hand, this cost is shared by a small minority of actors; farmers affected by a reduced 
irrigation capacity would entail an income reduction that is low with respect to total
irrigated land (€27/ha on average), but much higher for the farmers that are actually
affected (the value of being irrigated ranging between €309 and €3,682/ha depending on 
the crops). It is also interesting to compare this figure with the cost of water-saving 
actions (on average €37/ha with a range of 5-281). Apparently, reducing water losses is 
socially beneficial, and would remain acceptable if at least part of this cost would be 
charged to farmers. 
A similar deduction can be made for hydropower, for which the total estimated cost of 
minimum flows is calculated in the range of €20 to €30 million per year in Emilia 
Romagna.
Table 4 – Cost of non structural actions – Emilia-Romagna
€/year
(millions)
€/y per ha 
irrigated




Water-saving 9 37 5–281
Irrigation
Reduction of 1.6% 7 27 1.681 309–3.682
Reduction: Social cost(€/year, millions) 
Private cost
(€/year, millions) 
20% 25.7 - 32.9 18.9 - 25.7 
30% 38.5 - 49.4 28.4 - 38.5 
Hydropower
40% 51.3 - 65.9 37.8 - 51.3 
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Antonioli and Massarutto (2005) argue from these figures the evidence of a potentially 
inefficient allocation of water rights between civil and agricultural sector: since the cost
of infrastructural actions is much higher, households would be willing to pay farmers for 
reducing irrigation (and improve minimum flows) instead than paying for further WSS
infrastructure. However, the Italian system lacks the possibility for such an arrangement,
which is widely diffused in other EU systems (Heinz et al., 2002). 
Conclusions
The radical reshaping of Italian UWS can be traced back to various triggering factors, 
both internal to the water sector (such as the crisis of the ‘structuralist’ model based on
infrastructure and supply-side measures) and more general ones (such as the crisis of the 
public finance and the trend towards liberalization of ‘services of general interest’). It
aims at solving some contradictions of the previous model (and the related conflicts); on 
the other hand, it also changes substantially the allocation of power and responsibilities, 
and by doing so starts redistributive processes and creates new balances and equilibria. 
Some social actors gain, some others are net losers – or appear as such. While the 
capacity of the new framework to solve for the existing vicious circles and conflicts, it 
starts new problems and conflicts. 
Five main issues arise from the analysis presented in this paper: First, the chosen method 
of financing water investment raises some doubts on its capacity to remain sustainable in 
the long term. Once all costs will have transferred – including the value of existing assets 
– the impact on family budget will be significant. Of course this will happen only in the 
long term, and hopefully by that time economic growth will help compensate this 
negative effect; savings due to operational efficiency gains can also be expected. Yet the 
striking differences arising from assumptions on the cost of capital show that in a capital-
intensive industry like UWS show the importance of a system that provides the right 
incentives to invest and allows relieving the private sector of at least part of the 
investment risk. Achieving cost of capital lower than the market is possible only if public-
sector devices are introduced for sharing this risk; if the constraints on public finance are 
binding, this could be achieved through the creation of ear-marked systems.
Second, it seems clear that huge differences are likely to take place between different 
ATOs. The assumption that enlarging the management scale at the ATO level would be 
sufficient for alleviating regional disparities seems over-optimistic. If we consider that 
Lombardia and Emilia-Romagna are among the wealthiest Regions in the country and 
their water systems quite less problematic than in other areas of the country, this seems 
even more a worrying prediction. Mechanisms for redistributing the cost burden at the 
regional or basin level seem appropriate; at least, we need to consider that the actual
assumptions are derived from plans that are still insufficient to meet the WFD 
requirements. Further actions could be financed through a more equilibrated allocation 
of costs. 
Third, it seems that infrastructural actions – while unavoidable and for sure needed – are
not enough; while further steps towards the achievement of WFD targets will require 
demand-side measures that involve other water users. The paradox seems to lie in the 
fact that these actions at present have a far lower marginal cost – one order of magnitude 
lower; but they are politically difficult to adopt, since their burden would fall on 
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concentrated areas and economic categories. The individual economic impact would be 
much higher, while infrastructural action, even if more costly, have a lower individual 
impact since they can be averaged out on a large number of customers. The system is still 
dominated by infrastructural approaches and sectoral solutions, despite some evidence 
starts to appear showing that this strategy is both insufficient and inefficient. 
However, it would be more convenient for the society as a whole to use the first 
measures. In other countries, the dilemma is pragmatically solved by allowing urban 
water users to compensate farmers or industry for the economic impact of the action – 
be it reallocating water rights on cheap resources or paying farmers for abandoning
polluting cropping systems or reducing livestock concentration. Another example could
be the creation of ear-marked budgets, partially financed by the water bill, for covering
the cost of rehabilitation of polluted sites. 
Fourth, there seems to be some inconsistency between the regulatory system devised for 
water services and the implementation of environmental regulations. AMDPs on which
water services have been contracted out do not incorporate any requirement arising from
the WFD; in the best cases – not in all cases – they include just requirements arising from 
the UWWD, and also making optimistic and conservative assumptions over the 
interpretation that Regional plans will adopt. Consequently, introducing the new 
requirements in already existing contracts will require renegotiation, while both ATOs 
and water companies, for different reasons, might be reluctant to add new obligations
arising in new investment and tariff increase. 
Finally, an overall contradiction emerges between the approach to liberalization – mostly 
based on competitive tendering – and the evolutionary path that is more often followed
at the local level, based instead on the evolution of former public monopolies into 
privately participated ones. Uncertainty of the regulatory framework and its patent 
difficulty in managing long-term issues and investment responsibilities in particular 
represent a serious risk that the whole construction, despite its sophisticated articulation, 
will fail to deliver what it was mainly intended – namely, modernization of UWS systems, 
maintenance, replacement and new investment face to the new challenges imposed by 
EU regulation. These considerations allow us to anticipate the likely ‘urban water
conflicts’ that will characterize the Italian system in the next years.
In any case, the underlying economic cost is much higher than anticipated in the first 
AMDPs and will impact heavily on family budgets in the medium-long run, with
substantial disparities between ATOs and Regions. Systems aimed at reducing long-run
costs and achieve a more equitable sharing will probably be necessary in order to 
maintain social and political consensus.
Privatization, or at least increased managerial autonomy of water companies, is taking
place without the capacity to develop a regulatory framework that is coherent with it.
Many municipalities give signals of their willingness to go back to direct public 
management schemes just in order to avoid regulatory problems that the actual system
does not provide them with the means to solve appropriately. But the fear is that 
traditional public governance schemes cannot anymore guarantee adequate strategic 
supervision and performance control.
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If these trade-offs will not appropriately dealt with in the next phases of the reform
implementation, the likelihood that the new system will actually delivered what is 
expected in terms of investment levels and overall improvement of efficiency and 
management capabilities will remain questionable. 
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Introduction
With globalization, processes of ‘shrinking’ have gained importance in many cities and 
regions of the developed world. While many cities in the developing world are still 
growing, old industrial centres in the United States (Detroit), Europe (Manchester, 
Leipzig) and Russia (Ivanovo) have suffered from economic decline and significant 
population losses (Oswalt, 2004). In the social science literature, shrinking is described as 
a three-dimensional phenomenon (Hannemann, 2003). First, it means deindustrialization:
old industries decline without being replaced by modern services, i.e. the economic base 
of a city or a region erodes. Second, there is a declining population size, resulting from 
outward migration and a birth rate that is lower than the mortality rate. Thirdly, shrinking 
is characterized by suburbanization, leading to a socio-spatial differentiation between
declining core cities and former residential areas on one hand and growing or at least 
stable suburbs on the other. 
The shrinking of cities and regions has major consequences for networked infrastructure 
systems, which were priorly designed for satisfying the demands of a growing population 
under conditions of economic growth. Now they have to cope with exactly the opposite 
conditions, which paves the way for major, albeit contested, transformations. The latter
are accelerated by the growing commercialization of infrastructure provision, which 
Bakker calls the ‘introduction of markets as allocation mechanisms, and the introduction
and elevation of the profit motive to the primary goal’ (Bakker, 2003). In turn,
infrastructural transformations may affect socio-spatial development insofar as
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deterioration or an increase in price of infrastructure provision reduces the profitability 
of economic activities and worsen the living conditions of significant parts of the 
population, thereby making a city or a region even less attractive.
Despite these interrelations, infrastructure reorganization and spatial shrinking in regions
have largely been neglected by the social and regional sciences. In this paper, we analyse
the shrinking of cities and regions from the perspective of infrastructural restructuring. 
We do so, first, through a critical review of two bodies of literature: one on shrinking and 
the other on splintering urbanism. Our core argument is that each one suffers from 
neglecting the findings of the other, and that a combination of the two can shed new
light on important societal processes and contribute to new theoretical insights. Second,
we report on some findings from the investigation of water and wastewater systems in 
East German regions, with special attention to Brandenburg and the Frankfurt/Oder 
region on the Polish-German border.1 At issue here is to what extent the restructuring of 
networked infrastructures is not only an expression and a result of shrinking but also the 
very medium through which socio-spatial differentiation processes and shifts in the 
forms of urban and regional governance take place. The last section discusses the 
conceptual improvements of the empirical analysis for the splintering urbanism
approach.
Splintering and shrinking
Social science research on networked infrastructures was conducted for a long time 
primarily within the concept of Large Technical Systems (LTS). This is due to the
specific strength of this concept: to avoid the trap of technological determinism without 
falling into a socio-centrism and to conceptualize instead the development of 
infrastructures as a socio-technical process (Hughes, 1983; 1987; Mayntz and Hughes, 
1988; Coutard, 1999; Summerton, 1994). Notwithstanding this merit, there is an
important deficit that characterizes the LTS approach: space, as an analytical category, is
often neglected. In many investigations, the national scale is ‘naturalized’. And even if
scales like the European or the global ones are taken into account, there is an obvious 
deficit in dealing with the local or regional scale (see as a notable exception, Coutard et 
al., 2005).
This is where the splintering urbanism concept comes into play. Within this approach, 
infrastructural change is conceptualized as closely connected with spatial developments.
More precisely, urban development is investigated in its interactions with the 
restructuring of networked infrastructures (Graham, 2000; Graham and Marvin, 1996; 
2001; Guy et al., 2001; Offner, 2000), which are seen to have a basic, often 
underestimated importance for urban life. They organize the ‘perpetual process of
transformation of nature into city’ (Kaika and Swyngedouw, 2000). Furthermore, utilities 
often belong to the largest local and regional enterprises, thus being important 
employers, real estate owners and investors (Marvin et al., 1999). Recently, using a 
1 These findings are the result of the research conducted in the framework of the spatial analysis part of the
project ‘NetWORKS: Socio-Ecological Regulation of Network-Related Infrastructure Systems’, funded by 
the Federal Ministry for Education and Research. Besides Frankfurt/Oder, we also investigated the spatial
dimensions of infrastructural transformation in Munich, Hannover and Berlin.
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splintering urbanism approach, one can observe an unbundling of networked 
infrastructures: an organizational and technical segmentation of formerly standardized
systems that often goes hand-in-hand with the privatization of the profitable parts of 
infrastructure systems, whereas the less lucrative segments remain under control of the 
(local) state. On a symbolical level, this means that the promise of universal access, as 
represented in the ‘modern infrastructural ideal’, is no longer upheld. 
This process is seen to have far-reaching spatial implications: On the one hand,
privileged places like the financial and business districts of global cities, called ‘premium
network spaces’ or ‘hot spots’ of infrastructure provision, are closely connected by highly 
efficient infrastructural systems, which, on the other hand, bypass marginalized places 
like poorer residential or old-industrial areas (‘cold spots’ of infrastructure provision),
often situated in the same cities. Infrastructural transformations thus become a means of 
socio-spatial segregation or urban splintering (Gandy, 1997; Moss, 2003; 2004; Speak and
Graham, 1999; Summerton, 2004). 
A splintering urbanism approach offers a new and fascinating perspective on processes 
of urban change. It not only sheds light on the ‘invisible city’ of networked 
infrastructures by focusing the processes of their social production, but also shows how 
infrastructures themselves shape societal processes and power relations by their specific 
materialities and symbolic meanings. It is a ground-breaking approach that inspires 
empirical research on infrastructure and urban development. From our perspective,
however, there are at least two points where further conceptual work has to be done.
First, the splintering urbanism approach seems to suffer from a kind of ‘anglo-american 
bias’, insofar as it sometimes suggests a sharp break between a Fordist and a neo-liberal
mode of infrastructure provision. This certainly applied to the situations in Thatcherist
Britain and the United States under Reaganomics, but it does not necessarily apply to the
experiences of countries like Germany, where neo-liberalism had more problems
breaking up the inherited spatial and institutional constellations and societal power 
relationships of Fordism. Neither does it grasp the infrastructural transformations in 
many developing countries, which never came as close to the realization of the ‘modern
infrastructural ideal’ as did many countries in the developed world (Coutard, 2002). This
being the case, it is important to pay more attention to the variety and complexity of 
infrastructural transformations. 
Second, the study of splintering, until now, has focused on the urban scale, whereas the 
regional scale in general, and marginalized rural areas in particular, have been largely 
neglected. However, as empirical work, such as that done on Swiss mountain regions, has 
shown, infrastructural transformations with major social consequences also occur in rural 
areas (Abegg and Thierstein, 2003; Thierstein et al., 2004). Thus, it seems necessary to
expand the scalar focus of the splintering urbanism approach and to take into account
the experiences of rural areas and smaller cities in marginalized regions, too. It is against 
this background that a conceptual link between the literature on splintering and the
literature on shrinking promises to be of particular interest.
Like the research on splintering, the study of shrinking is a rather young body of
research. Back in the late 1980s Häußermann and Siebel (1988), when facing the decline 
of old industrial regions, tried to orient urban sociology towards shrinking processes. But 
research on shrinking in Germany developed only when the erosion of the economic 
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base of East Germany and the high population losses during reunification could no 
longer be ignored. This was the case in the second half of the 1990s. Research results
published since then converge on the assessment that East German development has to 
be conceptualized as a structural break, which, in contrast to West Germany, did not
bring forth a ‘post-industrial’ economy but rather produced deindustrialized or ‘de-
economized’ landscapes (Kil et al., 2003; Engler, 2002; Hannemann, 2003). Of course,
one cannot simply generalize the East German experience. Therefore, those who warn 
about rashly replacing the growth paradigm by a shrinking paradigm in urban and
regional sciences and planning are right (Häußermann, 2005; Hesse, 2003). But in view of 
an expected population loss in East German cities to the order of 25 per cent by 2025 
(Krautzberger 2001) and in view of similar processes in other old industrial centres in
Europe, North America and Asia, 2004), the assessment that shrinking is an increasingly 
important mode of spatial development within the fragmented geographies of post-
Fordism sounds quite convincing. It is exactly here where the specific merit of the 
research on shrinking cities and regions lies: to conceptualize shrinking not as a deviation
from the ‘normal’ case of urban and regional growth, but as a spatial dynamic in itself. 
In this framework, empirical work up to now has addressed the consequences of
shrinking for social infrastructures like schools, kindergartens or medical care
(Muschwitz et al., 2002) or for housing and urban renewal (Kabisch et al., 2004; 
Liebmann and Haller, 2001). Furthermore the possibilities of mobilizing social capital as 
a strategy to cope with the problems generated by shrinking have also been explored
(Bürkner, 2002; Hannemann, 2002; 2004). The interaction between shrinking and the 
transformation of networked infrastructures like water and wastewater systems, central
heat supply and local passenger transport, however, has not yet been analysed from a 
social or regional science perspective, although the research conducted by engineers,
planners and economists has shown the far-reaching implications that infrastructure
systems running on low capacity have for regional development (Koziol, 2004; Schiller
and Siedentop, 2005; Seitz, 2000). The ‘critical importance of infrastructure provision’ 
(Guy, 1999) in shrinking regions has yet to be addressed by the social sciences. 
Against this background, it seems to be of particular interest for us to explore the 
process of shrinking from an infrastructural perspective. This promises to contribute, 
first, to a better understanding of an increasingly important form of uneven spatial
development, and second, to enriching the splintering urbanism approach on an
empirical as well as on a conceptual level. We pursue this aim by investigating the 
simultaneous process of splintering and shrinking in East Germany, featuring
Brandenburg and the Frankfurt/Oder region. 
Spatial implications of the transformation of water and wastewater infrastructures 
in East Germany: The case of Brandenburg and the Frankfurt/Oder region 
East German infrastructure systems between extension and shrinking 
Brandenburg, one of the five East German Länder, is a largely rural area with 2.6 million
inhabitants. As far as its surface area is concerned, it is the largest of the five new Länder.
However, the its population density is very low. Only two of its cities, Potsdam (the 
capital) and Cottbus in the Southeast, have more than 100,000 inhabitants. Although 
Berlin is situated at the very centre of Brandenburg, it does not belong to it, forming a 
Land of its own. The effort to fuse the two Länder failed in the 1990s. 
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The city of Frankfurt, the fourth-largest of Brandenburg, is situated in the very east of
the Land on the river Oder, which marks the border between Poland and Germany in 
this region. In the 1970s and 1980s Frankfurt was the centre of the semi-conductor 
industry of the German Democratic Republic. As such it received major investments and
subsidies by the central government. Its population rose from 57,000 in the mid-1960s to
87,000 at the end of the 1980s. About 21,000 new flats were built in this period, mostly 
in new housing development areas. With the reunification, however, the economic
decline of the city began. Most of the 8,100 jobs in the semiconductor works (VEB 
Halbleiterwerk) were lost. And although there were considerable efforts to found the
city's future on its high-tech tradition, e.g. the establishment of research institutions like 
the Institute for Semiconductor Physics, subsidized by the European Union as well as by 
the National and the Land Government, the erosion of Frankfurt's economic base could 
not be prevented (Scheuplein, 2002). Finally, in 2003, the establishment of a large chip
producer failed. As a consequence of the economic decline, the city lost 22 per cent of its 
population between 1990 and 2003. In 2025 not more than 59,000 people are expected 
to live in Frankfurt (more pessimistic prognoses estimate population to fall between 
45,000 and 50,000 inhabitants). The decline in population also indicates a severe ‘brain
drain’ of experts looking for work in other regions of the country. This is a result of 
strong suburbanization, due to the bad image of the city centre and the attractive rural 
landscapes around Frankfurt (Matthiesen and Bürkner, 2004). Another of the city’s
disadvantages is its relative proximity to Berlin. The distance between the cities is only 
approximately 80 kilometres. Given the bad image of the city of Frankfurt as a place for
living, many high-income employees e.g. of the new established European University 
Viadrina prefer to live in Berlin and commute to Frankfurt.
The shrinking process has far-reaching implications on the water and wastewater 
infrastructure of the city and the region, insofar as it has fundamentally changed the 
conditions with which actors and institutions in the water sector are confronted. In the 
first years after reunification, the major task was to extend access to water and 
wastewater networks: for instance, in 1990 only 53 per cent of the population of
Brandenburg was connected to centralized sewerage. Peripheral rural areas with a low 
population density were especially disadvantaged in this respect, so that in infrastructural 
terms there existed large disparities between the city and the countryside. Some 
households were not even connected to public water supply and had to get water from
springs. Furthermore, many water and wastewater facilities had become obsolete and did
not meet the technical, ecological and sanitation standards of reunified Germany and the
European Union.
The large demand for modernization and equalization measures arosing from this
situation met with a widespread development goal after reunification. The future of East 
Germany under capitalist conditions was conceived mainly in terms of growth and
catching up with the levels of wealth and productivity of the West. Helmut Kohl's 
dictum of the ‘flourishing landscapes’ that would replace the socialist desert is possibly 
the most concise expression of the way of thinking of East Germany development. 
Infrastructure systems played a crucial role: they were considered preconditions to 
attracting expected economic and social activities. Therefore, their modernization and




Against this background, large investments were undertaken in the first half of the 1990s. 
In Frankfurt and the rural areas surrounding the city, several new sewage treatment 
plants were constructed, thereby enhancing the proportion of people with access to
centralized water and wastewater networks. However, not all urgent problems of 
infrastructure provision could be solved. Especially concerning drinking water provision, 
there is still an urgent need for modernization measures (MLUR interview). Investments 
were partly miscalculated, insofar as the development assumption did not prove true.
Instead of a growing economy with flourishing landscapes, large parts of East Germany 
in general and Brandenburg in particular faced an economic and demographic decline, 
and there was a consequent sharp decrease in water consumption (from more than 250 
to 105 litres/day per capita). Thus, the optimistic investments of the years following 
reunification resulted to a large extent in infrastructural overcapacities with some facilities 
operating only at half capacity or less (Interview BGW and DVGW).2
Environmental and socio-spatial dimensions of infrastructural problems 
The case of the sewage treatment plant of Frankfurt, driven by the utility FWA 
(Frankfurt Water and Wastewater Company), illustrates the dimensions of the problem. 
When its construction began in 1993, it was designed for 20,000 cubic metres per day. In 
1996, the real inflow was between 15,000 to 16,000 cubic metres, and today it amounts to
only 10,000 cubic metres (interview with FWA). As a consequence, FWA incurred extra 
costs to fight the malodour resulting from the facility operating with flow six times under
capacity. The amount of water necessary to flush the sewage pipes increased from 1,920
to nearly 12,000 cubic metres between 1999 and 2001 (Koziol, 2004). Efforts to save 
water are thus impeded, and a strong tension between environmental goals and the
technical demands of water and waste water systems has emerged. Constructed in a social
environment shaped by a growth discourse, these systems have become a cause of
environmental degradation, even if they are quite new and operate on the basis of
environmentally advanced technologies. Furthermore, the investments undertaken in the 
1990s and the following reduction of water consumption resulted in a high indebtedness
for the water and waste water utilities of Brandenburg. It is estimated that the debt of the 
public organizations for water and wastewater, which form only a part of all
Brandenburg utilities and mainly address rural areas, amounts to approximately 1 billion 
euros. Not surprisingly, the wastewater fees in Brandenburg are 3.31 euros per cubic
metre, compared to 2.28 euros on average in Germany (Boecker, 2004). 
The economic and environmental problems East German infrastructure systems face
under the conditions of shrinking are distributed unevenly among space and social
groups. For example, at the margin of many city centres in East Germany, people used to 
2 Of course, the creation of over-capacities in some places is also the result of corrupt deals. Constructing
or modernizing sewage treatment plants was an interesting field for private investors, who sometimes 
managed to convince a municipality to build (and pay for) a plant whose capacity exceeded the local needs
and requirements. But corrupt local state officials also took advantage of the modernization and
construction wave in the first years after reunification (see Boecker, 2004).
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live in buildings made of prefabricated slabs (Plattenbauten), a typical form of socialist 
housing that today serves as low-cost housing. In many municipalities, several of these 
buildings have been torn down recently, while others have been modernized, but many
still remain untouched. Because of the high vacancy rate in these buildings, the fixed 
costs of infrastructure provision have to be borne by fewer people, which means that the
costs which the remaining inhabitants are confronted with have increased. Taken
together, the price of water, wastewater, electricity and long-distance thermal energy in
some places is almost as much as rent in these buildings (Koziol, 2004). 
In rural areas of Brandenburg, to take another example, households which were
connected to central wastewater networks in the 1990s did not only have to pay large 
sums for their access, but are now also confronted with rising fees. Some of them had
tried to prevent the “connection by force”, as they call it, in favour of building small 
decentralised wastewater treatment plants. However, they failed in court. Now they 
articulate their protest on a political level, e.g. by forming civil initiatives and 
demonstrating in front of the building of the parliament of Brandenburg. On top of 
private households, economic activities in rural areas are disadvantaged by the high 
wastewater fees which are considered to be a severe negative location factor (Boecker 
2004).
In contrast to rural and inner-city areas, suburban spaces are not confronted as heavily 
with infrastructural problems. This is first due to the fact that suburbanization in East 
Germany accelerated in recent years and reached a new order of magnitude 
(Hannemann, 2003). Therefore the pipes serving the suburbs do not suffer from
operating at low capacity. Secondly, suburbanization is socially selective. Generally 
speaking, it is the middle and upper classes that move to the suburbs, social groups who 
can sustain to finance suburban housing. Drinking water prices and wastewater fees for 
these groups make up a far lesser share of their income than in the case of the rather 
mixed population in (peripheral) inner-city districts or rural areas. 
As these examples reveal, the problems of infrastructure systems are both a result of 
shrinking and a means through which the living and working conditions in shrinking can
be further deteriorated. In the course of this interaction between shrinking and
infrastructure systems, new forms of disparities between core cities, suburban spaces and
rural peripheries emerge and replace the old city-countryside dichotomy. Paradoxically, it 
may be the very universalizing of central infrastructure systems in the form of their
expansion to marginalized rural areas that gives rise to new forms of uneven 
development.
Infrastructural transformation as a catalyst for new forms of governance 
In spite of the far-reaching implications of shrinking for networked infrastructure 
systems, political responses have largely concentrated on housing issues. The most 
important response in this respect is the urban renewal programme, financed by the
Federal and the Länder governments (Bund-Länder-Programm Stadtumbau Ost). In the
framework of this programme, 262 eastern municipalities have worked out urban 
development concepts as a precondition for receiving subsidies. Although the
programme claims to support integrated solutions for the problems posed by the 
shrinking process, the measures completed so far mainly consist of decommissioning 
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largely unoccupied houses. As such, it is an expression of the influence of the housing 
industry, which suffers from the high vacancy rates (Franz, 2005; Hannemann, 2003; 
interview with PDS). The more comprehensive issue of considering infrastructural 
problems together with urban renewal has not yet been addressed.
This poses severe problems for the utilities. In contrast to housing enterprises, they do 
not receive any support within the framework of the urban renewal programme, and
worse, the large-scale destruction of buildings additionally confronts them with the
parallel necessity to deconstruct their networks, too, or, in the case that the abandoned
residential areas were not situated at the end of a service area but between places that still 
need to be served, to raise expenditures for the maintenance of networks. 
The rising costs of the utilities and the high demand for further modernization of water 
and wastewater facilities, which cannot simply be met by the status quo, paradoxically 
have paved the way for a further commercialization of infrastructure provision. There is 
a rather broad consensus among politicians, heads of administration and heads of the 
utilities in Frankfurt/Oder concerning the necessity of a further transformation of the 
FWA in order to increase the efficiency of the utility and expand its supply or service 
provision area (e.g. by exploiting its bridge position in respect to the Polish water 
market), and thereby enable it to contribute to improving the very precarious financial 
situation of the city. 
Commercialization does not necessarily mean selling the utility or parts of it to a private
company. It can also take place under public ownership, as the FWA reveals. The legal
status of the utility is that of a limited liability company (GmbH); 90.5 per cent of the 
shares are held by the city of Frankfurt and the rest by surrounding municipalities.
Formally, the supervisory board, composed of local and regional politicians, is
responsible for controlling the utility. But as one member of the advisory board admits,
he and the other members only get ‘filtered information’. And even if he is informed 
comprehensively, he lacks the competence for critically assessing the information
(interviews with PDS and FWA). Decisions are taken by the management of the utility in
agreement with some political and administrative heads of the local state, who secure the
political support.
Currently, there is a discussion about how to further proceed with the FWA. One option 
is to sell the utility to a private water company, which would mean taking advantage of a
situation in which private firms are prepared to pay high prices in order to enter the 
regional water markets, which are currently being restructured. Another option is the 
integration of the FWA into the Municipal Services (Stadtwerke), a semi-privatized local 
company for electricity and heat supply and local passenger transport. This option would
go along with an unbundling of the FWA, i.e. the separation between networks and 
operation, which is expected to save costs and create synergies between the different 
branches of infrastructure provision. Because this would mean a dissolution of the FWA, 
it is heavily opposed by the FWA’s management. The third and most probable option is 
to integrate the FWA into the Frankfurt Service Holding, a public enterprise that 
manages the city’s shares in housing companies, hospitals and the Municipal Services. 
However, this would be a provisional solution, only postponing the choice between a 
multi-utility company in the framework of the semi-privatized Municipal Services and a
separate water company with a strong private shareholder. 
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Thus a semi-privatization of the FWA is probable. Beyond the still debated institutional 
solution, this might have far-reaching implications for the possibilities of democratic 
control. Even now, where the utility is owned by the local state, major decision-making 
processes are rather exclusive, taking place in an informal grey area characterized by the 
articulation of a private legal form on the one hand and political and administrative 
networks on the other. Privatization might further protect the utility from democratic 
control. As the example of the Municipal Services of Frankfurt has shown, the pressure 
to raise profits has increased considerably after selling 49 per cent of the shares to two 
private companies (interviews with Treasurer, Interview Service Holding). Furthermore, 
privatization would have implications for rural areas served by the FWA. Small villages
and settlements with scattered buildings are not attractive to a private water company
whose primary goal is the maximization of profit. Neglecting these areas in terms of
infrastructure provision or leaving them to the highly indebted municipalities could be 
the result. Commercialization thus could contribute to further deepening regional 
disparities. On the other hand, this constellation could also create chances for
decentralized forms of infrastructure provision. 
According to a head of the Frankfurt administration, the city will be run like an company.
But the exact rules on how to do this have still yet to be found (interview with ASWE).
Driven by financial crisis, the actors are currently in a phase of experimentation, at the 
heart of which is the restructuring of the water and wastewater utility and other service
areas of the municipality. The direction of the ongoing transformation seems to be clear:
future decision-making processes will be more open to market forces, rather than being
led by the principles of transparency, democratic accountability and environmental 
justice. The transformation of infrastructure systems is one of the means through which 
this ‘privatization of urban governance’ takes place (Swyngedouw et al., 2002).
‘Silent privatisation’ – Conflicts over water in Brandenburg
In West Germany, privatization schemes frequently cause strong protest of different 
actors (trade unions, environmental groups, anti-globalization groups, etc.), and in some 
cases privatization has been stopped by local resistance. Conversely, in East Germany 
privatization takes place in a rather silent way. With few exceptions, e.g. Potsdam, there 
are no campaigns against privatization of former municipal water supply and wastewater 
sewage companies. Even the post-communists of the Party of Democratic Socialism
passively agree or even actively supported privatization plans. 
On the one hand, the lack of protest movements reflects the weakness of environmental 
groups and other NGOs in East Germany; on the other hand, though, it is the outcome
of the strong belief of many municipalities that there is no alternative to privatization.
Tight public budgets and the urgent need for investment force local East German
administrations to look for private investors. The upcoming privatization of the FWA is
not a public issue in Frankfurt/Oder: at the moment there are no attempts to form a 
protest campaign against privatization. But these will eventually spring up once private
investment, driven by ‘more expensive money’, will push water prices up. 
Today, a more controversial issue is that of sewerage fees. Associations of house owners
complain about the high fees for wastewater disposal, which are so high that they
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constitute a ‘second rent’ for them. In 2000, a hunger strike took place in Briesensee in
the Brandenburg Land. The inhabitants, including the mayor of the village himself, 
protested against the connection to a central sewage system, which was five times more
expensive than the construction of decentralized sewerage. After four weeks of hunger 
strike, the Ministry for Rural Development, Environment and Consumer Protection of 
Brandenburg Land agreed to study a decentralized solution for the village.3 But in 2004, 
in response to the technical staff’s resistance, house owners organized a protest camp 
and a hunger strike in front of the parliament of Brandenburg Land against the forced
connection to central sewage works (Boecker, 2004). 
Conclusions
What are the implications of our findings for further research on infrastructural 
transformations and for the splintering urbanism approach? We would like to sum this 
up in four points:
First, there is a need to extend the scale of investigation. Whereas in many cases the
urban scale is the most appropriate for investigating processes of splintering and
unbundling, in the case of infrastructural transformations under conditions of shrinking 
we have to focus upon the regional scale in order to grasp the complexity of the picture. 
As the East German experience reveals, the degradation of core cities, caused by 
deindustrialization and population losses, and the resulting emergence of cold spots of 
infrastructure provision (marginalized network spaces) are accompanied by severe 
problems in peripheral rural areas within the same region and the development of rather 
stable or even growing suburban spaces (hot spots or premium network spaces). Against 
this background we see the necessity of a shift from splintering urbanism to splintering
regionalism.
Second, the integration of rural areas into the analysis stresses that the ‘modern
infrastructural ideal’ is ‘more a deeply symbolic construction than a tangible, achievable 
reality’ (Graham, 2000). In rural areas of industrialized countries, let alone marginalized 
rural and urban areas in developing countries, the ideal invades everyday life only as a
vision of progress and emancipation. For the concerned population and the waste water 
engineers, reunification meant adopting the affluent Western standard of universal 
connection to networked public services, even in the countryside. In contrast, reality is 
often characterized by a deficient access to centralized infrastructure systems like 
wastewater disposal. That does not mean that nothing has changed, because
infrastructure provision has always been socially and spatially selective. And indeed, it is 
not only in Germany that septic tanks are here to stay in low density areas! Indeed, soil 
filtration technology has progressed in such a way that decentralized sewerage only needs
symbolic rehabilitation. However, it poses the challenge for future research on splintering 
urbanism and regionalism to pay more attention on the spatially and historically differing
constellations of disparities and uneven development, instead of focussing primarily upon the 
transition from a universal to an uneven access to infrastructure provision. The 
distinctive feature of the current, post-Fordist constellation then would be a rise in the 
3 See http://www.eigenheimer.de/grogerhu.htm.
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complexity of disparities, producing the fragmented (patchwork-like) socio-spatial and 
infrastructural landscape which Alain Lipietz compares to the fur of a leopard. 
Third, the emergence of socio-spatial disparities in infrastructure provision in the water 
and wastewater sector does not take place via the bypassing of marginalized spaces in
favour of premium network spaces, as one can observe in other networked infrastructure 
systems like telecommunications, roads and railroads. In contrast, it is the very attempt to
universalize the access to water and wastewater systems that becomes a medium for the 
development of disparities as well as for a neo-liberal shift in the modes of governance. 
This is due to the specific materiality of centralized water and wastewater infrastructures: 
Once established, they cannot be rapidly adapted to changing socio-spatial environments. 
Instead, their persistence imposes high costs on utilities, the local state and consumers in
shrinking areas. They contribute to the further degradation of these areas, giving rise to 
claims for privatization, further depriving infrastructure provision of public control. Our 
third proposal therefore is to pay more attention to specific materiality of different
networked infrastructures, which, in the case of water and wastewater systems, can result 
in a dialectical rather than a dichotomous relation between universalising and splintering.
Fourth, the experience of East Germany reveals a gap in infrastructure research: there is
a need for more in-depth analysis of infrastructural transformations in shrinking as well 
as in developing regions, taking into account urban as well as suburban and rural areas. 
In the present state of the art, East European countries in particular have been largely
neglected. However, they are of specific interest right now because their networked 
infrastructure systems can be expected to undergo major transformations in the course
of their accession to the European Union. Shrinking processes in Western old industrial
regions are still waiting to be explored from an infrastructural perspective. And lastly, 
there are poor and low-density regions in Mediterranean European countries where 
centralized infrastructure is not and will not be generalized, while in some northern
countries, part of the ecological movement proposes to disconnect houses from 
infrastructure, in a quest for ‘autonomous’ sustainability. What seems to be of particular
interest are comparative studies of shrinking and splintering. They promise to enrich the concept
of splintering urbanism with the experiences of an increasingly important type of socio-
spatial development, the shrinking city and region, thus contributing to completing the 
picture of new geographies of infrastructure provision drawn by the splintering urbanism 
approach. Furthermore they could reveal general modes of infrastructural 
transformations, socio-spatial selectivity and governance forms in shrinking regions,
whose identification is a precondition for shaping the transformation processes 
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